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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of essays that uses theoretical and experimental methods
to explore institutional persistence, contract structure, and authority.
Chapter One studies the informational and efficiency properties of institutions
that form to reduce moral hazard. While in the short run such mechanisms may
be optimal, in the long run inefficient institutions may persist because information
about changes in the underlying environment is lost. Using experimental and the-
oretical methods, it analyzes a market with high quality and low quality products
that are indistinguishable without a costly certification process. Sellers in the market
make endogenous production decisions and are heterogeneous in their levels of moral
hazard leading to two possible equilibria-non-certifying and certifying-that vary
in both efficiency and information about the underlying environment. The certifying
equilibrium, which does not carry information about changes in the distribution of
sellers, does not adjust when the underlying environment changes, perpetuating a
market structure that makes all market participants weakly worse off.
Chapter Two studies how changes in contract structure may help preserve antiq-
uities. Most countries prohibit the export of certain antiquities. This practice often
leads to illegal excavation and looting for the black market, which damages objects
and destroys important aspects of the archaeological record. Chapter Two argues that
many of the goals for export bans could be better accomplished through the use of
long-term leases which would raise revenue for the country of origin while preserving
national long-term ownership rights.
Chapter Three uses experiments to study how control rights are distributed in a
setting with incentive conflicts. It shows that while effort levels are consistent with
theoretical predictions, principals retain control rights even when it is strongly in
their interest to delegate. Chapter Three also documents a differential response to
authority by gender. As agents, women have strong fairness preferences resulting in
diminished effort in asymmetric treatments but higher effort in symmetric ones. As
principals, women are more likely to transfer authority when it is efficient to do so.
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Chapter 1
The Informational Properties of
Institutions: An Experimental
Study of Persistence in Markets
with Certification
Abstract
This chapter explores the idea that the information externalities inherent in insti-
tutions may contribute to their persistence. Institutions that form to reduce moral
hazard often eliminate discretion and pool the actions of heterogeneous agents so
that agents' types cannot be determined by their actions. While in the short run
such mechanisms may be optimal, in the long run inefficient institutions may persist
because information about changes in the underlying environment is lost. I model
and experimentally analyze a market with high quality and low quality products that
are indistinguishable without a costly certification process. Sellers in the market
make endogenous production decisions and are heterogeneous in their levels of moral
hazard leading to two possible equilibria-non-certifying and certifying-that vary in
both efficiency and information about the underlying environment. I find that the
certifying equilibrium, which does not carry information about changes in the dis-
tribution of sellers, does not adjust when the underlying environment changes. This
leads to the persistence of an inefficient certification institution that makes all market
participants weakly worse off.
1.1 Introduction
Many real world markets and organizations operate in environments with both het-
erogeneous types and moral hazard. In the markets for public debt, for instance, firms
have heterogeneity in project choice and moral hazard in taking risk and truthfully re-
vealing their financial records. In agriculture markets, producers have heterogeneous
costs for using quality inputs and moral hazard in supplying safe food.
Institutions that emerge to reduce moral hazard often do so through certification
and monitoring, which takes discretion away from the individual agents in the market.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for instance, requires standardized auditing across firms and
risk management which constrains some firms from taking undisclosed risks. The FDA
sets certification standards for agriculture products and offers voluntary grading and
certification programs for a variety of US agriculture goods. These programs may
endogenously induce sellers to specific joint production and certification decisions.
By eliminating discretion, certification institutions agglomerate the actions of het-
erogeneous agents so that observing an action may reveal less information about the
type of agent performing it. This pooling of types can eliminate information about
the true state of the world and limit the ability for individuals to learn and make
comparisons between alternative institutions. If the environment changes so that the
certification institution is no longer needed, participants in the market cannot observe
these changes and eliminate the institution.
The persistence of inefficient institutions may have long-term consequences on
the efficiency of many markets and organizations, especially in environments where
the underlying population is stochastic and the optimal institution varies over time.
The persistence of monitoring may lead to a continual expansion of red tape. The
persistence of certification may lead to additional verification costs and reduced com-
petition. The persistence of regulation may lead to increased enforcement costs and
a decrease in intrinsic motivation.
This chapter explores the idea that persistence of agglomerating institutions may
be due to inadequate information-an information externality inherent to the mech-
anism itself. Intuitively, if an institution or market structure suppresses information
about the underlying environment, the institution is likely to persist because infor-
mation necessary to evaluate relative efficiency and coordinate to a new equilibrium
is missing.
I develop a theoretical market with ex ante indistinguishable high quality and
low quality products where a costly certification technology can be adopted by sellers
that guarantees quality. Heterogeneity in production costs divide sellers into three
categories: good sellers who produce high quality units, conditional sellers who have
moral hazard and produce high quality units in the certified market and low quality
units in the uncertified market, and bad sellers who always produce low quality units.
I show that for some initial distributions of seller types, two competitive equilibria
may emerge--non-certifying and certifying-which vary significantly both in terms
of efficiency and in the information they generate about the underlying environment.
* In the non-certifying equilibrium, no seller chooses to certify their product and
the prevailing market price carries information about the proportion of good
sellers. A decrease in the number of good sellers leads to an observable de-
crease in the non-certifying price. This decline in price leads to a potential
arbitrage opportunity for good and conditional sellers by adopting certification
and provides a natural channel by which a market may endogenously adopt
certification.
* In the certifying equilibrium, the certification process is adopted by both good
and conditional sellers so that their actions no longer reveal their types. Changes
in the proportion of sellers between these two groups are not observable by
the market and thus there is no information revealed when market conditions
change. This information externality may lead to inefficient persistence of the
certification institution since the true state of the world is not transmitted
through private nor market information.
I next use laboratory experiments to explore the informational properties of the
certifying and non-certifying equilibrium by comparing their response to changes in
the environment. I design two environments-Safe and Hazardous-which vary in
the composition of sellers in the market. In the safe environment, the proportion of
good sellers in the market is large, thus favoring the formation of the non-certifying
equilibrium. In the hazardous environment, good sellers are replaced with conditional
sellers, leading to significant amounts of moral hazard and the elimination of the non-
certifying equilibrium. I begin half the sessions in the safe environment and switch
to the hazardous environment midway through. In the other half, I reverse the order,
starting in the hazardous environment and ending in the safe environment.
Consistent with the theory, I find that individuals who begin in the safe environ-
ment establish a non-certifying equilibrium and then adapt to the certifying equilib-
rium in response to a change in the underlying environment. Subjects who begin in
the hazardous environment form the certifying equilibrium and remain in this equi-
librium when the environment is changed to safe. This persistence leads to a loss in
efficiency relative to a market where the non-certifying equilibrium initially formed.
Compared to other empirical tools, experimentation has many advantages for
studying informational persistence. First, supply and demand are exogenously set
and do not have to be estimated in conjunction with the parameters of interest. This
allows for more explicit hypothesis tests, exogenous changes to the environment, and
tight control over the number of market equilibria. Second, natural data sets where
certification institutions are eliminated are rare. While this may be an indication
that information is important, it may also be a result of strategic actions taken by
agents with a vested interest in the current institution. In an experimental setting, I
can eliminate this form of agency from the analysis by ensuring that all individuals
can be made weakly better off with the elimination of the certifying equilibrium.
Experimentation also guarantees exogenous variation in seller costs and ensures the
existence of a non-certifying equilibrium through careful assignment of seller costs.
Finally, primitives that are typically unobservable such as beliefs and risk aversion
can be elicited in conjunction with the main experiment and used to study what
forces shape the dynamics of the market.
This chapter contributes to a growing literature on the persistence of institutions.
Whereas the political economy literature, developed by North (1990) and Acemoglu &
Robinson (2006) has centered on the role that agency plays in persistence, I develop an
informational channel of persistence where the informational properties of institutions
themselves endogenously affect long-run outcomes. I show that inefficient institutions
may persist even in an environment where all agents can be made better off. Given
the prevalence of mechanisms that mitigate moral hazard such as red tape, regulation,
certification, and monitoring, this form of informational externality may be of great
importance to the function and efficiency of many markets and organizations.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 relates the current chapter to the
literature. Section 1.3 builds the theoretical model and characterizes its competitive
equilibria in terms of efficiency and information. Section 1.4 develops the experi-
mental design. Section 1.5 reports the main experimental results and is divided into
three parts. Section 1.5.1 looks at initial convergence of the experimental market in
the safe and hazardous environments. Section 1.5.2 demonstrates the difference in
adaptation between the non-certifying and certifying equilibrium. Section 1.5.3 looks
at the welfare consequences of persistence in the certifying equilibrium and section
1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Although the theory in this chapter is, to the best of my knowledge, new, it is similar
to the history dependence, herding, and conventions literature developed by other
authors. History dependent models such as Argenziano & Gilboa (2006) and Tirole
(1996) establish links between actions today and global actions in the future. In Tirole
(1996), for instance, the reputations of members within a group are observed imper-
fectly. A member's current incentives are affected by his past behavior and, because
of imperfect observation, by actions of other agents in his group. The destruction
of reputation in one generation may lead to reduced incentives for reputation for all
future generations and eliminate the ability of the market to restore good faith. By
contrast, my model generates history dependence due to informational differences
between institutional structures. My model is most suitable in situations in which
global coordination can be mutually beneficial to all parties but where deviation from
the current institution requires information that is obscured by the institution itself.
In the herding literature, pioneered by Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
& Welch (1992), and Welch (1992), the ability to observe the actions of past actors
may lead individual agents to follow past play rather than their own signal.' This
can lead to an information cascade where new information is eliminated from the
environment and all agents continue to make the wrong, inefficient choice. Like the
herding literature, my model points out situations in which information needed to
make globally welfare improving changes is eliminated by actions taken in the past.
Whereas the herding literature concentrates on individual-level actions, I concentrate
on the endogenous formation of institutions that globally eliminates information.
In the convention literature, a game with multiple equilibria is augmented with
small amounts of persistent randomness to study how random mutations in strate-
gies might affect the persistence of equilibria. Developed by Foster & Young (1990),
Kandori (1992), and Young (1993), the conventions literature has the appealing char-
acteristic that it often selects a unique equilibrium in games with multiple equilib-
1For more general theoretical treatments of herding, see Chamley (1999) and Smith & Sorensen
(2000). Information cascades have also been studied in the lab by Anderson & Holt (1997) and more
recently by Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers & McKelvey (2007). In both studies, reversals of cascades are
observed in the long run suggesting that individual agents may overweight their own information
and mitigate inefficient herding.
ria.2 This chapter differs from the conventions literature in that it studies a specific
channel by which history and information together might dynamically influence final
outcomes. The informative properties of signals depend critically on the institution
that have formed and thus the probability that individual explore other strategies is
based directly on the institutions that have formed from past play.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Overview
In this section, I build a theoretical framework that illustrates the informational
properties of institutions. I begin by developing a benchmark model of a market with
unobservable quality, costly certification, and heterogeneity in seller types where the
distribution of seller types is known. Using a simple Walrasian approach, I define
and characterize the possible competitive equilibria. I show that two equilibria may
exist, non-certifying and certifying, and that these equilibria vary in terms of both
efficiency and information about the underlying environment.
The model developed here is intentionally stylized in order to concentrate on
market-level information externalities. In order to ensure that there are two stable
equilibria, I use a discrete certification technology. This eliminates many of the com-
plications that out-of-equilibrium beliefs pose to equilibrium selection by ensuring
that payoff relevant states are well defined.3 The baseline model also uses a common
knowledge assumption about the distribution of seller types to reduce complication.
In the appendix, I extend the baseline model to a game theoretic environment where
there is dynamic learning about the distribution of types. Given assumptions on the
learning of buyers and sellers, the prices for which an equilibrium exists as time grows
to infinity are similar to the prices in the static setting.
While the goal of this research is to understand dynamic information effects, I
study the static competitive equilibrium for three reasons. First, from an experimental
perspective, there is clear evidence that experimental markets converge toward the
competitive equilibrium when the trading mechanism is a double auction.4 From
2For an overview of conventions see Ellison (1993). The convention literature has been experi-
mentally explored in Van Huyck (1997) and Van Huyck (2001).
3For problems of existence in a competitive equilibrium with adverse selection, see Rothschild &
Stiglitz (1976). For a more general model of equilibrium selection in a market with adverse selection
and a continuous contract space see Gale (1992).
4See Walker & Williams (1988) for a discussion of convergence across varying institutions.
a theoretical perspective, simultaneous move double auctions also converge to the
competitive equilibrium as the number of players grows large. As such, the use
of a competitive equilibrium as a solution concept is meant to generate reasonable
benchmark predictions for the experimental environment.
Second, the model environment is designed with market power on the sellers' side,
so that all rents from trade are likely to be appropriated by the sellers in any fully-
specified bargaining process. In the appendix, I provide an explicit game-theoretic
auction model. I show that the set of pure strategy equilibria from the game-theoretic
model is identical to the competitive equilibria with the key exception being that the
certifying equilibrium does not exist in an environment where a single good seller, who
chooses to sell an uncertified unit over a certified unit, can generate a new equilibrium.
Finally, any particular dynamic game will be sensitive to assumptions made about
matching, memory, information, updating, bargaining, utility functions, and the for-
mation of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. On the other hand, if agents are anonymous,
trade is frictionless, and the number of players grow large, a few general restrictions
should hold true: A buyer should be able to buy uncertified and certified goods at
the cheapest price he can negotiate, sellers should be able to sell at the highest price
they can negotiate, and all buyers and sellers should be able to enter and exit as
many negotiations as they would like before the final resolution of the market. These
restrictions bring us naturally to outcomes that are ex post stable, a property that
directly leads to a set of prices identical to those in one of the competitive equilibria.
1.3.2 Benchmark Model
I consider a world with high (H) and low (L) quality units. There are N buyers
indexed by i E {1,..., N} divided into a finite number of types b E B. There are
M < N sellers indexed by j E {1,..., M} divided into three types s E {G, C, B}
(Good, Conditional, and Bad). The number of buyers who are of type b is Nb.
Likewise the number of sellers who are of type s is M,. Each buyer can consume a
single high or low quality unit. Likewise, each seller can produce a single high or low
quality unit.
While a more general structure is included for extensions, I initially consider the
case where there is only one type of buyer denoted by bo. Buyers of type bo have
gross utilities for consuming the high and low quality good of UH and UL relative to
a separable numbraire good, are loss and risk neutral, and receive zero utility if they
do not trade.
The quality of units being traded is initially unknown to buyers. Sellers have
available a costly technology that certifies quality. Certification costs T E (0, UH -
UL) and eliminates all uncertainty over the quality of the unit to the buyer. I assume
that certification costs are paid by the seller when a trade occurs and that T is common
knowledge. Since UH > UL, certifying the low quality unit can not increase its value
and thus a certified low quality unit will never be offered by a profit maximizing firm.
I thus omit this choice from the analysis and restrict all certified units to be of high
quality.
Given the choice over certification, buyers and sellers may exchange in three mar-
kets m E M = {C,Nf C, 0}. C is a market for high quality certified units, NAC is a
market of uncertified units, and 0 is a market without trades. In the certified market,
all three types of sellers produce the high quality unit. In the uncertified market, a
seller is free to exchange a unit of either quality.
If a seller exchanges a unit of quality L, she pays a cost of CL which is constant
across all sellers. If a seller exchanges a unit of quality H, she pays a cost CH which
differs by seller type. Types are defined such that
CH  C CH > CL > (1.1)
and
C H > CL + UH - UL - T > CH. (1.2)
Condition 1.1 distinguishes sellers of type-G from those of type-C and type-B by
giving them incentives to produce high quality units if they trade in the uncertified
market. Condition 1.2 distinguishes type-C sellers from type-B sellers by giving type-
C sellers incentives to adopt the certification institution and produce high quality
goods if the market price for low quality goods is sufficiently low.
As will be shown later, the adoption of certification by sellers of type C alters their
production decision so that it coincides with the social optimum. In a proscriptive
sense, the formation of a certifying equilibrium resolves the problem of hidden action
for sellers of type C. I thus define the "degree of moral hazard" in the environment
as the proportion of sellers who are of type C. Let the proportion of sellers who are
type G, C, and B be given by g, c, and b respectively where g = EL.
Definition 1 Degree of moral hazard: The proportion of type-C sellers c.
I make the simplifying assumption that CL < UL so that trade is potentially
welfare improving. In order to easily analyze the welfare implications of the model, I
make the additional assumption that CH  C L < U H  UL so that the total surplus
created from producing a high quality good is always higher than producing a low
quality good.
A buyer of type b E 1 who matches with a seller of type s E {G, C, B} in market
m E M at price Pm receives utility u(m, p m , b, s). The market affects this utility by
restricting the set of actions that a seller can take. For instance, if a buyer matches
with a type-C seller in market ArC, the conditional seller is free to exchange a unit
of either high or low quality and optimally supplies a low quality unit. If the buyer
had matched with the same seller in market C, the conditional seller is constrained
and would supply a high quality unit. In the baseline case:
UH _ pC ifm E C,s E {G,C,B}
u(m, Pm , bo, s)= UH - pNC ifm E JVC,s E {G} (1.3)
ULp-NC if mE AC, sE {C,B}.
Similarly, a seller of type s who matches with a buyer of type b in market m at
price pm receives utility v(m, pm, b, s). A seller maximizes expected value and thus,
given optimal action in both markets, has a utility function of:
v(m, Pm, b, s) =
-T if mEC, sE{G,C,B},
if m E NC, s E {G}, (1.4)
if m E NAC, s { C, B}.
Note that in the baseline case v(m, Pm, b, s) is independent of b.
The description of the competitive equilibrium is comprised of three parts: an
attainable allocation (D, S), a belief system p, and a price system P.
Attainable Allocations: The number of buyers of type b who demand from
market m is denoted by D(m, b). An allocation of buyers is a function D :
M x B - I+ such that EmEMD(m, b) = Nb. Likewise, the number of sellers of
type s E {G, C, B} who supply in market m is denoted by S(m, s). An allocation
of sellers is a function S : M x {G, C, B} - I+ such that EmeMS(m, s) = Ms.
An allocation (D, S) is attainable iff E1E{G,c,B}S(m, s) = EbEBD(m, b) for m E
{C, .nC}. Note that the market clearing condition is not binding in the 0
market.
Belief System: Buyers and sellers form beliefs about the types of agents ex-
changing each contract. Let Ab(m, s) denote the subjective probability that a
unit purchased in market m by a buyer is in fact supplied by a seller of type s.
Let p~(m, b) denote the subjective probability that a unit sold in market m by
a seller is in fact bought by a buyer of type b. A belief system is a pair of beliefs
A = (Pb, 8) such that ALb(m, s) : Mx {G, C, B} -- R+ satisfies EsIb(m, s) = 1
for every m and M,,(m, b) : M x B -+ R+ satisfies Eb1us(m, b) = 1 for every m.
Price System: A price system is a function P : M --+ R+. I define PC, pn'c, p 0
as the prices in each market.
Suppose that a buyer of type b purchases a unit in market m at price Pm . If the
buyer's beliefs are given by pb(m, s), his expected utility is given by
Eu(m, Pm, b, s)1b(m, s), (1.5)
where u(m, Pm, b, s) is the utility received when a seller sells her market constrained
optimal unit to the buyer. A buyer will choose a market that maximizes equation
(1.5). Consequently, an equilibrium allocation must assign all buyers of type b to
markets that are in the arg max of equation (1.5):
D(m*, b) f 0 4 m* E arg max Eu(m, P m, b, s)Lb(m, S) Vb. (1.6)
m
Likewise, suppose that a seller sells a unit in market m at price Pm. If the seller's
beliefs are given by /u,(m, b) her expected utility is given by
E,v(m, Pm , b, s)p,(m, b), (1.7)
where v(m, pm, b, s) is the value the seller receives from selling her optimal unit to
a buyer of type b subject to the constrains of the market she has entered. Like the
buyer, any competitive equilibrium requires:
S(m*, s) $0 , m* E arg max Ebv(m, p m , b, s)p,(m, b) Vs. (1.8)
m
Finally, the belief that a unit in a market is supplied by a seller of type s is
equal to the proportion of agents selling in a market of a specific type. Likewise, the
probability a unit in a market is bought by a buyer of type b is proportion to the agents
buying in a market of that type. If a market has no trades in equilibrium, then these
proportions are not well-defined and beliefs may be arbitrary. In the entire analysis,
I look at the case where there is at least one type-B seller who always trades in the
uncertified market. Thus buyers' beliefs about the uncertified market are always well
defined. Since the utility of other trades do not depend on beliefs, there is never a
case where an equilibrium is supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Definition 2 Competitive Equilibrium: A Competitive Equilibrium is a triple
((D x S), p, P) consisting of an attainable allocation (D x S), beliefs p, and a price
system P which satisfy:
E.1 : S(m*, s) $ 0 4 m* E arg maxm Ebv(m, pm , b, s),s(m, b) Vs,
E.2: D(m*, b) $ 0 - m* E arg maxm Eu(m, P m , b, s)Ab(m, s) Vb,
E.3: b(m, ) S(m,s) and ,(m, b) = D(m,b)E8S(m,s) - EbD(m,b)
Analysis of the competitive equilibrium is simplified by two characteristics of the
benchmark environment. First, the sellers valuation v(m, pm, b, s) is independent
of the buyer that she is matched with and thus p,u(m, b) does not affect the sellers
decision. It follows that condition (E.1) can be reduced to
E.lb : S(m*, s) $ 0 4 m* E arg maxm Ebu(m, pm, b, s) Vs,
which is the requirement that all sellers enter the market where the difference between
price and the cost of their constrained optimal production choice is largest. Second,
since all buyers share the same utility function given in equation (1.3), only beliefs
about MIb(NAC, G) affect utility. Since sellers actions only depend on prices, I define
a function rH(AP) where 7rH : P --+ [0, 1] is a buyers beliefs about the proportion
of high quality units in the uncertified market for a difference in prices of AP. Note
that 7"H(AP) = Ib(AfC, G) for AP = PC _ pC.
Given these two simplifications, I solve for the set of competitive equilibrium in
two steps. I first determine the set of S(m, s) that satisfy (E.lb) for each potential
price system P. I then determine the set of D(m, b) for which (E.2) is satisfied for
each potential price system P and (correct) belief system pb(m, s). I restrict attention
to the case where MB > 1 so that Ib(AfC, s) is well defined.
Supply Decisions by Sellers
For a price system P, a seller produces in the certified market if
v(C, pC, b, s) > v(AfC, pNC, b, s). (1.9)
For all sellers, this reduces to the condition
PC - CH - T > pnC _ mi(CsH , CL). (1.10)
-- · C
Define P and as the maximum willingness to pay for a certified unit across all
buyers. Similarly, define p"hic as the minimum willingness to pay across all buyers for
an uncertified unit. In the baseline model PC = UH and P"c = UL. In equilibrium
it will be the case that PNC < p'C < pC < P so that i) AP is always either zero or
positive and ii) both buyers and sellers have incentive to trade in either the certified
or uncertified market for prices within these bounds. Given the definition of Good,
Conditional, and Bad seller types:
* A seller of type G has CG < CL and will always produce high quality units. A
type-G seller will trade in the uncertified market if AP < T.
* A seller of type C has CCH E (CL, CL + 75P-PAc - T) and will produce either
low quality units to the uncertified market or high quality units to the certified
market. A type-C seller will trade to the uncertified market if AP < T+ (CCH
CL).
* A seller of type B has C'H > CL PC _ p N C - T. Given the bounds on possible
prices, type-B sellers never sell high quality units and will always produce low
quality units in the uncertified market.
Lemma 1 For a price system P with PA/C < paC < PC < pc.
SMG if AP < T
S(C, G) = [0, MG] E if AP-T,
0 otherwise
MC if AP < T + CgH - CL
S(C, C) = [0, Mc] E + if AP = T +C-CL,
0 otherwise
S(C,B) = {0 if AP (0,- P C)
S(.NC, s) = Ms - S(C, s) for s E {G, C, B}.
Proof. All proofs given in the appendix. m
Demand Decisions by Buyers
Suppose that a type b0 buyer has a choice of buying a certified unit at price pC
or a non-certified unit at price pNC. Let rH(AP) be a buyer's belief about the
proportion of high quality units in the uncertified market given the difference in price
between certified and uncertified units. A buyer is indifferent between purchasing in
the certified and uncertified market if
7rH(Ap)UH + (1 - PrH(Ap))UL - pNC = UH _ pC (1.11)
Lemma 2 In Equilibrium:
* If AP > T the buyer believes that all type-G sellers will certify their goods and
thus that rHH(Ap) = 0. In this case, a risk neutral buyer prefers to purchase the
certified unit as long as AP < UH - L PC--PNC and is indifferent between
buying a non-certified unit and not purchasing if pNC = UL.
* If AP < T the buyer believes that all sellers trade in the uncertified market.
In this case 7rH(AP) = g and a risk neutral buyer prefers to purchase the
uncertified unit as long as AP > (1 - g)(UH - UL).
1.3.3 Market Equilibria
Since there are more buyers than sellers and all buyers have identical utility functions,
buyers must be indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing a unit of the good.
Setting payoffs in equation (1.11) equal to zero yields the following two equilibria:5
* Certifying Equilibrium: pC = UH, pNC - UL. Type-G and type-C sellers
produce and sell certified high quality units. Type-B sellers produce uncertified
low quality units.
* Non-certifying Equilibrium: PNC = UH - (1 - g)(UH _ UL), pc = UH.
Type-G sellers produce uncertified high quality units. Type-C and type-B
sellers produce uncertified L-quality units. All buyers buy from the uncertified
market.
5In general, a partial-certifying equilibrium will also exist where AP = T and type-G sellers
are indifferent to trading in the certified and uncertified market. In the baseline model, since all
buyers have the same utility function and seller types are discrete, the partial-certifying equilibrium
is degenerate. See section 1.3.3 for an extension of the model where partial-certifying equilibria are
more likely to exist.
Theorem 1 Existence: The Certifying Equilibrium always exists. The Non-
Certifying equilibrium exists if (1 - g)(UH - UL) < T.
Multiplicity occurs in this market due to the cost associated with certification
which diminishes the incentive of type-G sellers to identify the quality of their product.
The existence of the non-certifying equilibrium requires the cost of certification to be
larger than the discount that buyers require to trade for uncertified goods. This will
be the case if, for instance, the proportion of type-G sellers is high.
When the price difference between the certified and uncertified market is large,
type-G sellers will respond by selling in the certified market. Since the probability of
receiving an high quality unit in the uncertified market is zero, a buyers' willingness to
pay for uncertified units falls to UL and the difference in price between the uncertified
and certified markets becomes AP = UH - UL = - _ pNC. Type-C sellers, defined
as having CCH - CL < pC _ pNC - T, also choose to certify since the profit gained
from switching markets is greater than the increase in production and transaction
costs.
Welfare
The relative welfare of the non-certifying and certifying equilibrium depend critically
on the degree of moral hazard in the market and the cost of certification. For type-C
sellers, the adoption of certification increases the quality of their goods. Not factoring
in the certification cost, this leads to a efficiency gain of:
Mc[UH - UL - (CCH - CL)]. (1.12)
However, in the certifying equilibrium, both type-G and type-C sellers certify their
product leading to a total certification cost of:
(Me + Mc)T. (1.13)
Combining the two terms and normalizing by M yields:
Theorem 2 The non-certifying equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient if
(g + c)T > c[UH - UL - (CH - CL)]. (1.14)
Otherwise, the certifying equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient.
The certifying equilibrium is likely to be efficient when the degree of moral hazard
in the environment c is high and the proportion of type-G sellers in the environment
is low. It is also more likely to be efficient if the cost of certification T is low or the
additional surplus for altering the production decision of a conditional type from low
quality units to high quality units is large.
Market Information
Suppose that a sequence of markets generate either the certifying or non-certifying
equilibrium above. If a new homogeneous buyer enters the market and can observe
price and the volume of trades in each market, what can he deduce about the pro-
portion of sellers who are good, conditional, and bad?
In the certifying equilibrium, the prices pC = UH and pNC = UL only provide
information about the demand function of buyers. Since only bad sellers trade in the
non-certified market, the share of goods traded in the uncertified market provides
information on the proportion of sellers who are of type-B but provides no additional
information about the relative proportion of type-G and type-C sellers.
By contrast, in the non-certifying equilibrium, the non-certifying price pNC
UH - (1-g)(UH - UL) carries information about the proportion of good sellers. Given
only the non-certifying price, any agent in the market can determine the proportion
of the sellers who are of type G. Since no sellers certify their units, sellers of type C
and type B are indistinguishable.
Theorem 3 In a non-certifying equilibrium, price is a sufficient statistic for the
proportion of type-G sellers in the environment. In the certifying equilibrium, no
market signal generates information that can distinguish between type-G and type-C
sellers.
The difference in information that is generated in a market with or without the
adoption of the certification institution is stark. In the non-certifying equilibrium,
the proportion of type-G sellers in the market can be inferred directly from the mar-
ket price, a primitive that is inherently observable in the market. In the certifying
equilibrium, no information is generated when the proportion of type-G and type-C
sellers changes. This may lead to persistence of the certification institution since the
true state of the world is not transmitted through individual and group decisions.
Loss Aversion, and Partial Certification and Public Information
One interesting corollary from the previous section is that if a market has converged
to a certifying or non-certifying equilibrium, ex post revelation of uncertified trades
does not generate new information about the distribution of seller types. In the
case of the non-certifying equilibrium, this result arises because the pooling price is
a sufficient statistic for the proportion of type-G sellers in the market. In the case
of the certifying equilibrium, this result occurs due to only low quality units being
traded in the uncertified market.
In an experimental setting, agents typically exhibit some aversion toward accept-
ing actuarially fair gambles. This section briefly comments on how differences in the
willingness to accept gambles can lead to a partial-certifying equilibrium where ex
post disclosure of trade quality can generate new informative. Due to its tractable
nature and players' responses to survey questions at the end of the experiment, I
model the aversion toward gambles using loss aversion. All the results of this section
carry over to alternative models using risk or ambiguity aversion. A full discussion
of both loss aversion and the partial certifying equilibrium in relation to learning is
included in the appendix.
Suppose that some buyers are loss averse and put a greater weight on aggregate
losses than gains. Let B = {A1, A2,..., AN} where Ai is the idiosyncratic loss aversion
parameter for buyer i with Ai > 1 for i E {1, 2, ..., N}. Without loss of generality, I
order buyers according to their risk aversion parameter such that A1 < A2 < ... N
and again normalize the utility obtained from not trading to zero.
For a price system P with _pAC < pAc <pC < - a buyer i buying from market
m at price P m from a seller of type s gets utility
UH _ pc if m E C,s E {G, C, B}
u(m,Pm , Pm s)= UH _ pnK if m E AC, s E {G} . (1.15)
-Ai(P N c - UL) if m E ANC, s E {C, B}
In the non-certifying equilibrium, the market price PN'C > UL and there is a potential
for losses in the market. Since buyers are heterogeneous in loss aversion, the aggregate
demand curve for uncertified units becomes downward sloping and the uncertified
price is pinned down by the loss aversion of the Mth buyer. If the Mth buyer is
sufficiently loss averse, he may be unwilling to trade for uncertified units at a price
where AP > T. In this case, partial certifying equilibria may form. Let Sc be
the number of certified units in an equilibrium. Then for each Sc < MG, a partial
certifying equilibrium may exist with the following properties:
* Partial-Certifying Equilibrium: PNC = UH - T, pC = UH. Type-C and
type-B sellers produce uncertified low quality units. Sc type-G sellers produce
certified uncertified high quality goods. MG - Sc type-G sellers produce high
quality goods. Buyers i E {1,..., M - Sc } buy uncertified units. S c other
buyers buy certified units.
In the benchmark model, the partial-certifying equilibrium was degenerate because
both type-G sellers and all buyers needed to be indifferent between trading in the
certified and uncertified market. With heterogeneity in buyer preferences, however,
partial-certifying equilibrium may be stable since the willingness to pay for uncertified
units is decreasing in loss aversion leading to a downward sloping aggregate demand
function.
In the partial certifying equilibrium, since PNC = UH - T and pC = UH, price
alone does not convey information about the proportion of type-G sellers. However,
there are two pieces of information that can be used in estimation. First, the certified
market is composed entirely of type-G sellers. Second, the buyer with the highest
level of risk aversion must be willing to trade in the uncertified market. Combining
these two elements, a lower bound for g can be constructed:
M(UH - UL _ T)AM-SC + SCT
M(UH - UL - T)AM-SC + MT'
g can be thought of as the smallest proportion of type-G sellers that could support
the partial certifying equilibrium at a given time. For instance, if S c = 0 and AM = 0,
then equation (1.16) reduces to
g > (U H  ULT) (1.17)(UH - UL)
which is a rewriting of the necessary condition for existence of the non-certifying
equilibrium given in Theorem 1. As is clear from this example, g may be far away
from the true proportion of type-G sellers leading to limited inference from market
information alone.
Since there are both high and low quality units being traded in the uncertified
market and inference is imperfect, public information about the proportion of high
quality units in the uncertified market can generate new information unavailable from
market signals. If, for instance, the number of uncertified units was publicly revealed
in a partial-certifying equilibrium, an observer could determine the proportion of type-
G sellers in the environment by adding the number of high units in the uncertified
market to the size of the certified market and dividing by M.
1.4 The Experiment
In the theory section, I developed and characterized the set of possible market equi-
libria that could arise in a world with moral hazard, costly certification, and seller
heterogeneity. I showed that if an equilibrium forms where a certification institution
is adopted, information about the degree of moral hazard in the underlying environ-
ment was eliminated. This could lead to persistence of inefficient institutions since
information about changes in the underlying environment was lost.
In this section I empirically explore the informational properties of institutions via
laboratory experiments. The experimental treatments are designed to study the ini-
tial formation of non-certifying and certifying equilibria, adaptation of these market
equilibria to changes in the underlying environment, and the information generated
in the market. I use a pre/post design in which there were two environments - Safe
and Hazardous - which vary in the composition of sellers in the market. In the safe
environment, the proportion of good sellers in the market is large, thus favoring the
formation of the non-certifying equilibrium. In the hazardous environment, the pro-
portion of good sellers is small, so only the certifying equilibrium should exist. I begin
half the sessions in the safe environment and switch to the hazardous environment
midway through. In the other half, I reverse the order, starting in the hazardous
environment and ending in the safe environment.
Compared to other empirical tools, experimentation has many advantages for
studying informational persistence. First, supply and demand are exogenously set
and do not have to be estimated in conjunction with the parameters of interest. This
generates more explicit hypothesis tests, allows for exogenous changes to the environ-
ment, and guarantees that alternative market equilibria do or do not exist. Second,
experimentation allows for the isolation of the information channel and eliminates
other potential channels of persistence. Finally, primitives that are typically unob-
servable such as beliefs and risk aversion can be elicited in conjunction with the main
experiment and used to study what forces shape the dynamics of the market.
Where possible, the experimental design matches the model developed in the
previous section. I choose to allow buyers and sellers to trade multiple units and
implement a downward sloping demand function in an effort to increase stability in
the market. Multiple units increase the thickness of the market in each period and
allow for an excess demand without the use of passive buyers who might cause noise in
the experiment by trying to play. A downward sloping demand function also generates
some surplus for the buyers, which has been shown by Holt, Langan & Villamil (1986)
to improve the speed of convergence in markets. The supply and demand curves are
constructed so that no seller or buyer could change the equilibrium price by more
than 10 points by withholding their entire supply or demand from the market. Since
no buyer or seller has market power, the competitive equilibrium for the experimental
environment varies only slightly from the simplified model of section 1.3.2.
1.4.1 Overview
I constructed an experimental market where each subject was assigned to the role
of buyer or a seller and allowed to exchange units of two possible qualities: a high
quality "red" unit and a low quality "blue" unit. Buyers and sellers had access to
two possible markets - an uncertified market and certified market - each conducted
simultaneously as a double auction.
Each experimental session consisted of 6 sellers and 5 buyers. Sellers could produce
a maximum of two units creating an aggregate supply of 12 units. Buyers could each
purchase up to a total of three units creating an aggregate demand of 15 units. Excess
demand in the market was implemented to allow sellers to capture any residual surplus
that existed in either of the two markets and to capture rents generated through
certification.
The main experiment lasted 24 periods and was composed of two phases: the
market game and a bonus game. The market game consisted of two simultaneous
double auctions - one with certification and one without - in which buyers and
sellers were anonymous and could not create reputations. In the first three periods of
the experiment, the market game lasted four minutes to allow for subjects to become
accustomed to the interface. In the remaining periods, the market game lasted two
minutes.
In the bonus game, subjects were asked to guess how many of the sellers had
lower cost for producing the high valued unit than the low valued unit. If a subject
correctly guessed the proportion of type-G sellers in the market, they earned a bonus
for the round. I tracked responses for the bonus game across periods and use them
as a proxy for beliefs about the underlying degree of moral hazard in the game.
Experimental treatments were designed to study the initial formation of non-
certifying and certifying equilibria, how these market equilibria adapt to changes in
the underlying environment, and the information generated in the market. Experi-
mental sessions were divided into four treatments which varied in the degree of moral
hazard (the number of type-C sellers) and in the amount of public information avail-
able about past trades. In half the sessions, subjects began in a Safe (S) environment
where the degree of moral hazard was low and switched to a Hazardous (7-) environ-
ment with a high degree of moral hazard at period 13. The order of environments
was reversed in the remaining sessions.
Ex post information about the quality of uncertified trades may improve inference
about the underlying environment in market where a partial-certifying equilibrium
forms. To test this idea, I introduced an information treatment where subjects were
informed about the number of high and low quality units traded in the uncertified
market in the previous period. This data was used in conjunction with beliefs data
from the bonus game to study the informational properties of the non-certifying
equilibrium.
Finally, after the main experiment, risk and loss aversion measures were con-
structed based on a risk aversion game and an exit survey. In the risk aversion game,
subjects made a decision between a safe gamble and a series of risky gambles that
varied in their expected value. The number of safe choices was recorded as a measure
of risk aversion. In the buyers version of the survey, buyers were asked how they
decided upon a price they were willing to pay for an uncertified good. 53% of buyers
responded to this question by saying that they were unwilling to take losses on an
uncertified trade. As a measure of loss aversion, I coded a binary variable which was
one if a subject wrote that they were "unwilling to take losses" and zero otherwise.6
1.4.2 Valuations and Trading Mechanism
In an experimental period, each of the six sellers could sell a total of two units across
both markets in any combination of high and low quality. Trades were conducted in
points and converted to Swiss Francs at the end of the experiment at a conversion
rate of 30 points to 1 Swiss franc (37 points to 1 Dollar US).
6The loss aversion parameter will be covered in greater detail in sections 1.4.5 and 1.5.1
As shown in Table 1.1, sellers could be assigned one of three possible cost functions
for producing high and low quality units which I designate as G, C, and B. Following
the theory model, type-G sellers had a lower cost for producing a high quality unit,
type-C sellers were conditional, and type-B sellers sold uncertified low quality units
only.
Table 1.1: Seller Costs
Uncertified Low Uncertified High Certified High
G 50 30 90
C 50 80 140
B 50 130 190
The certification cost, known to both buyers and sellers, was 60 points. If the
difference in price between the certified and uncertified market grew larger than the
certification cost, type-G sellers had an incentive to sell a high quality unit in the
certified market rather than a high quality unit in the uncertified market. Likewise if
the difference in price between the certified and uncertified market grew larger than
90, type-C sellers had an incentive to sell a high unit in the certified market rather
than a low unit in the uncertified market.
In an experimental period, each of the five buyers could purchase a total of three
units across both markets. As shown in Table 1.2, each buyer's demand schedule was
downward sloping. Conditional on buying a unit, the valuation of both the high and
low quality units declined for each unit purchased. Thus, if buyer 1 had purchased a
low quality unit and then purchased a high quality unit, he would have received 140
points for the first purchase and 220 for the second minus the price he paid for each
unit. The demand functions of buyers four and five were staggered slightly to smooth
the aggregate demand function.
Table 1.2: Buyer Valuations
Buyers 1-3 Buyers 4-5
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3
High 240 220 200 High 230 210 190
Low 140 120 100 Low 130 110 90
Earnings from one period did not carry over into the following periods. At the
start of each period, buyers were given 100 points as an initial cash endowment. After
each trade within a period, the type of unit purchased was revealed and his earnings
or losses from the transaction were added to or subtracted from his current cash. If
at any point in a period a buyer's total cash was negative, he was not allowed to
make further trades until the start of the next period. This form of bankruptcy was
only observed in two instances across all experimental sessions.
Information about seller costs and buyer valuations was private information. Sell-
ers were shown the three possible cost functions that they might be assigned in the
instructions and told that their cost schedule might change across periods. Sellers
were not given information on the assignment of other sellers or on the demand
schedule of the buyers. Buyers were given only their own demand schedule and were
informed via the discussion of the bonus game that some of the sellers might have a
lower cost for producing high valued units than low valued units. Buyers and sellers
were both informed about the actual cost of certification.
Trading in the market was conducted through a computerized exchange where
both buyers and sellers were anonymous and the only distinguishable feature between
the various seller offers and buyer bids were the public price and quality characteristics
available in each of the two exchanges.
A seller who posted an offer to the uncertified market publicly submitted an asking
price and secretly selected the quality of the offered unit. During the period, quality
was revealed only to the buyer who purchased the unit and was not publicly disclosed
to the market. A buyer who bid in the uncertified market publicly submitted a bid
price and a quality request. Quality requests in the uncertified market were not
binding and a seller who filled a request had the option of supplying either quality
good.
In the certified market, the quality of the seller's offer was observable and quality
requests by buyers were binding. If a seller transacted in the certified market, either
by having an offer accepted or fulfilling a buyer's trade request, she was charged the
certification fee of 60 points.
In each period, a history of trades from the current period was available in graph
form for all subjects in the market. Certified trades showed up in this graph in the
color of the actual unit traded while uncertified trades showed up as black lines.
Each seller could have one certified offer and one uncertified offer open at one time.
Likewise, each buyer could have one certified bid and one uncertified bid open at any
given time. If a seller sold her last unit or a buyer exhausted his demand, all remaining
open contracts were automatically withdrawn from the market. Bids and offers could
be changed or withdrawn at any time with no restriction on pricing. Agents could
select any offer from the opposite side of the market and were not bound to accept
the lowest possible price.
1.4.3 Bonus Game
In the bonus game, individuals were asked to guess how many of the sellers had lower
cost for producing the high quality unit than for producing the low quality unit. If a
subject correctly guessed the proportion of type-G sellers in the market, they earned
a 20 point bonus for the round. The monetary payment for the bonus game was
intentionally low to ensure that subjects did not change actions in the market game
for the sole purpose of gaining information to increase their bonus game earnings.
I tracked responses for the bonus game across periods and use them as a proxy for
beliefs about the underlying degree of moral hazard in the market.
1.4.4 Treatments
Experimental treatments were designed to study 1) the initial formation of equilibria,
2) how these market equilibria adapt to changes in the underlying environment, and
3) the information generated by the market. Experimental sessions were divided into
four treatments which varied in the degree of moral hazard (the number of type-C
sellers) and in the amount of public information available about past trades. In half
the sessions, subjects began in a safe (S) environment where the degree of moral
hazard was low and switched to a hazardous (R-) environment with a high degree
of moral hazard at period 13. This order was reversed in the remaining sessions.
To distinguish between periods before and after the switch, I use Pre and Post
superscript appended to the environment identifier.
Table 1.3: Treatments
Treatment Periods 1-12 Periods 13-24 Information Identifiers
1 Safe Hazardous Private SPre ,'Post
2 Safe Hazardous Public SPre ,'Post
3 Hazardous Safe Private 7WPre ,SPst
4 Hazardous Safe Public 7 -Pre ,SPst
The hazardous and safe environments varied in the number of sellers who were
assigned to the three seller types. In the safe environment, five of the sellers were of
type G and one seller was of type B. In the hazardous environment, one seller was of
type G, four sellers were of type C, and one seller was of type B. The single type-B
seller was included in both treatments in order to have both certified and uncertified
prices available when the certifying equilibrium formed.
Table 1.4: Moral Hazard Environments
Good Conditional Bad
Safe (S) 5 0 1
Hazardous (7-H) 1 4 1
The hazardous environment was designed so that only the certifying equilibrium
existed. This single equilibrium design was adopted for two reasons. First the exis-
tence of the non-certifying equilibrium environment for intermediate distributions of
good and conditional sellers depended critically on the distribution of loss aversion in
the buyer population. Given that I could not directly control the loss preferences of
individuals and maintain a random sample, I elected to study the polar cases where
the existence of equilibria were clear. Second, the experiments run in this chapter
were meant as a baseline for future research into institution adoption. As such, I
started with the treatments that I expected to be the most stable so that future
experimental work had a baseline on which to compare results.
The safe environment was designed so that under full information about the distri-
bution of types, the certifying equilibrium was extremely unlikely to form or persist.
Under full information, if a single type-G sellers switched to the uncertified market, a
loss neutral buyer who knew the proportion of agents in each market would be willing
to pay .5UH + .5UL for an uncertified good and UH for an uncertified good. Since
UH - UL was 100 points across all units, the difference in willingness to pay for a
certified and an uncertified unit was .5(UH - UL) = 50. This difference was less than
the certification cost of 60 points. Thus under full information, a paired deviation
from the certifying equilibrium by a seller and risk neutral buyer could eliminate the
certifying equilibrium.
If all buyers were loss neutral, the non-certifying and separating equilibrium under
the safe treatment were as follows:
* Non-Certifying Equilibria for Safe Environment : pNC = 183. type-G
sellers produce uncertified H quality units for a surplus of 153 points per unit.
Type B sellers produce uncertified L quality units for a surplus of 133 per unit.
* Certifying Equilibrium for Safe Environment : PC = 200, pNC = 100.
Type G sellers sell certified H quality units for a surplus of 133 per unit. Type
B sellers produce uncertified L quality units for a surplus of 50 per unit.
Prices in these equilibria were determined by the valuation for the twelfth unit traded.
Under loss and risk neutral preferences, this corresponded to the marginal valuation
of Unit 3 for a buyer with the higher set of valuations.
Comparing the two equilibria, type-G sellers received a surplus of 153 points in
the non-certifying equilibrium versus 133 points in the separating equilibrium. The
type-B seller received a surplus of 133 points in the non-certifying equilibrium versus
50 points in the certifying equilibrium. All sellers were thus better off in the non-
certifying equilibrium and had group incentives to coordinate to this equilibrium.
In the safe environment, if a single type-G seller traded both of her units in
the uncertified market, the proportion of high quality units in the uncertified market
would have been 1/2. If the proportion of high and low quality units in the uncertified
market were known, a loss neutral buyer who knew this proportion would be willing
to pay 150 for an uncertified unit versus 200 for a certified unit. Since the difference
in price between the two markets was less than the certification cost of 60, switching
to the uncertified market would lead to greater profit for all sellers.
As the statements above indicate, the non-certifying equilibrium was more efficient
than the certifying equilibrium under the safe environment. If the quality of both
goods was known without certification, the globally efficient outcome was for all seller
types to produce the high quality good. In this perfect world, the total efficiency
of the safe environment would be EUiH - EC H = 2100. Under the non-certifying
equilibrium, the type-B seller was expected to produce two low quality units rather
than high quality units leading to an expected efficiency of 2060. Similarly, under the
certifying equilibrium, the total expected efficiency in the market was 1460.
Table 1.5: Efficiency
Perfect Information non-certifying Certifying
Safe 2100* 2060 1460
Hazardous 1700* 1100* 1060
*not supportable as an equilibrium
Ex post information about the quality of uncertified trades may provide new
information about the underlying environment to buyers and sellers in a market where
a partial-certifying equilibrium forms. To test this idea, I introduced an information
treatment where subjects were informed about the number of high and low quality
units traded in the uncertified market in the previous period. This data was used
in conjunction with beliefs data from the bonus game to study the informational
properties of the non-certifying equilibrium. Information was given ex post rather
than during the trading period to eliminate intra period strategic waiting that would
make the trading patterns of the private and public information treatments different.
1.4.5 Risk and Loss Aversion
After all 24 periods of the main experiment, subjects participated in a risk aversion
game and an exit survey. In the risk aversion game, subjects made a series of decisions
between a guaranteed return of 90 points and a 50-50 gamble between earning 0 and
x, where x varied between 90 and 300 in increments of 30. I recorded the number of
decisions in which the agent chose the safe gamble and used this as a proxy for risk
preferences. A high risk score corresponded to more risk aversion.
After the risk experiment, subjects were asked to fill out a survey prior to payment.
In the buyers version of the survey, buyers were asked:
* How did you decide on the price you were willing to pay for an uncertified good?
53% of buyers responded to this question by saying that they were unwilling to
take losses on an uncertified trade. As a measure of loss aversion, I coded a binary
variable which was one if a subject wrote that they were "unwilling to take losses"
and zero otherwise. I included in the loss averse group two subjects who reported
they they were unwilling to make an uncertified trade that was guaranteed a profit
of at least 5.
While it is somewhat unsatisfying to use survey data for a measure of loss aversion,
there are a number of reasons to believe that the measure is capturing heterogeneity
of loss preferences. First, the survey question itself did not prompt subjects to talk
about losses. Given that all the responses coded for loss aversion explicitly talk of
an unwillingness to take a losses, it is likely that this is an issue of loss aversion
rather than risk aversion. Second, as will be shown in section 1.5.1, there is a clear
distinction in the riskiness of trades carried out by those who self report loss aversion
than to those who do not.
1.4.6 Experimental Protocol
Subjects for this experiment were volunteers recruited through a database maintained
at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. The subject pool was primarily
comprised of undergraduate students from the University of Zurich and UTH-Zurich.
Given the complexity of the experiment, I actively recruited subjects who were expe-
rienced in participating in laboratory economic experiments. I excluded economic and
psychology students from participating and only permitted each subject to participate
in one experimental session.
Subjects were recruited in groups of 33 and randomly assigned to the role of
buyer or seller in one of three simultaneous experimental sessions. Subjects were
given extensive written and oral instructions which explained the trading interface,
valuations, market procedures, bonus game, and payments. All subjects took a small
quiz to ensure they understood how trading worked and how their profits for trading
in the certified and uncertified market were calculated.
Once all subjects had finished reading the written instructions, a verbal summary
of the experiment was read aloud and subjects began a short computer program that
allowed them to become accustomed to all the components of the computer interface.
Each seller and buyer was given the chance to post a bid or offer, accept a bid or
offer, and play the bonus game. No prices were presented in the computer program
to prevent spillover from the practice market to the real market.
Subjects next played all 24 periods of the main experiment. A period of the
main experiment consisted of the market game, the bonus game, and an information
screens that varied between the information treatments. In the private information
treatment, individuals were given a summary of their trades at the close of each
trading period prior to playing the bonus game. In the public information session,
this summary screen also included the total number of uncertified low, uncertified
high, certified low, and certified high trades from the previous period.
At the conclusion of the market game, subjects participated in the risk aversion
game and the final survey. I randomly selected 6 of the periods for payment at the
end of the main experiment. Including the final questionnaire an experimental session
lasted between 2 and 2.5 hours and paid an average of 45 Swiss Francs ($38). All
programs for this experiment were written in Z-Tree. 7 Sessions were run in Zurich at
the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics and conducted in Swiss German.
1.5 Experimental Results
Analysis of the experiment is divided into three parts: Initial convergence, adaptation,
and welfare. Individual session level data as well as some preliminary findings on belief
7See Fischbacher (2007) for a description of Z-Tree.
formation and information is located in the appendix.
1. Initial Convergence: In section 1.5.1, I compare the equilibrium that forms
under the safe and hazardous environments absent a preexisting market orga-
nization. I find that in the hazardous environment the certifying equilibrium
forms and under the safe environment a non-certifying or partial-non-certifying
equilibrium forms. I then study how aggregate levels of loss aversion influence
the non-certifying price and the formation of the partial certifying equilibrium.
2. Adaptation: In section 1.5.2, I study how the non-certifying and certifying
equilibrium adapt to changes in the environment. I find that the non-certifying
equilibrium adapts to the certifying equilibrium when the environment changes
from safe to hazardous while the certifying equilibrium persists when the envi-
ronment changes from hazardous to safe. Looking at the dynamics of the mar-
ket, I find that when a market is non-certifying initially and the environment
changes from safe to hazardous, the composition of uncertified units changes
leading to a gradual change in price and ultimately a shift from uncertified to
certified trades. In markets that reach the certifying equilibrium, there is no
observable difference in the composition of trades associated with a change in
the environment.
3. Welfare In section 1.5.3, I compare welfare outcomes from subjects who were
in treatments 1 & 2 with those in treatments 3 & 4. I find a strong welfare loss
in treatments 3 & 4 due to the persistence of the certifying equilibrium in the
safe environment.
As noted in section 1.4.4, experimental sessions were divided into four groups
based on the ordering of the S and 'H environments and the amount of information
about past trades. I designate trades in the first 12 periods with a Pre superscript
and trades in the last 12 periods with a Post superscript. For reference, a copy of
Table 1.3 is reprinted here.
Table 3: Treatments
Treatment Periods 1-12 Periods 13-24 Information Identifiers
1 Safe Hazardous Private SPre ,7 Post
2 Safe Hazardous Public SPre -•Post
3 Hazardous Safe Private _Pre,S Post
4 Hazardous Safe Public WPre,SPost
1.5.1 Initial Convergence
Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
In this section, I compare the equilibria that forms under the safe and hazardous
environments absent a preexisting market organization. I establish that in the haz-
ardous environment the certifying equilibrium forms while under the safe environment
a non-certifying or partial-certifying equilibrium forms. I then study how aggregate
levels of loss aversion influence the non-certifying price and the formation of the
partial-certifying equilibrium.
Based on the theoretical model, the relative welfare and probability of existence
of the non-certifying equilibrium is increasing in the proportion of type-G sellers in
the environment. It follows:
Hypothesis 1 In markets with the possibility of certification, the likelihood of the
non-certifying equilibrium forming in a new market is increasing in the proportion of
agents who always produce high quality units.
I test this hypothesis by comparing the prices of uncertified trades in the Sp r e
environment where the degree of moral hazard is low with those in the 7-IPr envi-
ronment where the degree of moral hazard is high. To allow time for the market to
converge, I restrict attention to periods 7-12.8 Using session fixed effects, I estimate:9
Pi,, = ao + Eas + /certlcert + /sPrelsPre + ci,, (1.18)
where Pi,, is the price of an individual trade i in session s, a, are individual session
fixed effects, Ice,t is an indicator for a certified trade, and Isp," is an indicator variable
for uncertified trades in the safe environment.
In markets where the certifying equilibrium forms, the equilibrium prices for cer-
tified and uncertified units is 200 and 100. In the SPre environment, if the non-
certifying equilibrium forms, the expected non-certifying price with no loss aversion
8 The number of omitted periods was decided prior to running the experiment and based on the
initial pilots. As can be seen in the individual experiments included in the appendix, the price of
the uncertified market converges to the non-certifying or partial-certifying equilibrium from below.
Thus, increasing the number of periods in the analysis decreases the estimated uncertified price
for treatments that converge to the non-certifying equilibrium. All results are still statistically
significant in the full sample with attenuated magnitudes on 3spr.
9Note that since loss aversion only affects uncertified trades and the estimation includes both
certified and uncertified trades, session level fixed affects do not eliminate the variation in uncertified
trades across treatments.
is 183. Expecting the non-certifying equilibrium to form in the SPre environment
and the certifying equilibrium to form in the ?JPre environment, I predict ao = 100,
Oo + 3cert = 200 and ao + 3SPre = 183.
One possibly reason for a deviation from our non-certifying prediction price of
183 is loss aversion. As noted in the theory section, the loss aversion of the last
buyer who is willing to trade in the uncertified market impacts the market price
of a non-certifying equilibrium. In order to get a simple aggregate measure of loss
aversion, I take the total number of buyers in each session who self report loss aversion.
Interacting this number with the safe treatment (the only treatment where the non-
certifying equilibrium is likely) I estimate:
Pi', = ao + EaS + OLA(LA * Ispe) + Ocertlcert + OSPre ISPre + ci,' (1.19)
Where LA is the total number of buyers in a session who report that they were
unwilling to make a trade if they had the potential for taking a loss.
Results
Table 1.6 presents the price regressions from equation 1.18 and 1.19 with varying
degrees of control for loss aversion. As can be seen in column (1), when loss aversion
is not taken into account, the predicted non-certifying price (ao + O3sPr = 147)
is lower than our predicted value of 183 but above the minimum price that could
sustain a partial-certifying equilibrium. When an aggregate measure of loss aversion
is used, as in column (3), the predicted non-certifying price for a market with no loss
aversion is 184, remarkably close to our theoretical prediction. The estimated price
for uncertified and certified units in the 7FPre environment are 105 and 196, both close
to their predicted values of 100 and 200.
In order to confirm that my measure of loss aversion is indeed capturing hetero-
geneity of preference across agents, I look at the purchase history of buyers conditional
of their measured loss aversion. The left hand side of Table 1.7 compares the number
of certified and uncertified trades made by loss averse buyers in the certified and
uncertified markets. As expected, loss averse agents are more likely to buy from the
certified market than their counterparts.
Some trades in the uncertified market carry no risk for the buyer. A unit purchased
at price 100, for instance, has no possibility of loss for a buyer who has a value of 140
for a low quality unit. As a better measure of risk, I partition trades into those that
Table 1.6: Hypothesis 1: Convergence of
Certifying Equilibrium
Certification
Treatment ISPre
Risk Aversion of Buyer in IsPre
Individual Loss Aversion in IsPr.
Number of Loss Averse Buyers in IsPre
Constant
Pre Treatments to the Non-Certifying or
91.414***
(2.816)
39.100***
(4.685)
108.496***
(3.500)
(2)
91.414***
(2.816)
60.867***
(8.122)
-2.270*
(1.096)
-20.827***
(6.097)
106.630***
(3.597)
(3)
91.414***
(2.820)
79.229***
(7.905)
-0.090
(0.946)
-16.216***
(2.113) a
105.349***
(3.331)
Fixed Effectsb Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2  0.838 0.849 0.856
Observations (Trades in Period 7-12) 834 834 834
aSince loss aversion is an aggregate measure in specification (3), the standard error from the
trade level regression is improperly calculated. As a better measure, I use randomization inference
to construct a confidence interval. I begin by estimating the session level regression AvgP, =
to + ,LA(LA,). I then take every permutation of possible loss aversion assignments to construct
placebo estimates of the loss aversion parameter. This generates a distribution of possible loss
aversion parameters centered at zero. The true estimated value of fLA lies outside the 95% confidence
of this placebo distribution.
bFixed Effects are at the session level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Errors clustered by
individual buyer.
Table 1.7: Transaction History Conditional on Loss Aversion
Uncertified Certified Risky Safe
Loss Averse 84 120 Loss Averse 51 153
Normal 134 85 Normal 128 92
Fisher Exact Test p < 0.01 Fisher Exact Test p < 0.01
Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxonp = 0.2211 Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxon p = 0.0264a
aOne problem with using a Fisher Exact Distribution test is that each individual accounts for
multiple observations. In order to more accurately account for this multiplicity, I create two new
continuous variables which measure the proportion of uncertified trades and the proportion of safe
trades respectively. I then use a two-sample Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxon rank-sum test to test for
differences in the distributions of the proportions.
there are "safe" and have no possibility for a loss and those that are "risky" and may
result in a loss if a low quality unit is transacted. As shown on the right hand side of
1.7, loss averse individuals are significantly more likely to make safe transactions.
1.5.2 Adaptation
Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
I next look at how the equilibrium that formed in the initial 12 periods adapts to
changes in the underlying environment. In the theoretical model, I showed that when
the certifying equilibrium is reached, there is no aggregate information observable
when type-C sellers are replaced with type-G sellers and thus the equilibrium does
not change. By contrast, I showed that when the non-certifying equilibrium is reached,
a replacement of type-G with type-C sellers leads to a reduction in the uncertified
price and an eventual change to the certifying equilibrium. This leads to:
Hypothesis 2 Any market equilibrium that reaches the certifying equilibrium will
remain certifying for any changes in the number of type-C and type-G sellers.
I test this hypothesis by comparing the price of uncertified trades that occur in
the last six trading periods of each treatment. If there is no aggregate information
observable when the environment changes from hazardous to safe, equilibrium prices
in periods under the SPost treatment should be the same as those from RIPre and
significantly differ from those in SPre. I thus estimate:
Pi,s = 0o + Ea, + /LA(LA * ISPre) + PCertIcert (1.20)
+ 3 SPre ISPre + /SPost ISPost + P/Post I7 Post + ci,s,
where Pi,, is the price of an individual trade i in session s, as are individual
session fixed effects, Icert is an indicator for a certified trade, and IspPe, IsPo.t, and
I7 Post are indicator variables for uncertified trades in their respective environment. I
hypothesize that ao + OSPre = 183, and fSPost = P/Post = 0.
An informational theory of persistence predicts that markets in a certifying equi-
librium should show no observable change when a type-C seller is replaced by a type-G
seller. I next look at the composition of trades over time in the uncertified market
and between the certified and uncertified market.
In treatments where the certifying market forms initially, there should be no ob-
servable difference in the composition of trades before and after the change in envi-
ronment. I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 In a certifying equilibrium, the composition of goods within a market
and between the certified and uncertified markets is unaffected by a replacement of
type-C sellers with type-G sellers.
To study this, I compare the composition of trades in the six periods before and after
the change in environment. In the treatments that start in the R.Pre environment
(where the certifying equilibrium was consistently observed), I expect to see no change
in the composition of trades when the environment changes to SPSt.
As a comparison, I also look at the composition of trades within the uncertified
market and between the certified and uncertified markets when the non-certifying
equilibrium forms initially and type-G sellers are replaced by type-C sellers. When
sellers change from type G to type C in the non-certifying equilibrium, their initial
incentive is to sell low quality units in the uncertified market as long as the difference
in prices is greater than 90 (the certification cost + the difference in production costs
for a type-C seller). In transition from a non-certifying to a certifying equilibrium,
the expected dynamics of the market are thus an initial shift from uncertified high
quality units to uncertified low quality units followed by an eventual shift from the
uncertified market to the certified market.
Hypothesis 4 In a non-certifying equilibrium, the replacement of type-G sellers with
type-C sellers leads to an immediate shift from uncertified high quality units to un-
certified low quality units followed by a transition to the certifying equilibrium.
In the treatments that start in the SPre environment (where the non-certifying
equilibrium is consistently observed), I expect to see a shift to uncertified low quality
units followed by a gradual shift to certified units when the environment changes to
'_•Post
Results
The persistence of the certifying equilibrium is most easily seen by comparing an
individual session in treatments 1 & 2 with an individual session in treatments 3 & 4.
Figure 1 makes this comparison, showing the complete trade history of session 6 and
session 12. The horizontal dashed lines show the predicted price of the certified and
uncertified market in the case of the non-certifying equilibrium for the SPre environ-
ment and the certifying equilibrium in the case of the other three environments. The
vertical dashed lines split trades into 6 period increments with the aggregate number
of certified and uncertified trades reported at the bottom of each block.
As can be seen in the top half of figure 1-1, a session in treatment 1 & 2 where the
environment is initially set to safe converges to the partial-certifying equilibrium in the
first 12 periods and then adapts to the certifying equilibrium when the environment
changes. Note that in the safe environment, there is always a single type-B seller and
thus the predicted composition of units without loss aversion is 60 uncertified high
quality units and 12 uncertified low quality units. Typical of all sessions in treatments
1 & 2, convergence of the uncertified price to a partial certifying equilibrium is from
below with a subset of certified trades conducted in each period at a premium 60
points above the prevailing uncertified market price. When the environment changes,
sellers who switched from type G to type C sell low quality units leading to a fall in
price and the eventual establishment of a certifying equilibrium.
In the session that began in the hazardous environment, the certifying equilibrium
is established in the first 12 periods. When the environment switches to safe at period
13, there is no noticeable change in the uncertified price nor in the composition of
certified and uncertified trades. This is the case in the bottom half of figure 1-1
where convergence to the certifying equilibrium is rapid and the convergence of the
uncertified price is from above.
While the two sessions used in figure 1-1 were chosen for clarity, the patterns of
adaption and persistence are typical across all sessions. 10 Figure 1-2 shows average
uncertified prices for the last six periods of each environment. Notice that the
uncertified price in the SPost environments is nearly identical to both the WPre and
HPost treatments and markedly different to the SPre treatment.
Again using a price regression, I extend the initial regression to include the last six
periods of both environments in all 12 experimental sessions. In support of hypothesis
2, I find that there is no significant difference between the uncertified prices in the
SPost and (Post environments relative to the baseline environment of Pre.
Turning attention to market dynamics, I begin by looking at the composition of
trades over time. Based on the theoretical model, in sessions where the market is
10Summary statistics of the other treatments are available in the appendix. Additional data is
available upon request.
Session 6: Formation of the Pooling Equilibrium and Adaptation to the Certifying Equilibrium
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Figure 1-2: Average Uncertified Prices by Environment
Treatment SPre Treatment SPst' Treatment H.Pre Treatment HPost
Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Period Pedrod Period Period Period Period Period Period
7 8 9 10 11 12 19 20 21 22 23 24 7 8 9 10 11 12 ' 19 20 21 22 23 24
Table 1.8: Hypothesis 2: Persistence of the Certifying Equilibrium
Certification
Treatment SP re
Treatment SPost
Treatment 'IPost
# of Loss Averse Buyers in SPre
Constant
Fixed Effectsa
Adj. R 2
Observations
(1)
89.003***
(2.878)
36.610***
(4.698)
2.776
(3.721)
3.620
(3.592)
112.190***
(3.369)
Yes
0.861
1675
(2)
89.003***
(2.879)
75.948***
(7.196)
2.776
(3.722)
3.867
(3.503)
-16.207***
(2.528)
110.616***
(3.209)
Yes
0.873
1675
aFixed Effects are at the session level. Standard Errors in parenthesis. Errors are clustered at
the individual level.
initially non-certifying and the degree of moral hazard is increased, I expect to see
an initial shift of units from uncertified high quality units to uncertified low quality
units followed by a gradual transition to certified trades as the uncertified market
price falls. In sessions where the certifying equilibrium has formed, an information
based story of adaptation would predict no change in the composition of goods when
moral hazard is decreased.
Table 1.9 shows the aggregate number of trades in Treatments 1 & 2 for the
last 18 periods of the experiment split into 6 period increments. As seen in this
aggregate data, there is a strong shift in the composition of units in the uncertified
market in response to the change in environment followed by a gradual shift from
uncertified to certified markets between periods 13-18 and 19-24. In comparison,
table 1.10 shows the same aggregate data for Treatments 3 & 4 where the safe and
hazardous environments are reversed. In these sessions, there is very little change in
the composition of trades across time.
Table 1.9: Aggregate Trades in Treatments 1 & 2 (Sessions 1-6)
Uncertified Red Uncertified Blue Certified Red
Last 6 periods of SP 'r 135 95 208
First 6 periods of -lPost 15 206 177
Last 6 periods of 7-Post 2 156 254
Table 1.10: Aggregate Trades in Treatments 3 & 4 (Sessions 7-12)
Uncertified Red Uncertified Blue Certified Red
Last 6 periods of 7HPre 6 150 255
First 6 periods of SP"ot 23 95 311
Last 6 periods of SPost 21 89 319
As more precise support for hypotheses 3 and 4, I break the composition of trades
down to the period level. As with the aggregated data, the period level data shown
in figures 1-3 and 1-4 show significant compositional change in the non-certifying
equilibrium and no change in the certifying equilibrium.
Apparent in Figure 1-3, the change in environment from safe to hazardous results
in an immediate shift from uncertified high quality units to uncertified low quality
units. There is also a small but consistent shift of transactions from certified high
quality units to uncertified low quality units in the two periods following the change
in treatment. Recall that in the non-certifying equilibrium with loss aversion, it
may be the case that the type-G sellers are indifferent between trading certified and
uncertified units while type-C sellers strictly prefer to sell uncertified units. Given a
replacement of type-G sellers with type-C sellers, there is an increase in incentives
of sellers to sell in the uncertified market. This effect may increase the speed of
adaptation from non-certifying to certifying by increasing the number of uncertified
low quality observations that occur after the change in moral hazard.
Whereas a replacement of type-G sellers with type-C sellers increases the number
of uncertified trades, replacing type-C sellers with type-G sellers, as done in treat-
ments 3 & 4, may reduce incentives and diminish uncertified trade. Notice that in
figure 1-4, there is a slight shift away from the uncertified market when the environ-
ment improves, this again is most likely a result of weaker incentives for type-G sellers
to trade uncertified goods than those of type C. Unlike treatments 1 & 2 where this
effect improved adaptation, here the change in environment reduces experimentation
and increases the likelihood that the separating equilibrium persists.
Figure 1-3: Hypothesis 4 - Composition of Trades: Treatments 1 & 2
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1.5.3 Welfare
Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
In the theory section of the chapter, I showed that the relative earnings of the non-
certifying and certifying equilibria are conditional on the change in quality of the
conditional sellers and the proportion of sellers who were of type G and type C. It
follows
Hypothesis 5 In environments where the proportion of conditional sellers is small,
the certifying equilibrium will be less efficient than the non-certifying equilibrium.
To test this statement, I look at the overall efficiency of the last six periods of the
SPTe environment and compare it to the efficiency of the last 6 periods in the SPost
environment. I estimate
Efficiencyt,, = C• + 0SPrISPreI +/3LA(LA * ISPre) + /LA(LA * ISPos.) + et,, (1.21)
I predict that periods in the SPre period will have a higher overall efficiency than
those in the SP ost treatment with the efficiency gains decreasing in the number of
buyers who are loss averse and separate from the uncertified market.
Results
In figure 1-5, I compare period by period efficiency of the SP!e periods with those
of the SPOSt treatment. The dashed horizontal line in the graph shows the predicted
efficiency of a pure non-certifying equilibrium for the S Pre treatment and the certi-
fying equilibrium in the S P°ot treatment. On the left hand side of the figure, it can
be seen that the overall efficiency of the partial-certifying equilibrium is significantly
below what is predicted in the pure non-certifying equilibrium case. This decrease
in efficiency is a result of three factors: the exit of loss averse buyers from the un-
certified market, missed trade opportunities that often occurred in the non-certifying
equilibrium as buyers and sellers negotiated trades, and the adoption of certification
in one of the treatments that began with SPre. On the right hand side of the figure,
it can be seen that all 6 treatments have consistent efficiency levels in line with the
predictions of the certifying equilibrium.
Unsurprising given the visible difference in efficiency, the price regression in table
1.11 shows a significant increase in efficiency in the SPre environment relative to SPost.
The overall efficiency of the non-certifying equilibrium is lower than the theoretical
prediction, however, suggesting additional inefficiencies that are created from the
dynamic process that are not accounted for by loss aversion alone.
Figure 1-5: Hypothesis 5 - Efficiency Loss due to the Persistence of Certification
Environment S Pr e Environment S Post
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Table 1.11: Hypothesis 5: Efficiency Loss due to the Persistence of Certification
Treatment SPre 330.010**
(122.232)a
# Loss Averse Buyers in SPre -64.242
(50.930)
# of Loss Averse Buyers in SPost -2.073
(3.568)
Constant 1456.707***
(13.634)
Adj. R 2  0.439
Observations 72
aErrors are clustered at the session level
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter represents a first step in understanding how the informational properties
of institutions may lead to their inefficient persistence. I showed formally that, in a
market with endogenously formed certification institutions, observable information
about changes in the underlying environment could be lost. This lost information
could lead to the persistence of a certifying equilibrium where all participants in
the environment are weakly worse off relative to a world without the certification
institution. The experimental evidence of inefficient persistence of the certifying
equilibrium was striking. No session that initially adopted the certification institution
showed observable changes in price or the distribution of trades in response to a change
in the underlying distribution of seller types. This led to a loss of efficiency relative to
a market with the same underlying environment but where the certifying equilibrium
had not initially formed.
The experiments described in this chapter constitute a stable baseline on which
to guide future theoretical and experimental work. I showed that in a double auction
environment where trades were centralized and buyers and sellers were anonymous,
the benchmark model performed extremely well in predicting both initial convergence
and adaptation. I further demonstrated that for some initial distribution of seller
types, both the non-certifying and certifying equilibrium were stable. Building on
the consistency of these initial experiments, future research will focus on the types
of information necessary to adapt away from the certifying equilibrium and on the
dynamic learning processes that generate persistence.
The information externality highlighted in this chapter represents a general phe-
nomenon that extends beyond the simple certification market considered here. Com-
mon mechanisms designed to mitigate moral hazard such as red tape, regulation, cer-
tification, monitoring, process management, and credit scoring all share the common
characteristic that they group heterogenous agents into the same action. Given the
importance of these institutions in everyday markets and organizations, developing
an understanding of how information externalities dynamically alter the institutional
landscape is of great importance.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Appendix 1: The Partial Certifying Equilibrium
In experimental sessions beginning in the safe environment, a partial-certifying equi-
librium often formed in which the difference in prices between the certified and un-
certified market was equal to the certification cost. This section looks at two possible
forces that might contribute to this partial certifying equilibrium: loss aversion and
incomplete learning by buyers.
Appendix 1 is divided into three parts. In section 1.7.1, I explicitly characterize the
competitive equilibrium with loss aversion and a common prior about the distribution
of seller types. I show that loss aversion can lead to a downward sloping demand
curve that can potentially support a partial-certifying equilibrium. In section 1.7.1, I
develop an alternative game theory model where I relax the common prior assumption
in the benchmark model to study learning. I show that in the partial-certifying and
certifying equilibrium, the beliefs of buyers need not converge to the true distribution
of types leading to persistence of the partial-certifying equilibrium due to incomplete
learning. Finally, in section 1.7.1, I empirically distinguish between these two effects
using the information treatment as exogenous variation. I find that loss neutral buyers
respond to the information treatment with more trade in the uncertified market while
loss averse buyers do not. These results are consistent with a model where loss
aversion generates a partial-certifying equilibrium and other buyers, due to limited
market signals, do not have beliefs that converge to the true distribution of types.
Loss Aversion
Suppose that instead of all buyers being the same, some buyers are loss averse and put
a greater weight on aggregate losses than gains. Let B = {A1, A2 ,... , AN} where Ai is
the idiosyncratic loss aversion parameter for buyer i with Ai > 1 for i E {1, 2, ..., N}.
Without loss of generality, I order buyers according to their risk aversion parameter
such that A1 < A2 < ... < AN and again normalize the utility obtained from not
trading to zero.
For a price system P with PC < pAC < pC < PC, a buyer i buying from market
m at price P m from a seller of type s gets utility
UH _ p if m E C,s E {G, C, B}
u(m, p m , Ai, s) = UH _ pNC if m E KAC, s E {G} (1.22)
-Ai(PNC - UL) if m E AC, s E {C, B}
A loss-averse buyer prefers to purchase in the uncertified market any time that:
UH - pC < 7rH(A) (UH _ pC) + (1 - H(AP))Ai(UL - pNVC)
Rewriting this condition in terms of the uncertified market price, a buyer prefers to
purchase in the uncertified market as long as:
PC - UH +rH(Ap)UH + (1 - rH(AP))AiUL
p rH(Ap) + (1 - 7rH(AP))Ai + rH(AP) + (1 - 7rH(AP))Ai
Note that with a surplus of buyers, there is always indifference between buying and
not buying. Since the certified market has no risk, this means that PC = UH . Thus
the first term on the right side of the inequality will be zero and (1.23) reduces to
C < H(Ap)UH + (1- 7rH(AP))AUL
S H(AP) + (1 - 7H(AP))A (1.24)
In equilibrium:
* If AP > T the buyer believes that all type-G sellers will certify their goods and
thus that 7rH(AP) = 0. In this case, a buyer prefers to purchase the certified
unit as long as AP < UH - UL p C_-pNc and is indifferent between buying
a non-certified unit and not purchasing if PIC - UL.
* If AP < T the buyer believes that all agents trade in the uncertified market. In
this case 7H( A P ) = g. A loss-averse buyer prefers to purchase the uncertified
unit as long as inequality (1.24) is satisfied.
* If AP = T, the buyer believes that all sellers that trade in the certified market
are type G. Given that E,S(C, s) sellers trade in the certified market, 7"H(AP) =
M-'2S(C,s) and a loss-averse buyer prefers to purchase the uncertified unit as
long as inequality (1.24) is satisfied.
The demand decision of an individual buyer i is directly affected by his own loss
aversion parameter Ai and indirectly affected by the loss aversion of other agents. In
the non-certifying equilibrium, the market price pnVC is greater than UL and there
is a potential for losses in the uncertified market. Since buyers are heterogeneous in
loss aversion, the aggregate demand curve for uncertified units becomes downward
sloping and the market price is pinned down by the loss aversion of the Mth buyer.
If the Mth buyer (the last to trade in equilibrium) is sufficiently loss averse, he may
be unwilling to trade for uncertified units at a price where AP > T. In this case, the
Mth buyer may exit the uncertified market and a partial certifying equilibrium may
form.
As before, I characterize a competitive equilibrium where the supply and demand
decision of the buyers and sellers are optimal and where both the certified and un-
certified markets clear. Let AM be the loss aversion parameter for the Mth buyer
and define the prices at which he is indifferent between his three options of buying
certified units, buying uncertified units, and not buying as:
g _UH _ g) MULfMC gUH + (1-g)AMULg + (1 - g)AM
pCM = UH.
If ]c - Jc _> T, the Mth highest buyer is unwilling to buy in the uncertified
market at the minimal price supporting a pure non-certifying equilibrium. Due to
differences in costs across the three seller types, for any price system where a type-C
seller prefers to sell in the uncertified market, all type-G sellers must also wish to
certify. Thus any partial certifying equilibrium has only type-G sellers in the certified
market.
Iteratively, if the Mth buyer exits the uncertified market, the M - 1 remaining
buyers face a pool of uncertified goods where one type-G seller has been removed.
Looking at buyer M-1, I again define prices at which this buyer is indifferent across
markets, taking into account the higher risk in the uncertified market:
• NC _1UH + (1 - ~_1)AM-lUL
-1 + (1 - g-)AM-1
pC_ -= UH,
MG -1
M-1M-1 - 1
If buyer M-1 is unwilling to trade in the uncertified market, I iterate the process
again. Define prices at which the buyer with the M - kth lowest loss aversion is
indifferent between all three markets as
_C -g-k~U" + (1 - _-k)AM-_kU
_-k + (1 - _-k)AM-k
PM- k = UH,
M-k-k
M-k
A partial certifying equilibrium occurs any time their exists a k such that P-Ck -
P/-k < T and -k+1 k+ > T:
Theorem 4 Let k* be the smallest k such that PCk -- PNCk < T. Then, if k* E
[1, MG], a partial certifying equilibrium exists where pC = UH, pANC = UH _ T.
In a partial certifying equilibrium, buyers i = {1,..., (M - k*)} buy from the
uncertified market. These buyers have strictly positive expected utility since loss
aversion by other buyers pin down the uncertified price. k* other buyers trade in the
certified market. k* type-G buyers sell certified high quality units. The remaining
type-G sellers mix with the type-C and type-B sellers and exchange in the uncertified
market.
Alternative Game-Theoretic Model
In this section, I relax the common prior assumption of the benchmark model and
develop a game-theoretic model where strategic play over time may lead to price and
allocation rules similar to the Competitive Equilibria of Sections 1.3.2 and 1.7.1. I
first build a single period game which guarantees ex post stability. I then study under
what conditions buyers who update their beliefs solely from private signals can learn
about the true distribution of types. I show that even under the best conditions where
the non-certifying equilibrium is selected any time that it exists, incorrect beliefs by
buyers can lead to the partial-certifying or certifying equilibrium where buyers no
longer learn.
Game theoretic models with simultaneous action can often support equilibrium
based on the fear of being left unmatched when all players reveal their actions. In
order to eliminate this type of equilibria from analysis, I take a nonstandard modeling
approach in which buyers are allowed to make contingent offers to the market, sellers
sequentially and repeatedly decide whether to enter or stay out of the market, and
resolution is via a Vickrey auction.
By having the buyers act first and giving them weakly dominant strategies, I
eliminate the need to condition strategies on higher order beliefs. This eliminates
some of the complications that arise out of a pure signalling model where the sellers
are first to act. By allowing bids of buyers to be contingent on the overall size of
the market and allowing sequential offers by the sellers, I ensure ex post stability in
the market. This stability property coupled with assumptions about seller rationality
allows buyers to update their beliefs about the distribution of seller types directly
from the quality of units that they receive in the uncertified market.
The modeling approach taken in this chapter is not meant to be exhaustive of
the interesting theoretical questions that arise in this environment. Instead, I take
the most direct route to myopic belief updating to underscore how myopic learning
in the non-certifying equilibrium differs from the other two equilibria that might
form. Interesting questions related to higher order belief formation in signalling games
without common knowledge and dynamic learning on the seller side is left for future
study.11
Primitives
Consider an extension to the benchmark model in which all buyers and sellers are
11I sidestep some of the complications that arise on the seller side of the problem by restricting
analysis to the case of sequential action with known valuations for the buyer. More explicit dynamic
learning of sellers via fictitious play or reinforced learning opens up the possibility that type-C sellers
may certify in some periods before type-G sellers. This eliminates the ability to make inferences
about the distribution of types from signals in the partial-certifying equilibrium but does not affect
the results from the non-certifying equilibrium.
infinitely lived over periods indexed by t E {0,..., 00}. There are M sellers who can
each sell one unit and are divided into three types s E {G, C, B}. In each period,
sellers j E {1, ... , M - 1} are randomly assigned to either type-G or type-C. Seller
j = M is assigned to be of type-B so that there is always at least one seller in the
non-certified market. The true proportion of sellers of type G in a period is g.
There are N buyers who each demand a single high or low quality unit in each
period. Initially, the distribution of seller types is unknown to buyers. Buyers form
beliefs about {MG, Mc, MB} based on an initial prior distribution and update this
prior between periods based on the quality of unit that they received in the last
period, the market they traded in, and the volume of trades in the high and low
market. For simplicity, I assume that MB = 1 is known to all parties so that the
estimation problem can be reduced to estimating a single parameter ^ = M where
kM
e {go, , 1.gM-1} and k = *
Each buyers i has an initial prior p() = {()P ))} where
pA(Nk) > 0 and EkPo(gk) = 1. Buyers are strongly myopic in the sense that their
beliefs change only with their own history of trades and not on information that is
directly observable in the market. Let hi(t) be the buyers history at time t. This
history is comprised of the buyers prior p (§), the type of unit that he received in
the current period x ti  {H, L}, the market that he traded in m', and the volume of
certified trades in the market S c . If a buyer i at time t is given the trade history of
all other buyers hl (t), h2(t),... , hN(t) and the prices and allocations of the market
pAnC pC, SKc, Sc, a buyer's posterior is
i N
pt+ (g (h'(t), h2t),... hN(t),pNC pC, Sc, Sc) = pt+l(h'(t)). (1.25)
As such, even though the market is a common value auction, I treat each individual
as if he has a private value for uncertified goods based only on his individual beliefs.12
Let pb(m, sli, SANc) be the belief of a buyer that a seller in market m is of type s
conditional on the size of the uncertified market being SNc and the true proportion
of type-G sellers being §i. A buyers of type bp(§) (where type is defined by his prior
in the period) trading in period t in market m at price P m given SNA has (perceived)
expected utility:
EUt (mISc, p N )) = EkEU(m, Pt m , bp ,), s)Ab(m, SIk, Sc/)Pi( kScC). (1.26)
The Stage Game
At each point in time t, buyers and sellers take part in the following two part auction:
1. Part 1: The Uncertified Auction
12 0n the other extreme, a model in which all buyers understand the common value nature of the
problem could be resolved with a direct mechanism in which all buyers submit their signals and
the market clears using a Vickrey auction. In this case, each period, buyers perfectly learn the
information of other buyers and a single common knowledge prior emerges each period. The results
from this common prior model is similar to our common knowledge benchmark considered in section
1.3.2
(a) Stage 1: Each buyer i submits bid schedule 6c(Src) which is his bid for
an uncertified unit conditional on the number of sellers in the uncertified
market being Suc .
(b) Stage 2: All M sellers enter into stage 2 and are sequentially ordered with
type-B sellers first, type-C sellers next, and type-G sellers last.'3 Sellers
play a sequence of rounds in which they decide whether to stay in the
market or exit. At the beginning of each round, sellers who stayed in the
market from the previous round sequentially and publicly decide whether
to stay in the uncertified market or exit. Rounds are repeated until all
sellers who started the round remain at the end of the round.
(c) Stage 3: Given that K sellers remain in the uncertified market, the fol-
lowing Vickrey mechanism is implemented: Ordering buyers i by their
values of 1PC(K), K units are traded at a price equal to I3"(K). If
+ < UH - T and f c > UH - T, an exogenous reservation price
UH - T is used. 14
2. Part 2: The Certified Auction
(a) Stage 4: Each buyer i' who did not purchase a unit in stage 3 submits a
bid #i which is his bid for a certified unit.
(b) Stage 5: All remaining sellers j' who did not trade in stage 2 enter into
stage 5 with the same ordering as in stage 2. Sellers sequentially and
publicly decide whether to stay in the certified market or withdraw their
bids.
(c) Stage 6: Given that Sc sellers enter the certified market, a Vickrey auction
takes place where Sc units are traded at the reservation price of the Sc + 1
highest bid.
In order to study myopic dynamics, I assume that buyers and sellers both have
sufficiently high discount rates that they maximize their (perceived) expected utility
in the current period. Buyers in this game also adopt the weakly dominant strategy of
biding their valuation for an object allowing the stage game to be solved via backward
induction. Analysis of the game can be deduced via the following steps:
1. Starting in Stage 4, assume that K buyers and sellers exchanged goods in the
certified market. Buyers valuation for a certified unit is unaffected by beliefs
and thus each buyer bids UH for a certified unit. Since there are more buyers
than sellers and UH > T + CS for s E {G, C}, all type-G and type-C sellers
that remain will choose to enter and trade in the certified market.' 5 Buyers
13This ordering can be though of as coming out of a pre auction where sellers bid on the right to
chose their order in the sequence
14Note that all buyers and sellers weakly prefer this reservation price rule in the market rather
than letting the price fall to UL.
15If UH > T + CBH , the type-B seller will also enter the uncertified market if she has not sold a
unit in Stage 3. This will never occur in equilibrium.
in the Stage 4-6 auction all receive zero utility and all remaining sellers in the
market receive a utility of UH - T - CH.
2. In Stage 2, given a set of contingent bids, sellers must decide whether to stay in
the market or exit. Suppose that in a round there are k sellers remaining and
that the first k - 1 sellers have elected to stay in the market. The last seller
will stay in the market if I3 -• (K) - min(CL, Cf ) > UH - T - CH and exit
otherwise. Since the sellers are ordered in terms of their reservation values, a
buyer earlier in the sequence can always wait to exit unit they are the last seller
in the sequence. Thus, the exit of sellers from the market occurs in reverse
order and any partial-certifying equilibrium will have type-G sellers being the
first to exit the uncertified market.
3. In stage 1, a buyer knows that his utility from trading in the certified market
is zero. Thus, his reservation value for waiting is zero and a truthful bid in
the uncertified market must make his expected utility (based on his potentially
wrong beliefs) equal to zero. Buyers know that sellers of type-G are the first
to exit from the uncertified market. Thus, any equilibrium in which Snc < M
will have type-G sellers being the first to exit from the uncertified market. It
follows, that conditional on gk and SAC, a buyers belief about the proportion
of good types in the environment is
Pb(ANC, Gjik, SA c ) = max S( c  , O . (1.27)
Since in equilibrium, the type-B seller will always be in the uncertified market,
SNc > 0 and this belief is well defined.
4. A buyers perceived expected value for bidding in the uncertified market condi-
tional on SNc is EU (m|SNc, pt(g)). If this value is greater than UH - T the
buyer bids his actual value. Otherwise, the buyer correctly assumes that no
high type buyer would accept his bid and he bids UL.
Equilibria
Observe that since sellers begin in the uncertified market, if the non-certifying equi-
librium exists it will be selected. Further, if the non-certifying equilibrium does not
exist, but partial-certifying equilibria do exist, the stage game will select the partial
certifying equilibrium with the largest number of uncertified units. A slight modifi-
cation to the game here where there is a positive cost to entering Stage 2 and entry is
simultaneous will generate multiple equilibrium consistent with the model considered
in the main text. The current model is considered to simplify the dynamic analysis.
Dynamics and Convergence
Given the structure of the entrance/exit round of the game, getting high and low
quality units in the uncertified market can generate new information about the dis-
tribution of types for sellers who trade uncertified units in a non-certifying or partial-
certifying equilibrium. I assume that in each period, a buyer updates his beliefs based
on the type of unit that he receives conditioning on the fact that sellers do not select
dominated outcomes. Basing updating only on a buyers history at the end of the
period, a myopic Bayesian buyer updates his beliefs in the following way:
1. If a buyer trades in the uncertified market when APt > T, the buyer will
update his beliefs based on Bayes rule. Given a new unit of quality x E {H, L},
a buyer recognizes that an uncertified unit must be from a type-G seller and an
uncertified unit must be from a type-C or type-B seller. He thus updates his
prior as follows:
lkPt(gk)q(xfgk)
where
q(xJ.k) f 9k for x = Hk f r   L1 g- gk forx=L
is the probability of getting a unit of quality x in the uncertified market given
the proportion of high types is gk and all sellers trade in the uncertified market.16
2. If a buyer trades in the uncertified market when APt = T, the buyer recognizes
that the portion of sellers in the certified market must all be type-G types.
Taking this into account, the seller weights his update in relation to the number
of units being traded in the certified market. Let - be the share of sellers who
trade in the certified market. With probability L-, a buyer ignores his own
signal and updates as if he received a high value units. With probability 1 - s
the buyer updates his beliefs with the actual quality of unit he purchases. 17
3. If a buyer trades for a certified unit or an uncertified unit with APt < T, then
Ph(t+l)(9) = Ph(t) ().
Repeated play of the stage game using these updating rules yields the following the-
orem:
16The use of q(xjlk ) in this equation is to highlight that there is actually two steps taking place
in updating the posterior over types. The first is an empirical update on the likelihood of getting
a high quality unit in the uncertified market. The second is mapping this empirical data back into
implications about the proportion of type-G sellers in the environment under the assumption that
sellers do not play dominated strategies.
17Beliefs using this update method converge to MG + M= = g. Note that up-
dating a prior in the partial-certifying equilibrium requires stronger assumptions about the strategies
of sellers. A buyer observing empirical data in a partial-certifying equilibrium must assume spe-
cific sorting and strategies in Stage 2 of the game in order to map empirical data back into types.
Strict ordering of seller types may not hold in more general versions of the game where sellers
learn about their best strategies through experimentation (such as a model with fictitious play or
reinforced learning). This suggests that beliefs are significantly more likely to be incorrect in a
partial-certifying equilibrium relative to the non-certifying equilibrium.
Theorem 5 As t -- oo:
1. If the non-certifying equilibrium occurs, then there exists at least M buyers such
that
Pt(g) ) g. (1.28)
2. If a partial certifying equilibrium occurs with M - k* trades in the uncertified
market, then there exists at least M - k* buyers such that:
S a.W(g) 0 (1.29)
3. If the certifying equilibrium occurs at time t*, then
p•() = p=.() Vt > t* (1.30)
Theorem 5 stems from the fact that sellers choices in Stage 2 of the game always
correspond to the equilibrium with the largest number of buyers in the uncertified
market. In each period that the non-certifying equilibrium occurs, the M buyers
with the highest (perceived) expected utility for the round get units and update their
beliefs. As long as the non-certifying equilibrium continues to exist, these buyers will
continue to learn from the market leading to eventual convergence of beliefs.
If there exists a period where there are no longer M buyers with an expected
utility for uncertified units larger than UH - T, the non-certifying equilibrium no
longer exists and a partial-certifying equilibrium forms. Given the structure of Stage
2, good type sellers are the first to exit, and thus belief updates for buyers based on
the size of the certified market and the proportion of high quality goods still provide
a consistent estimate for the proportion of type-G sellers. Over time, the sellers who
stay in the uncertified market learn, but the other sellers do not.
Finally, if there is ever a period in which all non-certifying and partial-certifying
equilibrium do not exist, only type-B sellers will stay in the uncertified market. Qual-
ity updates no longer reveal information about the proportion of type-G sellers in the
environment and thus buyers no longer receive private signals on which to update
beliefs.
Given the convergence of beliefs, prices in the dynamic game converge as follows:
Corollary 1 Suppose that a series of auctions are played in which 1) buyers play the
weakly dominant strategy of truth telling and 2) buyers update their beliefs myopically.
Then, as t --- oc, the prices generated in the uncertified auctions must converge to
one of the following three prices:
* Certifying Equilibrium: pNC - UL
* Partial- Certifying Equilibrium: pNC = U H - T.
* Non-Certifying Equilibrium: pNC < UH (1 - )(UH _ UL).
The prices in the Non-Certifying Equilibrium are not strictly equal to the price found
in the competitive equilibrium model since it is the value for player M + 1 that pins
down the uncertified price.
Information
The theoretical models in the last two sections point to two reasons why a partial-
certifying equilibrium might form: loss aversion and incorrect beliefs by buyers. In
this section, I use the public information treatment as exogenous variation in order
to differentiate these two effects. I find that both information and heterogeneous
preferences contribute to the formation of the partial-certifying equilibrium and may
contribute toward the adoption of inefficient certification technologies.
Hypothesis and Empirical Strategy
If the partial-certifying equilibrium is due purely to loss aversion, the creation of
public information about the proportion of uncertified goods should have no effect
on the partial-certifying equilibrium. In contrast, if the partial-certifying equilibrium
is due to limited information, public information should have increase the number
of uncertified trades since it decreases the likelihood that buyers will have incorrect
beliefs about the proportion of sellers in the marketplace. Using this second prediction
as the null hypothesis I predict:
Hypothesis 6 In the SPre environment, the information treatment should increase
the likelihood that buyers purchase risky units from the uncertified market.
To test this hypothesize, I run a probit regression where I study the relationship
between buying units that have the potential for losses and the information environ-
ment. I interact the information treatment with the S Pre treatment since this is the
only treatment where the information treatment should matter and estimate:
Riskyi,s = ao + EOZa + OLAiILossAverse +/ 3BeliefsBeliefs + (1.31)
+
3 Public(IPublic * ISPTe) + /Public*LN (ILossNeutral * 'Public * ISPre) + E
where Riskyj,s is 1 if a buyer purchased an uncertified unit that had the potential for a
loss, as are session level fixed effects, ILossAverse is an indicator variable for individual
loss aversion, IPublic is an indicator for the public information treatment, and IsPre is
an indicator for environment SPre. I predict that 3Public*LN > 0 and that 3Public > 0.
Results
Evidence from the experimental sessions shows a clear effect of information on the
proportion of uncertified trades in the environment. Figure 1-6 shows the proportion
of risky trades undertaken by loss neutral and loss averse individuals divided between
the SPre treatment where the non-certifying equilibrium formed and all other treat-
ments where the certifying equilibrium formed. As can be seen on the left hand side,
public information greatly increases the probability that a loss neutral individual
takes risk in the uncertified market and has a postive much smaller effect on buyers
who are loss averse. In other treatments, there is minimal differences between risk
and loss neutral individuals in their response to information. These same forces can
be seen in the probit regression shown in table 1.12.18
Figure 1-6: Effect of Information on the Propensity to Purchase Risky Units
Environment S Pre
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Private Information
Loss Averse
Other Environments
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Table 1.12: Probit Regression of Risky Purchases on Information and Loss Aversion
Loss Aversion
Public * SPre
Loss Neutral * Public * SPre
Beliefs
Constant
Psuedo Adj. R2
Observations
-0.568***
(0.069)
0.349***
(0.130)
0.480***
(0.151)
0.005
(0.017)
-0.835***
(0.119)
.216
3353
18Probit regression with fixed effects is shown to be biased by Fernandez-Val (2007). The current
specification does not take this bias into account.
0.6
o 0.5
0.4
o 0.30
S0.2
0 1
1.7.2 Proofs
Proof. By the definition of s E {G, C, B}, CH > CL + UH - UL - T > CQH Ž CL >
CGH. Thus, in the uncertified market, only type-G sellers will produce high-quality
goods. Writing out the utility of the seller:
v(m, pm, b, s) =
T if mEC, sE{G,C,B},
if m E ArC, s E {G},
mif E .AC, s E {C, B}.
By Definition 2,
S(m*,s) # 0 m* E argmaxEbv(m, P m , b,s) Vs.
m
Finding the points where each seller type is indifferent between the certified and
uncertified markets lead directly to Lemma 1. m
Proof. In the baseline model, there is only one type of buyer which I denote as bo
whose utility is as follows:
UH- p C  ifmE C, sE {G, C, B}
u(m, p m , bo, s)= UH  pNC ifmE .fCs E {G}
U L - PNC if m E ANCs E {C, B}
It follows:
1. When AP > T, v(C, PC, b, G) > v(AfC, pC, b, G) and thus S(AfC, G) = 0. By
the definition of a price equilibrium, #b(NAC, G) = S(NCGc) = 0 and thus,S(rC,s) -0 d
E,u(NC, PIAC, bo, s)Lb(A/C, s) = UL _ pNC.
Since Vs, u(C, PC, bo, s) = UH - pC and u(0, PO, bo, s) = 0, it follows that an
agent is indifferent between all three markets when pNc = UH, PC = UL
2. When AP < T, Vs, v(C, PC, b, s) < v(AC, p'C, b, s) and thus S(JVC, G) = MG.
By the definition of a price equilibrium, Ab(AKC, G) = -s(C•) = It
follows that
E,u(.C, PAc, bol, s)Lb(NC, G) = gUH + (1 - g)UL - pAC.
A buyer is indifferent across all three markets if PNC = UH _ (1 - g)(UH - UL)
and pC = UH.
U
Proof.
1. When AP = UH - UL:
(a) By Lemma 1, S(ANC, B) = MB, S(C, G) = MG, and S(C, C) = Mc.
(b) By Lemma 2, if P'C = UH, pC = UL, D(C, bo) = [0, Nbo] E I+, D(AC, bo) =
[0, Nbo] E ]J+, D(0, bo) = [0, Nbo] E l+ with EmD(m, bo) = Nbo.
Thus the attainable allocation where PNC = UH, pC = UL , D(C, bo) = MG +
Me, D(NAC, bo) = MB, and D(0, bo) = Nbo - M always exists.
2. When AP > T:
(a) By Lemma 1, S(AC, B) = MB, S(NC, G) = MG, and S(NC, C) = MB.
(b) By Lemma 2, a buyer is indifferent between all three markets if PIC
UH - (1 - g)(UH _ UL) and pC = UH .
If pC _ pNC = (1-_g)(UH _UL) > T, then D(NC, bo) = M, D(0, bo) = Nbo - M
is an equilibrium. Otherwise, there does not exist a set of prices such that
AP > T and a buyer is indifferent between the certified and uncertified market.
Proof. By Lemma 1, S(C, C) > 0 -+ S(C, G) = Mc. It follows that for any
competitive equilibrium where type-C sellers certify their good, all type-G sellers
certify their good. Define
W = Emu(m, P m , bo, s)ub(m, s)D(m, bo) + Es,mv(m, Pm , bo, s)S(m, s)
Since u(C, PC, bo, G) + v(C, PC, bo, G) - T < u(AFC, PNC, bo, G) + v(ANC, PNc, bo, G),
W is decreasing in S(C, G). Likewise, since u(C, PC, bo, C) + v(C, Pc, bo, C) - T >
u(.NC, pNc, bo, C) + v(fAC, pnc, bo, C), W is increasing in S(C, C). Thus, the con-
strained Pareto Efficient equilibrium must either be the certifying equilibrium where
all the type-C sellers trade in the certified market or the non-certifying equilibrium
where no type-G sellers certify their goods. In cases where the non-certifying equi-
librium does not exist but where partial-certifying equilibria do exist, it is either the
certifying equilibrium or the partial-certifying equilibrium with the least amount of
certification that is constrained Pareto efficient. m
Proof. Let b, ý, b be the prior beliefs about the proportion of good, conditional
and bad agents in the market. When a non-certifying equilibrium exists, pA/C =
UH - (1 - g)(UH - UL). When a certifying equilibrium exists, only type-B sellers
are in the uncertified market.
Define SN c as the number of sellers trading in the uncertified market. Then,
if the number of buyers in each market are known, prices are observable, and the
marginal valuations for the pivotal buyer are known, the posteriors g, 2, b under the
non-certifying and certifying equilibrium are as follows:
Type Non-Certifying Equilibrium Certifying Equilibrium
pNC-UL (1-
UH _ U L  -+r-
c -c (1 - •:) -- (1- b)
c+b B+e
b(1- ) SKCIM
When UH and UL are known and the market is in a non-certifying equilibrium,
g = g and thus price is a sufficient statistic for the proportion of type-G sellers in the
environment. m
Proof. For a partial certifying equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that
at AP = T, EbD(C,b) = E,S(C,s) and EbD(KfC,b) = E,S(KNC,s). By Lemma
1, at AP = T, S(C, G) e 11+, S(ANC, G) = MG - S(C, G), S(AfC, C) = Mc and
S(AfC, B) = MG. Buyers are ordered with increasing loss aversion, thus if there exists
at least one buyer with loss aversion Ai and Ai+l, if D(m, Ai) = 0 -+ D(m, Aj+1) = 0.
Further, if D(m, Aj+ 1) > 0 -+ D(m, Ai) > Nx\.
Given this monotonicity, it is sufficient to look for solutions that have the first k buyer
types demanding from the uncertified market, and the remaining buyers demanding
from the certified and null markets. Define the prices at which the kth buyer is willing
to buy given D(A'C, Ak+1) = 0 and D(AfC, Ak-1) = Nk-1 as:
NMCk _ -kU H + (1 - ý_k)AMkUL
g-k + (1 - g-k)AM-k
PC-k = UH,
MG - kgM-kc--
M-k
If PC_ - M•Ck > T, D(A/C, Ak) = 0. Otherwise D(AfC, Ak) > 0 and thus buyers
i E {1, . . ., k} all have strictly positive demand. For each k E {1,..., M - 1} such
that _k - PC > T and P -k+1 -P Ck+ - T, a partial certifying equilibrium
exists where buyers i E {1,..., k} demand 1 unit from the uncertified unit, and M- k
other buyers are randomly matched with type-G sellers in the certified market. *
Proof.
The proof of theorem 5 is built in two steps. I first show that for the non-certifying
equilibrium to exist as t --+ oo, the non-certifying must occur an infinite number of
times. I then show that if a buyer samples from the uncertified market an infinite
number of times, his beliefs will converge to true proportion.
Step 1 By construction, in any period where the non-certifying equilibrium exists, this
equilibrium is selected. In any period where the partial-certifying equilibrium
there exists a k such that buyers k + 1,..., N trade in either the certified mar-
ket or don't trade. Since buyers in these markets do not update their beliefs, a
market where the partial-certifying equilibrium has been adopted never returns
to the non-certifying equilibrium. By similar logic, the non-certifying equi-
librium does not return to the partial-certifying equilibrium or non-certifying
equilibrium. Thus, for the non-certifying equilibrium to exist as t -+ oo, all
periods leading up to the current period must all have had the non-certifying
equilibrium form.
Step 2 Let x = (x1,... ,XT) be observations of a single buyer where xi = {H, L}. As
before, let § E {0, M,..., I } be the possible number of type-G sellers in
the market. Given an initial prior p'(^) = {p (go),p'(gl), ... ,pj(gM-1)} where
Po(gk) > 0 and EkPi(k) = 1, the posterior pt(lIx) converges almost surely to
the true proportion as t -~ oo as long as g E ^ and
Exq(xlg[)log q(x j > 0. (1.32)
Expanding condition (1.32) yields:
gilog( ý) + (1- ^ )log 1 (1.33)
Rewriting +j = gi  z and taking the derivative with respect to z, the first
derivative is zero at z = 0 and the second derivative is strictly positive for
all z. Thus condition (1.32) holds. Since g E {0, 7,..., M7 }, convergence is
guaranteed as t --, oo.
The proof of convergence of beliefs in the partial-certifying equilibrium follows a
similar logic. By construction, if the non-certifying equilibrium does not exist, the
partial certifying equilibrium with the largest number of uncertified buyers is selected.
Over time, buyers in the uncertified market are always the same and thus they sample
an infinite amount of time. Since their updating rule is consistent, beliefs converge
to the true values. m
Proof.
In each period of the non-certifying equilibrium, the M buyers with the highest
valuations for an uncertified unit win units from the auction. Since N is finite, as
t - o00, there exists at least M buyers who get infinite draws. For these buyers, the
willingness to pay for an uncertified unit converges to gUH + (1- g)UL. If a buyer has
a higher value than gUH + (1 - g)UL, he will be included in the M buyers who win a
unit and as such, his valuation will decrease over time toward the true valuation. The
price paid at auction, based on the valuation for the M - 1 th seller must therefore be
at or below PNC = gUH + (1 - g)UL. *
1.7.3 Instructions
Sellers Instructions
Before the experiment, subjects were randomly split into two groups: buyers and sellers. These are a
translated version of the instructions given to the sellers. Instructions for the buyers as well as the
computerized instructions are available upon request.
Today you will take part in a market experiment. Please read through the following instructions
carefully. All the information you need to successfully participate in this experiment is written here.
If you have questions regarding the experiment or the instructions, please raise your hand. An
instructor will come to your desk and will answer your question.
By participating in this experiment, you automatically receive a show-up fee of 10 Francs. In the
course of the experiment you can earn additional money by earning points through trading. The
amount of points you will earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants
during the experiment.
The experiment is split up into 24 separate periods. In each period you will interact with other
ao participants in the experiment using the computer in front of you. The points that you earn during this
Qo experiments are converted into francs at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate is:
30 Points = 1 Swiss Franc
At the end of the experiment, six periods are randomly chosen and you will receive the amount
of money you earned in these periods plus the 10 francs show-up fee in cash.
Please be aware that communication is strictly forbidden during the time you are in the laboratory.
Also note that the use of the computer is restricted to the experimental program only. Communication
or manipulating of the computer will result in exclusion from the experiment. If you have any
questions please raise your hand and an instructor will answer them.
Overview of the course of the experiment
In this study you are a seller in a market with RED and BLUE products. The market consists of 5
buyers and 6 sellers. As a seller, you may sell up to two products. You will earn a number of points
on a transaction equal to the price that you sell a unit minus the cost for producing the unit and any
certification costs that you incur.
Your Earnings = Price - Production Cost - Certification Fee
In the market, you may sell two types of products: RED and BLUE. These products are of different
quality and may have different valuations to the buyers in the market. A buyer earns money if he
pays less than his valuation for a product A buyer's valuation for a product depends on the quality
of the product that he receives and the total number of units that he has already bought in the period.
Initially, the buyers and other sellers can not observe the quality of the unit that you are selling. You
may choose to offer certified units instead of normal units which guarantee a specific color to the
buyer. If you sell a certified unit, you will be charged 60 points in certification fees at the time of
transaction.
In total the experiment consists of 24 Periods. The course of each period is as follows:
1. The Trading Phase: In the trading phase, you will trade with buyers in the market. The trading
phase in the first 3 periods will be 4 minutes. The trading phase for the remaining periods will be 2
minutes. During the trading phase, you may complete trades either by posting offers that a buyer
accepts or by accepting bids from the buyers.
Your offer to sell:
* Your offer to sell consists of the following specifications:
1) the price that buyers have to pay for a unit of the product
2) the quality of the product
3) whether there is a certificate for the product
* The other participants can only see the actual quality of a product if the product is certified.
If the product is not certified, the product quality will be labeled "UNKNOWN".
The offers from buyers:
* A buyer's bid to buy consists of the following specifications:
1) the price he is willing to pay for a unit of the product
2) the desired quality of the product
3) whether the buyer requires a certificate or not
* If a buyer requests a certificate you must sell the buyer his desired quality. If the buyer
doesn't request a certificate you can sell either quality.
2. The Bonus Phase: The next phase is the bonus phase. In this phase you have to guess how many
of the sellers had lower cost producing the RED quality than producing the BLUE quality during
the respective period. If your guess is correct you will earn 20 points.
3. The Earnings Screen: At the end of each period you will see the earnings screen. Each
participant is informed how much he has earned during the last trading period.
6 out of the 24 Periods are randomly chosen and the earnings of these periods and the show-up fee
will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment.
Detailed course of the experiment
During the experiment you will enter your decisions using the computer. In the following instructions,
all the functions will be explained in detail.
1. The Trading Phase
At the beginning of the trading phase, you will be informed of the production costs for the following
period. When all players have reviewed their cost and value information, the trading phase will begin.
During the first three periods the trading phase will last for 4 minutes. In the remaining periods, the
trading phase will last 2 minutes. The clock in the upper right hand comer of the screen will show the
remaining time in a period in seconds. When this clock reaches zero the game will immediately end
and you will not be able to make any more trades.
During each trading phase you will see the following screen:
Product Quality
There are two possible product qualities: RED and BLUE. Your production costs as well as the
valuations of the buyers differ with the quality. In each period either the RED or the BLUE quality
can be cheaper for you to produce.
Sellers Production Costs
The production costs of a product depend on two things. First the quality (RED or BLUE) of the
product influence the costs and second certification increases the production costs. In every period
you will see your costs on the lower left side of the trading screen.
Your costs can change from period to period, so please pay close attention to your production
costs.
The following cost structures can occur during the experiment. In each period one of the three
following cost structures will be applicable. Please note that different sellers may have different costs
during each period.
Case 1, RED Quality is cheaper to produce:
Quality Costs without certification Costs with certification
RED 30 30+60 = 90
BLUE 50 50 + 60 = 110
Quality Costs without certification Costs with certification
RED 80 80 + 60= 140
BLUE 50 50+60= 110
Case 2b, BLUE Quality is cheaper to produce
Quality Costs without certification Costs with certification
RED 130 130 + 60 = 190
BLUE 50 50 + 60= 110
Certification
The other participants, buyers and sellers, can only see the quality of a product if the product is
certified. A buyer can see the quality of products without a certificate only after the purchase. In this
case the quality of the product will be labeled "UNKNOWN".
To reveal the quality of a product to the buyers, you can elect to certify your product. As you can see
in the table above, certification increases the production cost by 60 Points. The certification costs
only occur when a product is sold. So you don't have to pay certification costs for an unsold unit.
Your offers to buyers
You and all the other sellers can post offers to buyers during the whole period. If you want to post an
offer you have to specify the following:
* You have to specify a price, which the buyer has to pay for the product. The price has to lie
between 0 and 400:
0 < Price 5 400
* You have to specify the quality:
I quality = RED or BLUE
* You have to decide whether you will issue a certificate:
Certificate = Yes or No
Costs of certification = 60
As soon as you have made all the required specifications you can validate your offer by clicking on
the "post offer"-button.
This information will appear on the screen in the field offers to sell and all the other participants,
buyers and sellers can see it. Your own offers will appear in blue, the offers of all the other sellers
appear in black. The offers to sell appear in descending order of the price on the screen.
As soon as a buyer accepts an offer, the respective offer disappears from the screen. If you want to
post the same offer again, you have to reenter all the specifications.
As long as you can sell at least one unit you can have two standing offers, one that is certified and one
that is not certified. After your second sale all of your standing offers will be deleted.
If you have a standing offer, and you enter a new offer, the new offer replaces the old one, if both
offers have the same certification status.
You have the following standing offers:
Quality I Price Certified
RED 400 Yes
BLUE 50 No
Now you enter an offer for a RED quality product at the price of 350 and you offer a certificate. Your
standing offers will change to:
Quality Price Certified
RED 350 Yes
BLUE 50 No
Now you enter an offer for a RED quality product at the price of 250 and you do not offer a
certificate. Your standing offers will change to:
Quality Price Certified
RED 350 Yes
RED 250 No
To withdraw offer you can click the "withdraw offers"-button and all your offers are withdrawn.
Accepting offers from buyers
The offers to buy are sorted in descending order of the price.
To accept an offer from a buyer, you select the line of the respective offer and click the "sell RED"-
button, if you want to sell the RED Quality or click the "sell BLUE"-button if you want to sell the
blue quality.
* If the buyer doesn't request certification, you can sell either quality.
* If the buyer request certification, you have to sell the desired quality AND you have to pay
the certification cost.
History
On the bottom left side of the screen, you will see your personal history. There you will see detailed
information about the products you have sold so far during the respective period. For every product
purchased you will see:
* the quality
* whether the product was certified
* the price you got
* the resulting earnings
On the right side of the screen you will see the market history. On the top you will find the
information of the last traded good. Below you find a chart with all the trades of the period.
On the axis to the right you will find the amount of products traded. On the other axis you will find
the price that has been paid for the product. Depending on the quality and certification of the product,
the entry is of a different color:
* RED certified products appear in red
* BLUE certified products appear in blue
* Uncertified products appear in black
2. The bonus phase
sellers had lower cost producing the RED Quality than producing the BLUE quality during the
respective period. If your guess is correct you will get 20 points.
3. The earning screen
At the end of each period you will see the earnings screen. There you will find your market earnings
of the period.
Six out of the 24 Periods are randomly chosen and the earnings of these periods and the showupfee
will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment.
Omitted: Examples of How Earnings Is Calculated, Example of Randomized Payment
Exercises
The experiment starts only after all participants are fully accustomed with the experiment. To ensure
this, we ask you to solve the exercises on this page.
Please also write down intermediary steps.
After these exercises you will have the possibility to get to know the trading screen before the first
period starts. The options you have will be presented again in detail and you can do some trial trades.
For these exercises please use the following cost structure:
Cost without certification Cost with certification
ROT 80 140
BLAU 60 120
Exercise 1: A buyer bids 180 for a product and doesn't request a certificate, how much do you earn
with this sale?
Earnings if you sell a BLUE quality product =
Earnings if you sell a RED quality product =
Exercise 2: You sell a RED Quality good for which a buyer paid 150. How high are your earnings if
the buyer requests a certificate and what do you earn if he doesn't request a certificate?
Earnings with certificate =
Earnings without certificate =
Exercise 3: There are the following two standing offers of buyers:
Offer number Price Quality Certificate requested
1 220 BLUE Yes
2 180 RED No
Through which sale can you make the higher earnings?
Possible earnings through offer number I =
Possible earnings through offer number 2 =
1.7.4 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics reported here are for the last 6 periods of each environment.
1. Session:
(a) Sessions 1-6 are Safe/Hazardous treatments.
(b) Sessions 7-12 are Hazardous/Safe treatments.
(c) Sessions 4-6 and 10-12 are public information treatments.
2. Uncertified Price: Average Price across both uncertified low-quality units
and uncertified high-quality units.
3. Certified Price: Average Price of certified high-quality units.
4. Uncertified High Quality: Total number of uncertified high-quality units.
5. Uncertified Low Quality: Total number of uncertified low-quality units.
6. Certified High Quality: Total number of certified high-quality units.
7. Number Loss Aversion: Number of buyers reporting that they were unwilling
to take losses in a period
Table 1.13: Summary Statistics for SPre Environment
Session Uncertified Certified Uncertified Uncertified Certified Number
Price Price High Quality Low Quality High Quality Loss Averse
1 141 194 22 12 28 3
2 170 203 19 13 40 1
3 103 193 1 17 53 4
4 145 202 19 12 39 2
5 143 197 34 18 19 3
6 176 209 40 11 16 2
Table 1.14: Summary Statistics for 7-Post Environment
Session Uncertified Certified Uncertified Uncertified Certified Number
Price Price High Quality Low Quality High Quality Loss Averse
1 114 200 0 44 25 3
2 126 203 1 31 34 1
3 98 199 0 19 51 4
4 119 204 0 23 47 2
5 114 211 0 20 50 3
6 124 201 1 19 47 2
Table 1.15: Summary Statistics for 7 _Pre Environment
Session Uncertified Certified Uncertified Uncertified Certified Number
Price Price High Quality Low Quality High Quality Loss Averse
7 125 202 0 39 28 2
8 97 193 1 14 51 2
9 106 201 0 22 46 3
10 109 202 0 25 45 5
11 118 212 2 29 36 3
12 106 200 0 21 49 2
Table 1.16: Summary Statistics for SPost Environment
Session Uncertified Certified Uncertified Uncertified Certified Number
Price Price High Quality Low Quality High Quality Loss Averse
7 134 201 12 24 36 2
8 102 192 0 11 60 2
9 99 198 0 18 54 3
10 111 198 2 12 56 5
11 121 205 6 12 54 3
12 101 191 1 12 59 2

Chapter 2
Protecting Antiquities: A Role for
Long-Term Leases?
Abstract
Most countries prohibit the export of certain antiquities. This practice often leads
to illegal excavation and looting for the black market, which damages the items and
destroys important aspects of the archaeological record. We argue that long-term
leases of antiquities or sales contracts with an option to buy the object back at
a prearranged price would raise revenue for the country of origin while preserving
national long-term ownership rights. By putting antiquities into the hands of the
highest value consumer in each period, allowing leases would generate incentives for
the protection of objects.
2.1 Introduction
As part of an effort to preserve their cultural heritage, 140 countries ban the export
of certain antiquities. One side effect of these export bans is a black market in
antiquities. Artifacts often have a greater monetary value outside their country of
origin, especially if that country is poor.1 Because of absent legal markets and weak
enforcement, owners turn to black markets to sell objects abroad.
Illegal trade is surreptitious, and actions that conceal antiquity trade often de-
stroy archeological sites, damage objects, and reduce economic value. Looters use
fast methods of excavation such as bulldozers, dynamite, and pneumatic drills.2 They
work to keep site locations secret and often disguise the origin of objects by intention-
ally damaging sites to camouflage their activities and breaking objects into fragments
to pass international borders. 3 When objects are traded illegally, and therefore sur-
reptitiously, it is difficult to both search for and extract rent from the highest value
buyer. The value to many potential buyers may be reduced because of limitations on
the ability to display the object and because of danger of detection and prosecution.
These factors reduce the price for the object relative to what sellers would obtain
under legal trade.4
We argue that compared to complete export bans, allowing lease markets could
raise revenue for artifact-rich countries and create incentives for maintenance and
preservation, while keeping long-term ownership rights for the country of origin. By
putting the object in the hands of the highest value consumer at each point in time,
leases would reduce the size of the black market and generate funds that could be
used for the legal excavation of at-risk sites or other needs. Since future ownership
rights are preserved, a country could manage its cultural heritage without restricting
objects from flowing to highest value use.
As one example of an environment where leases are likely to be useful, consider
1An Italian antiquities trafficker was recently caught offering Hellenistic marble statues of Marsyas
and Apollo for $850,000. The statues were originally purchased from a Turkish farmer for $7,000.
See Bagli (1993) and Borodkin (1995).
2 See Coggins (1972), Bator (1982), and Prott & O'Keefe (1990) for many examples.
3 Ross (1995) estimates that over 50 percent of archaeological sites in Mali have been severely
damaged or destroyed by illegal looting. Archeologists, who rely on the stratification of objects
to make inferences, have limited access to pristine sites and no access to objects already extracted
illegally. Owners of artifacts have no legal channel by which they can return objects back to the
public domain, leading to limited knowledge concerning the number of objects still existing and
complicating arrangements that might lead to repatriation.
4 Christie's Auction House estimates that the original owners of artifacts typically receive 2 percent
of the object's final sale price. See Beech (2003).
the case of Nigeria. In the last three decades, at least seven of the major museums in
Nigeria have been the victims of major robberies; the most notable occurring at the
Ife museum in 1994 with estimated loses of 200-250 million dollars.5 Illegal excavation
of archeological sites has also escalated with the most significant losses occurring from
'Nok' sites in northern Nigeria. Nigeria's museum system has struggled to generate
funds to maintain security and preserve objects. Tourism revenue for major exhibits
is limited and the total 2008 public budget for museum and monument preservation
was under 16 million dollars. We believe that a lease program that rotates a portion of
Nigeria's collections internationally would generate revenue and reduce the potential
of theft by moving at risk objects abroad.
In this paper, we look at the antiquities market from the perspective of a hypo-
thetical Minister of Culture, a government agent who is attempting to manage the
cultural heritage of his country. Our main approach is to first explore potential rea-
sons why a benevolent Minister of Culture might choose to impose an export ban
when faced with a choice set consisting only of an export ban or free market. We
then expand the set of possible government policies to show that many of the govern-
ments objectives may be better achieved by restricting transactions to leases or sales
contracts with an explicit option to repurchase.
We begin by considering the optimal policy for the Minister of Culture who is
attempting to maximize social surplus when an object is in the hands of a private
individual who has property rights over the object but must invest in maintenance to
prevent its destruction. When the object is intact and within the nation's borders,
the object generates a positive externality which the owner of the object does not
take into account. We show that under free trade, a rich owner of an object will
have incentives to use an object locally in all periods, while a poor owner may have
incentives to sell the object to a foreign collector outright. For owners with a moderate
level of initial wealth, the optimal policy is to share usage rights intertemporally with
a foreign collector, which can be achieved by a lease contract. Under free trade,
owners will invest in maintaining the object while under export bans, owners with
sufficiently low initial wealth will not invest in maintenance leading to the object's
destruction.
Given the actions of the owner, export bans may be effective at realigning incen-
tives for wealthier countries, but may lead to inadequate maintenance, black markets,
and the permanent loss of art in places where owners are poor. When taxes can be
5 See Akinade (1999) and Shyloon (2000).
imposed costlessly, it is possible to obtain Pareto optimal allocations by using subsi-
dies to keep antiquities intact and in the country. However, when taxes are inefficient,
quantity constraints that limit the amount of time an object can leave the country
may be second best. Allowing for intertemporal sharing through a lease contract
may increase home usage relative to a pure export ban by generating income and
strengthening maintenance incentives.
Next we examine a model with asymmetric information regarding the value that
foreign collectors and the Minister of Culture assign to an object. If a country is
initially poor but may become rich later, it may be optimal to initially transfer usage
rights to a foreign collector, but for the artifact to return to the country of origin if
the home country becomes wealthier. If the Minister of Culture is fairly certain that
it will want the object in the long run, but its future value is private information, sale
and repurchase contracts may be inefficient, since attempts by foreign collectors to
extract surplus from the government may prevent efficient transactions. Either leases
or a sales contracts with an option to buy the object back at a prearranged price
may help avoid this hold up problem. In a world without credit constraints, leases
dominate both sale and repurchase contracts and option contracts since negotiation
occurs after the resolution of uncertainty and with the home country in control of the
auction. With credit constraints, allowing for options can increase liquidity of the
private owners thereby increasing their overall utility.
Finally, we introduce the probability that the Minister of Culture in each gen-
eration is corrupt and extracts value from antiquities by selling them abroad at the
expense of future generations. We show that in this environment, laws imposing ex-
port bans may be preferable to free trade. In an effort to constrain the bad types, a
benevolent Minister of Culture may create legislation which limits both their actions
and those of future generations. For reasonable parameter values, allowing leases may
be preferable to either free trade or complete export bans. Leases prevent the ex-
propriation of value from future generations while still granting freedom to optimally
allocate usage rights today.
Since the influential paper by Merryman (1986), the debate over cultural property
has often been expressed in terms of cultural nationalism and cultural international-
ism. Cultural nationalists, such as Greenfield (1996), emphasize the importance of
local ownership and alienation of objects sold abroad. Cultural internationalists, such
as Appiah (2006), stress the value of international access and cultural awareness. We
see the lease approach as helping fulfill many of the goals of both viewpoints while
reducing looting and increasing maintenance incentives.
Writing from a legal perspective, Bator (1982) and Borodkin (1995) advocate the
use of legal markets to reduce looting in developing countries. These papers concen-
trate on the increased information that is revealed when markets are legal and when
individuals have private information and partial ownership claims over the location
of objects still in the ground. As a way of generating stronger incentives for individ-
uals to report found sites, Wendel (2007) advocates the use of "possessory estates,"a
shared trust set up by the government that grants a proportion of proceeds to an
individual who reports the location of an antiquity site. Our paper is complementary
to these analyses, focusing on the efficiency and preservation incentives generated by
different contract structures.
Lease contracts have been briefly mentioned in press by Butcher & Gill (1990),
Asgari6 , and Gerstenblith (2001). In all three of these articles, leases are proposed
as a way to move objects between museums in order to decrease demand for new
pieces from foreign countries. We believe our paper is the first to formally model the
effects of export bans and lease markets and to suggest leases and option contracts
as a broad alternative to export bans.
The idea that export bans can constrain dictators is related to Kremer & Jay-
achandran (2006) and Pogge (2001), who address the potential of dictators to expro-
priate wealth from future generations by entering debt contracts or selling natural
resources. Our results on the optimal contract structure is related to Hart & Tirole
(1988) and Dewatripont (1989), who study short- and long-term lease contracts when
future valuations are known but private.
There is precedent for art being leased to cross international borders. The King
Tut exhibit which circulated in the United States and London from 2005-2008 was
leased to a private company in order to generate proceeds for Egypt.' Leases have
also recently been used to resolve disputes over ownership. The Menil collection in
Houston negotiated with the Church of Cyprus a 25-year lease of two 13th century
Byzantine frescoes it recovered in 1982 from sources with disputed claims. More
recently, the Metropolitan agreed to return a collection of objects believed to be
looted from Italy in exchange for a long-term loan of objects with similar value.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the notation used in the
6Asgari argues that ten year leases may be used between major museums to reduce incentives to
purchase illicit artifacts. See Erdem (1993).
7The lease agreements for the King Tut exhibit specified transportation, display, and storage
conditions in order to reduce moral hazard. Egypt charged a flat fee of $5 million dollars per city
and required insurance of roughly $1 million dollars per city. The exhibit was valued at $650 million
dollars. See Boehn (2005).
paper and the assumptions of the model. Section 2.3 develops our benchmark model
in an environment where there is an externality for home use. In Section 2.4, we relax
the information assumptions to study how potential holdup may lead to inefficiency
in sales contracts, which can be resolved via lease contracts. Finally, in Section 2.5 we
study how leases may be superior to sales contracts and export bans in an environment
with intergenerational corruption. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Our model considers a single antiquity, referred to as the object. There are N + 2
actors - the domestic owner of the object, the Minister of Culture, and N foreign
collectors. Initially the antiquity is in the hands of the domestic owner who must
decide whether to maintain the object at home, sell it abroad, or let it be destroyed.
The Minister of Culture cannot directly control the actions of the owner, but has
influence over his decision by setting domestic policy.
Preferences-At each time t E {0, 1,... ,T} (with the possibility that T = oo),
the owner of the object gets utility from non-antiquity consumption, ct, and domestic
antiquity usage xt. To distinguish between the two types of goods without additional
qualifiers, we refer to ct as "consumption" and xt as "usage" throughout the paper.
We assume that the agent's utility function for consumption and usage is additively
separable, Ut(ct, xt) = u(ct) + Doxt, where Do is the usage value of the object to the
domestic owner, and xt E {0, 1} is a binary variable that is 1 when the object is held
by the owner. We assume that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing with
u'(c) > O,u"(c) < 0 and that u'(0) = oo, u'(oo) = 0.
The Minister of Culture is a benevolent government official that would like to
maximize social welfare for the domestic country but can not directly affect the actions
of the owner. Social welfare in each period is defined as S(ct, xt) = u(ct)+[Do+DE,t]zt
where DE,t is the domestic externality for an object to remain intact and within the
country's borders. We assume that DE,t is stochastic and that Do + DE,t be bounded
between bounded between D and D and distributed according to a cdf Ht(.) which
has an increasing hazard rate.
There are i = 1,...,N foreign collectors who are interested in legally using the
object. Each foreign collector has a private value for art consumption Fi bounded
between F and F and distributed according to a cdf A(.) which is constant over time,
and has an increasing hazard rate. All foreign collectors are rich so that their utility
for consumption is approximately linear for the potential changes in consumption we
are considering. We thus assume that Vti(ct, Zt) = ct + Fizt where zt E {0, 1} is a
binary variable that is 1 when the foreign collector legally keeps the object abroad.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the buyers are ordered in ascending value.
Thus FN and FN- 1 represent the highest and second highest values respectively.
All actors in our model share a common intertemporal discount rate of 6 E [1, 1]
and are subject to identical interest rates R. We assume 6R = 1. This ensures that
the domestic owner of an object prefers flat consumption over time and is indifferent
in the combination of periods for which domestic usage of the antiquity takes place.
Maintenance-Preserving art requires expenditure M at the beginning of each
period to maintain the object. We consider M to be a reduced form parameter that
includes the cost of preventing damage and theft by looters. While in reality, M is
best represented by a continuous variable that influences the probability and severity
of loss, we make the stark assumption that M is binary and that if it is not paid, the
artifact is immediately destroyed.s When an object is destroyed, both home usage,
xt, and legal foreign usage, zt, are equal to zero. Since destruction is permanent, we
require that xt+l + zt+l •< xt + zt for all t. We assume that F > M so that all foreign
collectors value the object more than its maintenance cost.
In the infinite horizon representation of our problem, it will be convenient to
represent some of our results in terms of rD = [1 - 6] E-' 6txt, the proportion of
time that an object is used domestically after adjusting for the discount rate. It is
shown in the appendix, that when 6 > 1, there exists a combination of xo, ... , x, that
corresponds to any value of 7D in [0, 1]. Reformulating problems using this equivalent
representation allows us to solve problems in terms of the continuous variable rD
instead of an infinite set of binary variables xo,..., xo. 9
Budget Constraints-The owner of an object has initial assets w0 and receives a
deterministic endowment shock of wt in all other periods. We take wealth as exoge-
nous, but it is worth noting that depending on how well markets function inside the
country, the object may wind up in the hands of the highest value domestic owner.
8Extending the model to a more general moral hazard environment is straightforward and does
not substantively change the analysis. Part of the reason we have chosen a binary representation
is that with a minor redefinition of variables, M may also include opportunity costs such as the
revenue passed up from not selling an object to a smuggler. In this case, the cost of maintenance is
not likely to be convex and the optimal maintenance decision will inherently be binary in nature.
'As 6 -+ 1, we can also get arbitrarily close to a continuous [0,1] variable using the first T*
periods instead of an arbitrary set of periods in xo,..., xzo. When we study export bans, we will
use this formulation in order to avoid violating the maintenance constraints.
This will typically be someone rich.10 Letting bt be the amount borrowed in period
t and Pt being the price if an object is legally traded abroad, the owners budget
constraints are:
cl + xM = bl + zi[P1 - M] + wl for t = 1, (2.1)
ct + xtM = bt - Rbt-1 + zt[Pt - M] + wt for Vt > 1.
where
T
bt <_ 6t-s+1 [w8 + z8[P - MI]. (2.2)
s=t
We assume that all foreign collectors have wealth in each period greater than
Z•o max(F, D) so that their credit constraints never prevent them from purchasing
the object.
2.2.1 Timing
Timing of our model occurs as follows. Prior to period 0, the Minister of Culture
decides on a policy which is written into law and binding for all future periods. In each
section, we initially assume that the Minister of Culture has a choice only between
allowing free trade or passing an export ban which restricts zt = 0 for all t. We
then explore the alternative of allowing for leases and sales with an option to buy the
object back at a prearranged price.
Each subsequent period is comprised of four stages: a subsidy/tax stage, a sales
stage, maintenance, and consumption:
Subsidy/Taxation: In the subsidy and taxation stage, the Minister of Culture
can decide on a subsidy schedule which is paid to the owner when an object is held
intact domestically and a tax schedule which is collected when an object is auctioned
abroad. We assume that the domestic owner cannot be taxed if an object is stolen.
This is similar to a limited liability constraint in a standard moral hazard problem.
Sales: After subsidy and tax schedules have been set, the owner of the antiquity
chooses whether to sell the object or not. We make two key assumptions. First, we
assume that whoever owns the object gets to decide on the selling procedure. Second,
we assume that the laws passed by the Minister of Culture and the tax/subsidy
schedules do not apply to objects that are owned abroad. Thus, if a foreign collector
10Poor owners of unregistered art may wish to hold on to objects as a way of keeping an informa-
tional advantage over the government and increasing their chance of being able to sell an object to
a smuggler moving the object overseas.
owns the object, the foreign collector chooses the selling procedure optimal to him.
This will typically be an optimal auction. When the domestic owner has future
ownership rights, he will choose the selling procedure that maximizes his surplus
subject to the legal and tax environment.
Maintenance: The party holding an object after the sales stage must immediately
pay M to prevent the destruction of the object.
Consumption: All players consume for the period and play continues to the next
period.
2.3 Aligning Incentives through Leases
As is typical with moral hazard problems, when taxation is frictionless and there
is no asymmetric information, a tax system that can use lump sum transfers for
redistribution purposes and taxes and subsidies to resolve the externality can reach
the first best. In particular, the externality can be internalized by a subsidy to the
owner of DE,t for every period the object remains intact and in the country. This will
induce optimal maintenance and export decisions.
In reality, governments may be reluctant to subsidize wealthy owners of antiquities,
estimation of the externality may be difficult, and bureaucrats in charge of taxes and
subsidies may be corrupt. If potentially corrupt bureaucrats must judge the value of
revealed objects, an asymmetric information model suggests that a subsidy program
may be inefficient. 1"
In this section we examine the optimal policy when taxes and subsidies are com-
pletely inefficient. A dollar taxed from the individual is consumed by bureaucracy
and leads to no social welfare. Likewise a dollar in subsidy requires infinite govern-
ment funds. We begin with a simple two period model that illustrates how the owner
of the object responds to export bans and then sketch how this model extends to the
infinite horizon case.
"See the appendix for a simple model of this in the case in which high (H) and low (L) quality
objects are random across a large number of potential domestic owners and the government wants
to create an incentive program for people to reveal these antiquities. Under these conditions an
incentive program for people to reveal local antiquities would expand to become far larger than the
optimal program size, and would be partially comprised of bribes which the government may view
as wasteful.
2.3.1 Two Period Case
Taking the most simple case of our model, let t E (0, 1}, 6 = 1, R = 1, and N --+ oo00.
Further assume that there is a perfect credit market so that
co + c, + [Xl + x2]M = wl + w2 + [Z1 + Z2][F - M] (2.3)
where F - M is the per period price generated by auctioning the object abroad.
We begin by studying the owner's optimal actions under a free market and an
export ban when no subsidies and taxes are used.12 Beginning with the case of a free
market, since credit markets are perfect and the owner's utility for consumption is
concave, the owner will borrow so that his consumption is constant over time. Using
the fact that credit markets are perfect, the owner's problem simplifies to:
max 2u + w (F - M) X2 XF) Do[x+ 2 (2.4)
mx,22 2 2
As can be seen in this equation, the proportion of time that the object stays at home,
X1+2, is increasing monotonically in the owner's total wealth. For low wealth levels,2 1
the marginal utility of consumption is high leading to a sale of the object in period
1. For intermediate wealth levels the owner shares usage, for instance by selling the
object in period 2. For high wealth levels the owner keeps the object domestically in
both periods.
The owner of an object facing an export ban faces a similar problem with the added
constraint that foreign sales are illegal and thus zt = 0. Again equating marginal
utility across periods, an owner's problem becomes:
max 2u (w 2 + 1 X2 +X 1 M + D[x1 + x 2]. (2.5)
X1,X2 2 2
subject to x 2 < X1.
Equations 2.4 and 2.5 differ in two respects. First, the inability to sell abroad
reduces the total potential income of the owner by F - M. Since consumption is
concave, the decrease in income leads to an increase in the the marginal utility of
consumption for individuals under an export ban which reduces maintenance incen-
tives and potentially decreases home usage. On the other hand, an owner facing an
121t is interesting to note, that even though taxes are inefficient, they still may be used as punish-
ment to dissuade owners from selling an object. The optimal tax schedule, however, is isomorphic
to the sharing rules developed in the next section and thus is omitted from formal analysis.
export ban considers the tradeoff between keeping an object and letting it be de-
stroyed rather than the tradeoff between keeping an object and selling it. For a given
wealth level, this substitution effect will increase the amount of time an object stays
intact in the country of origin.
Theorem 6 For high wealth levels of the private owner, an export ban leads to an
increase in home usage relative to a free market. For low wealth levels, an export ban
leads to the destruction of objects.
Proof. Define an allocation profile as {x 1 , x2 }. Under a free market zt = 1 - xt
while under an export ban zt = 0. Letting W = w1 + w2 and writing out the maximal
utility for each possible allocation profile generates Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Utility by Allocation Profile {xl,x 2}
{0,0} {0,1} {1,0} {1,1}
Export Ban 2u() 0 2u( - L + Do 2u( - M)+2Do
Free Market 2u( +F-M same as 2u ( + F -M )+Do 2u( -M)+2Do
The marginal utility of u is decreasing in W and thus the choice of x 1 + x 2 is
increasing monotonically in W. For each trade policy, there exists a unique wealth,
W, such that the owner is indifferent between selecting allocation {0, 0} and {1, 0}
(or {0, 1} in the case of a free market) and a unique wealth W such that the owner
is indifferent between selecting allocations {1, 0} and {1, 1}.
Notice that the gross utility for choosing allocation {1, 1} is the same under both
an export ban and a free market. Since P-2M > -m ..M WBan < Free
The ordering of WBan and WFree is ambiguous. As with the upper threshold,
the difference in consumption is larger in the free market than under an export ban.
However, there is now a difference in income for allocation profile {1, 0} so that the
concavity of u needs to be taken into account. In general, an export ban may lead to
both a decrease in welfare and a decrease in the amount of time an object stays in
the country of origin if u is very concave or F - M is large. m
2.3.2 Infinite Horizon
The two period model can be readily extended to infinite periods. Assume that the
period length gets small so that 6 -- 1 from below and assume JR = 1. Recall that
under these conditions, it is possible to construct 7tD = [1 - 6] • 6=oYxt which is
continuous over [0, 1] using a combination of the discrete variables {zo, xl,... ,x }.
Maintaining the assumption of perfect credit markets, we can simplify the infinite
horizon problem under free markets to:
max u((1 - 6)W + [Fi - M]- rD-) DDo (2.6)
rD  \ /
where 7rD E [0, 1] is the discount adjusted proportion of time the object is used by
the domestic owner and W = E'o 6Ytwt. We can similarly rewrite the maximization
problem under an export ban as:
max ((1- 6)W - 7DM) + DDo. (2.7)
7rD /
Just as in the two period case, the creation of an export ban leads to an income and
substitution effect. An owner facing an export ban considers the tradeoff between the
utility gained from using the object and the consumption lost from maintaining the
object. An owner under a free market considers the tradeoff between using the good
and the value gained from selling it. As shown graphically on the right hand side of
Figure 2-1 by the gap between WBan and WFree, this substitution effect leads to an
increase in usage for high wealth levels.
On the other hand, an owner faced with an export ban cannot increase wealth
through partial usage. For any wealth level where ran < 1, the marginal utility for
consumption is higher under an export ban than under a free market. As seen in the
slopes of the two lines, this income effect leads art usage to decline faster in response
to a decrease in wealth under an export ban than under a free market.
2.3.3 The Minister of Culture's Problem
Returning to the policy makers problem, we analyze the simplest case of the model
where the domestic externality is constant with value DE. 13
13 0ur main results of this section are about the reachable set of contracts. Since DE,t does not
affect this dimension, we avoid the added notation necessary to characterize solutions with this
additional dimension.
Figure 2-1: Discounted proportion of time object remains intact and in the country
of origin as a function of owner's wealth
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A Rationale for Export Bans
An export ban may be welfare improving if it keeps the object in the country of
origin for an extended period of time and the externality for domestic usage, DE, is
large. Export bans are a constraint imposed on the owner of an object. If the foreign
collector places more value on the object, the constraint is binding and fundamentally
reduces the possible utility of the owner. From a social perspective, an export ban
will be preferable to free trade if the increased utility from usage is greater than the
decrease in consumption utility. In the infinite horizon case, this will be true if:
(rBan - 7Free) (Do + E[DE]) > U(cBan) - u(cFree) (2.8)
where
(cFree) = u((1 - 6)W + [F - M] - 7rFreeFp
u(cBan) = U ((1 - 6)W - rDM). (2.9)
Our results show why export bans may have significantly different effects in rich
versus poor countries. In a country such as Italy where artifacts are typically in the
hands of the affluent and where the average income is high, export bans may increase
the amount of time an object stays in the country without increasing the theft and
W
destruction rate of objects. In a poor country such as Mali, however, many objects
are buried in areas of high poverty with the location of objects known only by the
local population. At least in the model, this combination leads to a deterioration of
protection when bans are put into place in poor locales.
Optimal Policy
As before, define 7rD as the discounted proportion of time that an object is maintained
domestically. The social planner's first best solution is to choose rD that solves
max u((1 - 6)W + P - M - roDP) + rD[Do + DE]. (2.10)
7rDE[0,1]
Taking the FOC of Equation 2.10 let 7r* be the value of r that solves
u' (( - ) W + P - M - r) = DE (2.11)
for wealth level W. From the bounds on orD, it follows that
1 r* > 1
7 = l* 7* E [0,1] (2.12)
0 lr* <0
We take the viewpoint that the government cannot directly regulate 7D but does
have the ability to limit, 7FF, the proportion of time that the object can leave the coun-
try legally. We restrict our attention to regulation that can restrict the percentage of
time an object can leave the nation but does not regulate the exact periods. Legisla-
tion that requires an object to stay in the country for a certain amount of time before
export increases the reachable set of domestic usage in this simple model but suffers
in more complicated environments with credit constraints, stochastic endowments, or
asymmetric information.
Theorem 7 When taxes and transfers are completely inefficient, the government can
achieve the second best solution by setting a constraint on the amount of time an object
can leave the country.
Proof: Proof is in the appendix.
While we leave the formal proof of Theorem 7 to the appendix, we show the key
ideas from the proof graphically. In the interesting case of our model, the first best
level of rD is not implementable since it does not leave enough consumption to the
agent to satisfy his maintenance constraints. The government must therefore look for
Reach(W1), the maximum reachable 7D given the agents initial wealth IW.
Figure 2-2: Construction of the optimal sharing rule
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As shown in the left hand side of Figure 2-2, 7reach(lW) is found by restricting the
share of foreign usage to a level f such that an owner with slightly less wealth would
begin to allow the object to be destroyed. The logic for such a law is as follows. Under
any sharing rule, domestic usage is increasing in wealth. Thus, since the destruction
of the object leads to a decrease in wealth, the optimal policy never creates incentives
for destruction. 14 At the same time, after an object has been moved abroad for a
proportion of time equal to TF, the owner of the object faces a defacto export ban.
For any wealth level where an agent who faces an export ban chooses to maintain
the object, domestic usage under an export ban is weakly higher than under any
other policy. Thus, by using the substitution effect of the export ban and the income
effect of the free market, a sharing rule that limits the time an object can be shared
maximizes rD for a given wealth W.
Following this logic over all possible wealth levels, the maximal reachable 7rD is
parallel to the contracts attainable with a free market but is shifted to the left by
14By a similar logic, the optimal policy never charges a positive tax for foreign usage.
|
--
W r e e - W an . This set is shown on the right hand side of Figure 2-2.
Theorem 8 Let 7r** be the solution to
u'((1 - 6) + P- M-r)= min Do +DE Do (2.13)
For a given owner wealth of W, The optimal policy that is incentive compatible is to
constrain the amount of time an object can leave the country to TF = 1 - 7rSB where
1 1r** > 1
7SB = r** r** e [0, 1]. (2.14)
0 lr** < 0
Wealth and the ratio of value to maintenance costs both play an important role
in defining the optimal policy. In a relatively wealthy country, a straight export ban
may approximate the optimal second best policy. In a developing country, Do may
be small and the wealth level of owners may be low. Under these circumstances, a
straight export ban can lead to a much lower level of domestic usage than a policy
that allows for the sharing of usage rights.
It is worth noting that the optimal sharing rule developed in this section can
also be implemented using tax policy. Again using the assumption that taxes are
completely inefficient, the optimal tax policy uses a non-linear tax schedule which
has zero tax for an object that are shared abroad for more than time TF and imposes
the maximum possible tax subsequently. This tax policy is identical to a law that
restricts foreign use to 'F.
2.4 Transaction Costs and the Role of Leases
In this section we explore how asymmetric information and uncertainty about the
future shape the optimal contract for sharing objects abroad. When a country is
initially poor but may want objects back in the future, it must decide how best to
move the object and secure its return. When the externality for domestic usage
is unknown, selling the object today and attempting to repurchase it in the future
may be inefficient, since attempts by foreign collectors to extract surplus from the
government may prevent efficient transactions. Keeping ownership rights to an object
in the home country via a lease or fixing prices in future negotiations with an option
allows the government to exert influence on future negotiations and eliminate this
hold up problem.
To focus on asymmetric information, we present a case polar to the prior section
in which the government's tax technology is completely efficient. The government can
use lump sum transfers so that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the
marginal value of money for the government. Further, it can use subsidies and taxes
on legal transactions to align the incentives of the owner with that of the government.
Relative to the size of the country's total budget, the value of the object is assumed
to be small. As such, we simplify the problem by assuming a linear marginal utility
of consumption. Initially we also assume that the country is not credit constrained
and normalize u(ct) = ct. In section 2.4.2, we relax this assumption in order to study
optimal contracting in an environment where the shadow cost of money decreases
over time.
2.4.1 Asymmetric Information
Let Dt = Do + DE,t for t = 10, ... , }00. We assume that the country is poor initially
so that Do = D < F. However, there is potential for it to become rich in the future.
Let D1 be drawn from distribution H1 (.) and assume that all exogenous variation is
resolved at this point so that Dt = D 1, Vt > 1. We assume that at time Do, the the
value D 1 is unknown to all parties but the distribution H1 (.) is common knowledge.
At time 1, D1 is realized, but is private information known only to the Minister of
Culture.
In our model, ownership of an object gives the owner the power to choose the
mechanism that is used in future exchange. Thus, in the first period, the government
has the power to select the mechanism by which an object is sold. If the object
is sold to the foreign buyer in the initial period, then that foreign seller selects the
mechanism in future negotiations. We assume that both the government and foreign
buyers have the power to commit to any mechanism they choose.
As before foreign collectors have a private value for art consumption FP which is
independently drawn from cdf A(.) which is time invariant. Keeping the mnemonics
D = Domestic, F = Foreign, H = Home, A = Abroad in mind, the problem can be
though of as a two period allocation problem.
Period 0 Period 1+
Domestic Do = D D Hl(.) (2.15)
Foreign F' - A(.) F' = F'
In the first period, all of the foreign collectors have greater value for object than the
home country and thus the object should be moved abroad in a first-best world. In
the second period, the home country learns its new domestic valuation and may value
the object more than foreigners.
To avoid corner solutions, we assume that H has sufficient variance such that
H 1(F) < 1 and H1(F) > 0. Asymmetric information surrounding the government's
willingness to pay for an object is most likely more acute than foreign collectors' valu-
ations. In most government decisions, an official is assigned to deal with repatriation
and must estimate the net present value of future utility that citizens of its country
would get from the object. Given the highly subjective nature of this estimation it
may be difficult for a foreign buyer to accurately gauge the government's willingness
to pay.
Sales and Repurchase Contracts
We first analyze the efficiency of selling an object in period 0 and attempting to
repurchase the object back from the foreign buyer in period 1. In our model, the
foreign buyers (i) have independent valuations, (ii) are risk neutral, (iii) are not credit
constrained, and (iv) are symmetric with valuations drawn from the same distribution
functions. Under these characteristics, if an object is sold using either the efficient or
optimal auction, the winner of the object will be the foreign collector with the highest
intrinsic valuation for the object FN.
Given this observation, analysis of the sale and repurchase contract occurs in two
steps. We first study the optimal mechanism for the foreign buyer who is attempting
to sell the object back to the Minister of Culture in period 1. Using the expected
revenue from this resale auction, we then return to period 0 to analyze efficiency.
Step 1 - Repurchase: For readability we define
P = P + M (2.16)
and designate the hazard rate of distribution H and A as
h(P) a(P)
1H(P) )A(/) = (2.17)1 - H(P) 1 - A(P)
The foreign collector in our problem has commitment power and thus selects the
mechanism that maximizes his expected utility. To avoid the decrease in monopoly
power associated with intertemporal price discrimination, the foreign buyer commits
to offering the object back to the Minister of Culture exactly once in period 1. The
optimal price is found by solving the standard per period monopoly problem
Pt = arg max[Pt - (FN - M)][1 - H(Pt)], (2.18)
Pt
and then aggregating up over all periods:
00
pResale = • t-lpt, (2.19)
t=1
Taking the first order condition of Equation 2.18, the solution takes on the familiar
monopoly solution:
pResale= 6  FN - M + M (2.20)
1 - 6)H(HP M )
Step 2 - Sale: Returning to the auction in stage 1, a foreign collector with value Fi
incorporates the monopoly rents into his original value. Thus, the value of an object
to a foreign collector with value Fi is:
1 1 - H( )
V1(F 2) = (F' - M) + 1 - H(PM) (2.21)1-6 1-6 ?I)H(pM)
Consider the case where limy-,,. When the optimal reserve price is less than
V(F), the optimal and efficient auction will both generate revenues equal to V(F)
and the foreign collectors expected value goes to zero. However, the monopoly power
of the foreign collector in the second period creates residual inefficiencies in the initial
auction. By attempting to extract rents from the domestic owner, the foreign collector
offers an inefficiently high price in period 1. While these rents are recaptured by the
domestic owner in period 0, the allocation in the future is inefficient which leads to a
permanent loss of possible total utility.
Since the collector's utility is always zero and his utility is linear, maximizing
domestic utility subject to the foreign collector's IR constraint yields the socially
optimal price:
pFB = FN - M. (2.22)
In a sale and repurchase scheme, pResale > pFB and thus there exists possible real-
izations of D 1 in which an object is misallocated to the foreign collector when the
object has a greater value at home.
Rationale for an Export Ban
Whereas objects that leave the country in the future stay in foreign hands too long,
inefficiency may also cause the home country to block sales in the initial period if
the government can only sell objects. As a simple example, continue to assume that
N --+ oo so that FN = F. Comparing the revenue that the home country expects to
receive in period 1 when it has control of the auction mechanism versus when it does
not, the home country expected loss from a sale is:
SFB - Ssale - [H1(PReSal e ) - H1(F)] [E(D21F < D2  pResale) T]. (2.23)
Probability of Expected Loss
Inefficient Trade
Intuitively, the magnitude of this inefficiency is equal to the probability of an inef-
ficient trade multiplied by the expected loss when such an event occurs. When the
discount rate is small, the home country may have incentive to hold the object until
uncertainty is resolved.
Leases
At its core, the problem with selling an object and trying to repurchase it in the
future is a contractual one. Both the foreign collector and the domestic owner have
an incentive to distort prices and consumption in order to increase rents in the second
stage. However, since these rents are already priced into the initial auction, strategic
action leads to pure efficiency losses without any change in the overall share of profits.
Leases diminish the effects of asymmetric information by leaving the choice of
mechanism in both periods to the government, which can use auctions to significantly
reduce the asymmetric information about the valuations of the foreign collectors.
Consider a lease auction in which the government leases the object to the foreign
agent in the first period but retains future ownership rights. As is well known from
the auction literature, an agent running multiple auctions cannot improve his final
outcome by using information about the winning bid from the first auction in later
auctions. We thus assume the agent constrains the information generated in the
auction by running an optimal English auction in stage 1 in which the second highest
bid price but not the true value of the winner is revealed.
Given the information revelation of the initial auction, the domestic owner knows
the value of the second highest agent FN-1 and the density function of the highest
bidder:
a(F) F > FN-1
aN(F) = 1-A(F-) F > (2.24)
0 otherwise
The home country attempting to maximize profit in the second period solves:
max [1 - AN(P)]P+AN(P)[D2 - M]. (2.25)
Noting that since:
AN(p) - A(P) - A(F N - 1) (2.26)
1 - A(F N - 1) (2.26)
A(FN-1) drops out of the FOC leaving an optimal period 2 offer price of:
P = max(D 2 + 1 FN- - M. (2.27)
What is most interesting with this result is that the optimal pricing rule from equation
(2.27) is equivalent to running an English auction in each period with a reservation
price dependent only on the home countries value and the initial distribution. As the
number of bidders goes toward infinity, such a lease auction converges to the socially
efficient price P = max(D2, FN) - M.
Theorem 9 When the government's utility function is linear and the buyers' valu-
ation are independent and identically distributed, the optimal allocation mechanism
is to lease objects each period using an anonymous English auction with reservation
price:
PtRES = Dt - M + (2.28)
Proof: Proof is in the appendix.
As indicated in the theorem, the optimal lease contract generalizes readily to a
more complicated environment where Dt grows over time. 15 Since contracting in each
forward period is done once uncertainty about the home countries value is resolved,
the reserve price in each period extracts the maximum expected value. Further, since
the true valuation of the highest valued bidder stays private, there is no incentives
for individuals to strategically manipulate their bids.
2.4.2 Credit Constraints
In the previous section, access to a perfect credit market allowed efficiency of the
contract to be separated from intertemporal consumption. In each period the govern-
ment had the ability to borrow against future leases and thus smooth consumption
over time.
In many environments where objects are threatened, the government is likely to be
credit constrained. This section looks at the case where the total value of an object is
small relative to the nation's budget, but where the marginal utility of money differs
over time. If the government expects to get richer in the future, the government
would prefer to extract and spend as much surplus as possible from the object in
period 0 as long as the inefficiencies caused in the art market are not too large. A
sale auction with an option to buy the object back at a prearranged price resolves
the holdup problem of the sales contract while maximizing expected revenue in the
first period.
Option Contracts
Suppose that the government is credit constrained so that the marginal utility of
money is decreasing over time. We assume that the value of the object relative to
the total budget is small and represent the utility of consumption in each period as
u(ct) = (1 +,yt)ct. The country is poor today and is credit constrained so that Yo _ -•t
for all t. As such, the Minister of Culture prefers to (i) consume the value of the
object in period 0 and (ii) prevent holdup in future periods.
An alternative to a lease in this circumstance is to sell an object to the foreign
buyer with an option to repurchase the object in the future at a fixed price r. Deter-
mining the optimal reserve price in future periods is complicated by the fact that the
actual value of the object is unknown ex ante. The home country has two instruments
- the reserve price PtRES and the option price r at which it could repurchase the
15That is Dt = Dt-1 + Zt(.) where Zt(.) is bounded below at zero.
object in period 2. In order for foreign collectors to be willing to enter the auction,
the option price of an object must be greater than or equal to the sale price adjusted
for interest. Thus rt Ž RtPt. Under the assumption of independent and identically
distributed values, the following theorem gives the optimal option contract:
Theorem 10 When the government's utility function is linear and the buyers' val-
uations are independent and identically distributed, the optimal mechanism using a
sale and option to repurchase is an English auction that sells ownership rights for
each period independently with a reservation price of:
RES t + ) [E(DelDe < PtRESRt(l+7t))-M] + A(ER (2.29)S 7t + K(70) A t
where
= o - Yt() 70 - 7t (2.30)
H (tRESRt)
The optimal option price r is set equal to the sale price in each period, multiplied by
the rate of return Rt.
Proof: Proof is in the appendix.
Like the lease contract, the optimal option contract eliminates the holdup prob-
lems of the sale contract by settling all negotiations ex-ante. The (0yo) term in this
equation is a term that adjusts the reservation price downward when (i) the marginal
value of money is higher today and (ii) it is likely that the country will repurchase
the object in the future. In both these cases, the object acts like collateral in a loan
with the reservation price being used to maximize loan size.
When there are no credit constraints and the marginal utility is normalized to
one, the optimal option contract auctions the object using a reservation price equal
to:
PtRES = t [E(DID < PRESt) - M + A(tESRt) (2.31)
This equation is analogous to the reservation price of a lease, shown in Equation
2.28, with the difference being that the auction is done in period 1 prior to the true
valuation of D2 being known. In an environment in which there is no corruption
and the government knows its future valuation, the efficiency of the lease and option
contracts are the same. However, in the case where future valuations are unknown
and credit constraints do not exist, leases dominate both option contracts and sale
and repurchase contracts.
Theorem 11 When future valuations of the home country are unknown to all parties
and there are no credit constraints, a lease auction maximizes social welfare of the
home country.
Proof: Proof is in the appendix.
When credit constraints exist and the country is expected to get wealthier over
time, options may dominate leases since the country has the ability to consume more
than its per period valuation. In our model, this will occur if Yo > ~/t for all t and the
future valuations of DE,t are known but private.
Theorem 12 When future valuations of the home country are known but private
information and credit constraints bind, an auction that sells the object with an option
to repurchase maximizes social welfare of the home country.
Proof: Proof is in the appendix.
Option auctions differ from lease auctions in that they can generate a much larger
surplus in the initial period for consumption. In an option contract, the object is
sold in the first period, allowing a country the ability to consume more than FN- 1
in period 1. In cases where the government is credit constrained, the flexibility in
consumption that option auctions allow may be advantageous.
2.5 Corruption and Intergenerational Conflict
In this section we argue that if there is a probability of a corrupt Minister of Culture in
each period who seeks to appropriate the value of the object from future generations,
laws restricting international art transactions may be optimal. When the only laws
that can be passed is an export ban, a benevolent Minister of Culture may choose
to enact such a law in order to constrain bad agents at the cost of restricting good
agents from acting optimally. For reasonable parameter values, less draconian export
restrictions that allow one period leases are superior to both free trade and complete
export bans.
Recall from the timing of the model that the Minister of Culture can pass a law
prior to period 0 that binds itself and all future regimes. In this section, we assume
that decisions in subsequent periods are made by a sequence of new Ministers of
Culture who act as a social planner with probability 1 - e but which maximizes their
own consumption with no regard for current or future generations with probability e.
Bad ministers will allow objects to be exported and consume the proceeds.
As in section 2.4 we assume that the value of Do + DE,t is stochastic with inde-
pendent and identically distributed shocks and CDF Ht(.). We continue to assume
that tax and subsidy are perfect under a benevolent Minister of Culture and that
the country faces no credit constraints so that the marginal utility of consumption is
normalized to 1.
A good leader who has no constraints on his action allows an object to be used by
the foreign collector any time Do + DE < P and keeps the object local otherwise. 16
Under an export ban, the object always stays in the country resulting in a value of
Do + E[DE].
Theorem 13 If the only law available to a benevolent Minister of Culture is an export
ban or free trade, as 6 -4 1, there exists a probability that a bad minister will come
into power, e* E (0, 1), such that if E < e* the government maintains a free market
and if e E (e*, 1 - c*) the government passes an export ban.
Proof: Proof is in the appendix.
In this model, export bans act as a very blunt tool to constrain bad future ministers
from acting in a malevolent way. By attempting to reduce the ability of future corrupt
leaders to steal funds, the government limits the ability of good actors to make welfare
improving trades.
Leases act as a way of balancing concerns of corruption with efficiency. Such
leases may achieve a good balance of restricting the long-term damage that corrupt
officials can do while still giving benevolent ones the ability to make Pareto-improving
short-term trades.
To see this, note that with free trade, the country gets max(P, Do + DE) - M
each period before the first bad leader arrives. Afterwards it gets nothing. The net
present value of this stream is:
00
EDE Z 6t( 1 - )t( max(P, Do + DE,t) - M). (2.32)
t=O
16A benevolent dictator may also sell an object and distribute the earnings during his rule to
prevent future bad dictators from expropriating this value. We assume that P < Do + E(DE) so
that such preemptive distribution is always dominated by an export ban.
Under an export ban that successfully binds bad bureaucrats, the country receives a
maximum NPV of:17
Z 6t(1 -( )min(t,l ) (Do + E[DE,t] - M). (2.33)
t=O
Under a constitution or international treaty that permits one period leases but not
sales, the NPV of the stream is:
00oo
EDE Z 6t( 1 m- i)mn(t,1) (max(P, Do + DE,t) - M). (2.34)
t=O
This implies that for any positive e, allowing leases but not sales dominates free trade.
If P exceeds Do + DE,t in some state of the world, then allowing leases but not sales
is preferable to a complete export ban.
As noted in section 2.4.2, one caveat is that allowing leases but not sales dominates
free trade only if there are no credit constraints. In a model with credit constraints,
it may be desirable to transfer long-run claims on the object in exchange for higher
consumption in the short run. A benevolent Minister of Culture, who believes that
they would like the object in the future, will always want to sell the object with the
option to repurchase in order to avoid holdup problems. A bad Minister of Culture
would like to eliminate these repurchase clauses since the sale price in the future
is higher without the option. As with leases, putting some restriction on the type
of contract being signed will ensure efficiency and reduce the damage that corrupt
officials can have on future generations.
2.6 Conclusion
Debates between cultural nationalists and internationalists have focused on the de-
sirability of export bans. We argue that it may be appropriate to consider a broader
class of contracts, including leases and perhaps sales with options to repurchase. Un-
der three of the potential rationales for export bans we consider - externalities from
keeping the object intact and within the country, the possibility that corrupt rulers
or bureaucrats will expropriate the value of the national patrimony, and the difficulty
17We implicitly assume that bad leaders will still consume the usage value of an object in the
period that they are in power, but that the export ban is otherwise successful. We view this as an
upper bound of social value with export bans since in reality ban laws are typically porous.
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of repurchasing objects once sold - leases or sales with options to repurchase may
perform as well or better than export bans while generating more revenue for the
country and improving maintenance incentives.
The simple models we examine here may abstract from important issues. First,
objections to the sale of important cultural items may relate to unwillingness to
alienate objects from the nation or distaste for "commodification" of antiquities. In
this case, sales with repurchase options may be unacceptable, but leases may still
be acceptable. If leases for general revenue are not acceptable, leases which dedicate
revenue to the preservation of antiquities may be more acceptable.
Second, we do not address the case of disputed ownership (including when objects
are overseas). It seems likely that in such cases, such as between Greece and Britain
concerning the Elgin marbles, leases may be a way to effectively split ownership and
thus avoid legal costs without declaring the value of the object.
Third, we focus on the case when the government knows the object exists and
where it is. The appendix discusses a case in which the government needs to create
incentives for citizens to reveal the existence of objects and argues that offering them
lease rights for a set number of years could create such an incentive and may be
robust to corruption problems in valuing objects that might make a cash reward
system untenable.
It is worth noting that lotteries, as well as lease arrangements, could allow the
value of objects to be split without declaring their value and could create incentives
to reveal objects without a need for the state to estimate objects' value, but under
lotteries the parties bear more risk and, as argued above, lease arrangements that
give ownership rights to the state may achieve preferable intertemporal allocation.
As with any policy that increases the domestic value of antiquities, there is poten-
tial that the introduction of lease markets can exacerbate looting by giving individuals
incentive to grab objects today. The ability to grant leases of varying length depend-
ing on the method of extraction may partially mitigate this incentive problem by
creating differentiated products between legally and illegally excavated antiquities.
The rules of such a policy are likely to vary on a country by country basis depending
on the relative weight placed on recovering objects that have already been looted and
preserving pristine sites.
Fourth, we have assumed that the valuation of foreign buyers does not change with
respect to their ownership rights. It may be the case that for some private collectors,
ownership itself generates value which is lost under lease and option contracts. In
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such circumstances, the sale of fractional ownership rights may be preferable to other
contracts where a portion of ownership is sold to the foreign collector. Fractional
ownership allows for both sharing and foreign ownership, but requires more sophis-
ticated contracting which may be difficult in an international setting. Nonetheless,
given the large amount of looted objects moving to private hands, such contracts may
be worth exploring.
We have noted that leases are likely to be preferable in the presence of corrup-
tion or asymmetric information while option contracts are likely to be optimal in an
environment with credit constraints. Limitations on the types of contracts that may
be signed are a general constraint imposed on the action of the owner. The choice
between allowing options and leases ultimately depends on the constraints facing the
country and the relative weights given to the value of domestic ownership.
We have not modeled the optimal length of leases. If transaction costs are sub-
stantial, relatively longer leases may be desirable. We also do not address moral
hazard in maintenance and return of the object by the receiving country. Based on
existing experience with loans between museums, our sense is that these issues could
be adequately addressed contractually, as long as the legal system in the receiving
country is sufficiently well-functioning.
Finally, although this analysis has focused on markets for antiquities, it is worth
noting that parts of the analysis may have implications for other contracting situa-
tions. In particular, the argument in Section 2.4 may help explain other patterns of
asset ownership.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Appendix 1: Using Leases as an Information Rent
We consider an economy with high (H) and low (L) quality objects which are dis-
tributed randomly across a large number of potential domestic owners. Each owner
in the economy has no intrinsic value for her object (DH = D- = 0) but is in contact
with a smuggler who will pay o-VH r iVL in exchange for a high or low quality
object. For simplicity, we assume that u(ct) = ct so that each owner maximizes the
expected value of her action.
The government accurately estimates the proportion (p) of high quality objects
in the economy and the externality to its constituents for domestic use (-D H and
_EDL'). It has de jure rights to all domestic objects in the economy but lacks
information in two dimensions. First, the government does not know the location of
objects and must provide an information rent to domestic owners in order to convince
them to reveal their objects. Second the government cannot distinguish between H
and L quality units without the use of a bureaucrat who estimates its value and
generates a report. Some bureaucrats are corrupt and may adversely alter a report
to the government by reporting a low quality object as high quality. Assume that a
proportion b of low quality objects are passed through the hands of corrupt officials
who will accept a bribe B as compensation for deception.
The government would like to design an incentive mechanism that creates incen-
tives for individuals to report their goods but is hampered by the inefficiencies that
are generated by using bureaucrats as a part of their mechanism. Reliance on bu-
reaucrats to carry out interim action may make the cost of a program prohibitively
expensive or lead to allocation inefficiencies that may swamp the actual value of the
program.
The timing of the game is as follows:
* Stage 0: The government decides upon an incentive mechanism and purchase
rule.
* Stage 1: Individual owners decide whether to publicly disclose their object or
sell them to the smuggler.
* Stage 2: Publicly disclosed objects are randomly assigned to bureaucrats:
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* Stage 3: If an individual owner is assigned to a corrupt bureaucrat, the owner
chooses whether to offer a bribe
* Stage 4: Bureaucrats generate their reports and the governments incentive
mechanism is implemented.
Suppose that DEH > VH and DL > VL. In this case, the government would like to
retain all objects for home use and thus must create an incentive structure that induces
all agents to reveal their objects. Suppose first that the only mechanism available
to the government is to provide cash transfers that are contingent on bureaucratic
reports. Let TH and TL be transfers made to owners whose objects are reported
as high and low respectively. Setting the IR constraint for individuals holding both
high and low quality goods to the value of their outside option, we have
TH V H ,
(1 - b)T L + b(T H - B ) = V .
Rearranging in terms of TH and TL yields:
TH= VH,
1-6
The total cost of a project that purchases both high and low quality goods is
[p + (1 - p)b]TH + (1 - p)(1 - b)TL.
Plugging in for TH and TL yields:
p VH + (1 - p) -L (1 - p)bB.1-6 1 -
In the case of DEH > VH and DL > VL the possibility of bribes reduces the
cost to providing incentives for low quality objects which reduces the cost of the
overall program. Bribery generates additional transfers to bureaucrats which must
ultimately be paid by the government. Such bribes may make the total cost of the
program prohibitive, especially in cases in which the government views bribes as a
form of pure waste in the economy.
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The effect of bribery is exacerbated in the more likely case where D H > V H and
DL < VL. Here, the government would like to retain objects with a large externality
and allow other objects to be moved out of the country. Corruption generates
inefficiency both by making the total size of the program larger than it should be and
by generating inefficiency through the misallocation of some low quality objects to
the domestic market. The net allocation gain for the program is -~ times
p[D H
- VH] - (1 - p)b[VL 
- DL ]
If p is small, the overall efficiency gain for the program may be negative. The gross
cost for the program is - times
[p + (1 - p)b]VH
with (1 - p)bB of these proceeds going to pay for bribes to intermediaries. This pro-
gram size is potentially far larger than the optimal program and is partially comprised
of bribes which the government may view as wasteful.
2.7.2 Appendix 2: Loss Aversion
The social psychology literature suggests that many collectors' valuations of an object
increase after taking possession of it. Such attachment creates inefficiencies any time
the owner and private collector renegotiate display rights with changed ownership.
We model the attachment effect as stemming from loss aversion, though political
economy constraints on foreign institutions limiting their ability to resell objects will
generate near identical results. Assume that there exists a foreign collector who is
loss averse with a reference dependent utility function that values art consumption
xt and non art consumption ct in each period. Following Koszegi & Rabin (2006)
we assume that the foreign collector's utility function is composed of two separable
parts: the pure consumption utility of a bundle and a reference dependent gain-loss
value of a bundle. A buyer's utility is given by:
2
U(c, xIr, r,) = EJ`t-iv(ctxtcr, )r,,) (2.35)
t=1
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where
V(Ct, xtIrce, rx,) = Ct + xtF + L(ct - rc,) + p,(Fxt - Frx,). (2.36)
Define p4(x) as a "universal gain-loss function" with the following properties:18
(1): p(x) is continuous for all x, twice differentiable for x 5 0 and p(O) = 0
(2): p(x) is strictly increasing
(3): p"(x) = 0 for all x • 0
(4): if y > x > 0 then p(y) + mu(-y) < p(x) + Ip(-x)
(5): p'_(0)/p'(0) - A > 1
p(x) is linear for positive and negative values of x but has a steeper slope for losses
than gains. Let p(x) = rqx for x > 0. By (3) and (5), this implies that when x < 0,
p(x) = Arjx with A > 1. Agents who internalize a loss in one consumption dimension
and a gain in the other will be reluctant to move away from the reference point even
if consumption utility remains constant.
Consider first the case in which an agent's reference point is based on his initial
state. When an agent does not own the object, as in Figure la, his reference point is
rt = (cinit, 0). A reduction in non art consumption to c in exchange for an increase in
art consumption to x yields a change of utility of:
v(c,xlrl) - v(rlrl) = (1 + Ar)[c - cinit] + (1 + i?)Fx. (2.37)
A loss averse agent's indifference curve passing through the reference point rl is all
(c, x) pairs such that:
1 + Fx + c = cinit. (2.38)
1 + 77A
If the agent is loss neutral (A = 1), a foreign collector's utility function reduces to the
simple utility function. As loss aversion increases, the agent requires a larger change
in ownership to compensate for the losses felt in consumption. This drives down the
price a foreign collector is willing to pay to buy an object.
Conversely, an agent who owns the object and has a reference point equal to the
status quo r2 = (ct - pSale, 1) will be averse to moving away from owning the object.
1 8The universal gain-loss functions are identical to Bowman, Minehart & Rabin (1999) where the
gain-loss function is assumed to be linear in sensitivity. See also Kahneman & Tversky (1991).
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r2 = (C,,, - pSle, 1)
psale pResale
Figure la: Indifference curve with reference at ri Figure ib: Indifference curve with reference at r2
for 2= 1 and2> 1 for A = 1 and 2 > 1
As in Figure ib, the indifference curve from r2 is all points such that:
1+ QA 1 + q
c - A Fx = Ciit + F. (2.39)1+rq 1 +
As A increases, the level of c necessary to compensate for the lost art consumption x
increases. This drives up the price that the domestic owner must pay to repurchase
the object from the foreign collector.
In the case of sale and repurchase contracts, negotiations in the sale and resale
phase are likely to occur at two reference points. This may drive a wedge in the price
paid for an object and the price at which an object may be repurchased. Leases and
options mitigate the effect of loss aversion by fixing the repurchase agreement in the
original reference state.
Loss Aversion and Asymmetric Information
In isolation, both loss aversion and asymmetric information will lead to inefficiency
in sale and repurchase contracts. In this section, we briefly comment on how these
two forces compound.
Much of the current literature on reference dependent preferences centers on how
individuals gain and update their reference point. The effects of loss aversion on auc-
tions, for instance, depend strongly on assumptions made on self knowledge (whether
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individuals understand that they are loss averse) and at what speed agents update
their reference points.19 Side stepping some of the less empirically studied issues that
arise with loss aversion in an auction setting, we concentrate on the resale portion of
the sale and resale contract to illustrate how loss aversion and asymmetric information
might compound.
Continuing to use the utility function presented in Koszegi & Rabin (2006), we
assume that an agents reference point is his beliefs about outcomes. To accommodate
for probabilistic beliefs, we allow for the reference point to be a probability measure
G over consumption (RI) and usage ({0, 1}). When the actual consumption bundle
C = (c2, x2) is drawn according to a probability measure F, utility is given by
U(FG) = JJf u(cJr)dG(r)dF(c). (2.40)
For simplicity, we assume that preferences are linear in probabilities.
Given that the foreign buyer decides his offer price long before the domestic agent
accepts or rejects it, it is likely that the foreign buyer will become acclimated to the
risk associated with his offer. That is, the choice of an offer price today will determine
his reference point by the time that the domestic agent chooses to accept or reject
the offer. As a solution concept, therefore, we use the choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium proposed by Koszegi & Rabin (2007):
Definition 3 For any choice set D, F E D is a choice-acclimating personal equilib-
rium (CPE) if U(F|F) Ž> U(F'IF') for all F' E D.
A foreign buyer offering an object back to the country of origin takes into ac-
count the gain and losses that are associated with his offer price. Adding in the
gain/loss terms to the standard monopoly maximization problem yields the following
maximization:
max [1 - H(P)]P + H(P)(FN - M) - rl(A - 1)H(P)[1 - H(P)][P + (FN - M)]P
Consumption Utility Gain-Loss Utility
(2.41)
The first two terms of this maximand are identical to a simple monopoly pricing
model with reservation price FN - M. The last term is the loss of utility due to loss
aversion. As the probability of changing hands moves toward 1, loss aversion has a
19See Dodonova & Khoroshilov (2005) for a brief discussion of these issues in relation to revenue
equivalence.
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stronger effect since there the agent feels a strong loss both when the object is sold
and held.
Theorem 14 A foreign buyer with loss aversion parameter A > 1 sets:
1
PLA = (FN - mM) +
H (pLA)[ A H(3LA) ]  (2.42)
+ (A - 1) [2H(PLA) 1][PLA + (FN - M)]- H(LA) (2.42)
This price is increasing in A if the last term is positive:
The first two terms on the right hand side of Equation 2.42 are the standard
optimal pricing optimum in the case of a monopolist with reservation price FN - M
who faces asymmetric information and can set only one price for all consumers. The
last term can be thought of as the increase in price generated by loss aversion. As
long as the foreign buyer reasonably expects to keep an object, attachment for the
object will drive the repurchase offer upward.
As a simple example assume that the domestic valuation for the home country,
D2 ~ U[0, 1] . A foreign buyer will increase prices due to loss aversion any time
F > .2613. For prices to be decreasing in A, the future expected value of the object
to the home country would need to be approximately double that of the foreign buyer.
As can be seen with this simple example, the trade mechanism in a sale and
repurchase contract is inefficient for three main reasons:
1. The reference state prior to the first auction incorporated the uncertainty of
losing the auction to all future states, depressing the prices paid by the agents.
2. The foreign collector had bargaining power in the second stage which created
inefficiency as he tried to extract surplus from the domestic owner.
3. The foreign collector was loss averse in the resale phase leading to a higher offer
price and an exacerbation of asymmetric information.
Leases are likely to improve upon sales and repurchase plans for all three reasons.
In a lease contract, bargaining in the second stage onward occurs before the discovery
that the agent is the highest bidder is realized. This depressed the reference point of
the agent leading to a reduction in bids from all agents. By contrast, in a lease auction
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the identity of the highest bidder is known prior to the second stage negotiation. This
increases his willingness to pay.
Unlike the resale case in which the loss averse agent is making take it or leave it
offers, loss aversion may mitigate the effects of asymmetric information when it is on
the responder side of the market. A government attempting to extract money from
the foreign buyer by setting a reservation price in subsequent auctions must take into
account how this affects the expectations that the foreign collector has about keeping
the object. Provided that the foreign buyer correctly predicts the distribution of
prices and her behavioral reaction to these prices, the foreign buyer's willingness to
pay is decreasing as the offer distribution shifts upward.
Finally, if the home country is also loss averse and has expectations of keeping
an object in the future, leases remove future considerations from current ones. By
retaining an option to repatriate the object in the future, the reservation price imposed
on objects can be reduced increasing short-run allocation efficiency.
2.7.3 Proofs
THEOREM 1: Proof shown in main text
THEOREM 2: We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 For any 65 [, 1], 3{xo,x 1,... ,xz} such that E7O 6tx t = a for any
Proof. Let a be an arbitrary value in [0, a-] nd consider the following algo-
rithm. Define:
So = 1 1
O 0 otherwise (2.43)
So={( ~(2.43)
S SN-1 + 6N a - SN > jN,
hSN-1 otherwise
When 0 < a-SN _< -_6N this implies that 0 < a-sN+l •_< 1 6 N+ l since 6 N < 5 _N
when 6 E (1, 1]. Thus, by induction, SN -- a since 6N < _6•N converges to zero. m
Since a is continuous in [0, 1_,], rD = (1 - 6)a is continuous from [0, 1]. Note
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also, that as 6 -- 1, can get arbitrarily close to 7rD E [0, 1] by selecting a T* such that
1 t < T*
Xt = (2.44)
0 otherwise
In cases where there is the potential that an object can be destroyed, we use this
convention in order to avoid violating the maintenance constraints.
Analogous to 7D, define rF = [1 - 6] Et=1 6tzt. When there is no destruction of
the object, it follows that rF = 1 - rD. Let T(7rF) be a (possibly nonlinear) tax
imposed on the owner of an object based on the amount of time he legally leases
an object out of the country. Since taxes are inefficient, the penalty is completely
wasteful and any money taken from the owner is destroyed. The owner solves:
max u ((1 -6) + rF[F - M] - rDM- T(7F)) + 7DDo (2.45)
7rD ,7rF
subject to IrF + 7rD < 1
Let r*, 7* be the domestic and foreign usage when ir is maximized and define:
w(-r, T(7r)) = (1 - 6)WV + frF DM- MI -7 - T(r*) (2.46)
By concavity 7r is increasing in w(r, T(ir*)) and thus T(ir) = 0. However, r* is
increasing as o ()) gets smaller. Thus T(r + e) = oo00. The optimal policy is
thus a bang-bang tax policy of the form:
S0 rF < TF
T(7F) = o (2.47)
00 otherwise
THEOREM 3: We first determine the largest reachable rD at wealth W, facing a tax
policy T(TF). Given the bang-bang nature of T(TF), we can represent the effect of
T(TF) as a constraint rF 5 F. Using this representation, the owner solves:
max D, F u((l1 W + P - M] - rDM) + rDDo (2.48)
Subject To: 7rF + r-D • ,1, rF •1 TF, TF, rD E [0, 1].
Ignoring the boundary conditions and taking the derivative with respect to rE, 7 "D
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yields:
(1) : [P - M]u',((l - 6) W +r [P_-MI-_rDM) = +0r (2.49)
(2)° : Mu'(1( - 6) W + 7F[P - M] -rDM) = -- + Do
where Aw, is the lagrangian from the 7rF ! f TF constraint and p is the lagrangian
from the lrF + 7rD 1 constraint. Substitution for M yields:
[P]u'((1 - 56)W^ + rF [P - M] - 7DM) = A + Do. (2.50)
When AXF = 0, we know that p > 0 and thus 7rF + 7rD = 1. Under these conditions:
Do(2.51)
u ((1 - 6)V + 7rF[P - M] - (1 - 7rF)M) = .(2.51)
If AXF > 0, then
(2.52)(1) (F[P - M- + _rDM)  A (252(2) :u' (1 - 6)V +F[P - M] + 7rDM) Do -_ '
These two equations can only both be satisfied when p = 0. Define rD(W, TF) as the
solution to
((1 - ) + F[P- M] + M) = (2.53)
r'D(W, WF) is increasing monotonically in rF. Thus, there exists a value T* such
that TF + 7rD(W, ý*) = 1. At this point p = 0 since the constraint is just satisfied.
Further, since o < and u is concave, 7rD in the constrained problem will be
larger than the level from the unconstrained problem.
Using the fact that rF + 7-D((W,*, ) = 1 when 7rD is maximized, let r**, be the
solution to
U ((1 - 6)1V + [P- M] + rDM) = Do (254)
It follows that
1 ** > 1
7rD
~
each(IV) = ** ** E [0, 1]. (2.55)
0 7r** < 0
If Do+DE < the first best is reachable and thus can be implemented. Other-
wise, the optimal contract is the contract where I7D is as large as possible. This will
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be 7Reach(W^).
THEOREM 4: This result stems directly from Myerson's optimal mechanism. Let
q(Fi) = Fz - M + A(M) be the virtual valuation for buyer i. The optimal mecha-
nism (Q, M) is an allocation rule Q and payment rule M such that:{ 1 if (Fi) > maxj i ¢(Fj) and q(Fi) > O(D2)
0 otherwise (2.56)
Mi = max z{-(D 2), maxj#iFj)
An English auction with reservation price P = D2 - M + A(M is an optimal
auction which does not disclose the true valuation of the highest bidder in each
period.
THEOREM 5: We show the proof for the simple case where 6 = R = 1 and yo = -t = 0.
The proof of the more complicated version is straightforward. The owner of an option,
attempting to maximize his expected value selects a price Pre, and reservation value
r which maximizes:
max [1 - A(Pres)] [(1 - H(f)) (Pres + E(D 2fD 2 > f) - f) +H(f)Pres] +A(Pres) [E(D2) - M]Pres, rV
Probability of Probability of Expected Value Conditional Value Conditional
Initial Sale Exercise on Option Exercise on No Initial Sale(2.57)
Subject to r > pRes
Taking the FOC with respect to the option price r and the inequality constraint
we have:
L: [1 - A(Pres)] [ - h(f)E(D2|D2 > f) -
+(1 - H(f))[ E(D 2 |D2 > ) - 1 +-A •es)] = 0 (2.58)
0: (r - Pres) > 0, A > 0, A(r - Pres) = 0.
Noting that
- h(f)E(D2jD2 > f) - f + (1 - H(f))[d E(D 21D 2 > f) - F] = 0, (2.59)
Equation 2.58 reduces to:
- r[1 - A(Pres)](1 - H(f)) + A = 0. (2.60)
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Since a(f) > 0, the SOC of [1- A(f)] is positive. Thus r = oo is a global minimum
which implies A > 0 and r = Pres. The home country doesn't gain anything in leaving
a separation in the price that it sells an object to a foreign collector and the price
that it can rebuy the object in the future. The home countries problem thus reduces
to:
max [1-A(Pres)] [(1-H(res))(E(D2 D2 > Pres)-M)+H(Pes)Pre] +A(Pres) [E(D 2)-M]
(2.61)
Noting that E(D 2) = E(D 21D2  PRes)[1-H(PRes)] + E(D 21D2 < PRes)H(PRe,) this
reduces to:
max [1 - A(Pres)][H(Pres)] [(E(D21D2  Pres) - M + Pres] (2.62)
Pres
Taking the FOC and using the simplification from Equation 2.59 we find:
1
PRe = E(D2 D2 < PRes) - M + (2.63)OA (PRes)
THEOREM 6: With no credit constraints, the marginal utility of money is constant
over time and thus the country is indifferent to the periods in which the contract
generates payment. Leases with an English auction are surplus maximizing for the
home country. Since the reservation prices for the option contract differ, it follows
that leases are more efficient that options. The difference between the optimal lease
and the optimal option is that under options, contracting is done before the home
country knows its valuation D2. This can generate situations in which the option
price results in no trade in future periods even though, upon realization of D2 trade
would be optimal.
THEOREM 7: Since the future valuations of the objects are known, the reservation
price of the option contract can replicate those of the lease auction perfectly. Further,
since yo > yt for all t, the option contract dominates the lease auction by guaranteeing
that all payments are received in period 0.
THEOREM 8: Without constraints, a generation that is reached without a bad Min-
ister of Culture that is serviced by a good Minister of Culture gets expected value
max[P, Do + E[DE]] = [1 - H(P)][Do + E(DEIDE > P)] + H(P)P), (2.64)
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where P = P - Do and H is the CDF of possible home valuations. The NPV of an
object with a free market is:
1 [[1 - H(P)] [Do + E(DEIDE 
_ P^)] + G(P)P]. (2.65)1 -6(1 - E)
The NPV of an export ban is
1 [Do + E(DE)]. (2.66)1-6
The home country prefers an export ban if Equation 2.65 is less than equation 2.66.
This condition is equivalent to requiring that
62E(1 - E) [Do + E(De)]P < E(DE|DE < P) + (2.67)1-6 H(P)
or
H(P)P + [1 - H(P)]E(DEIDE > P) - E(DE)] 5 6 (1- ( )[Do + E(DE)]1-56
Per Period Gain From Flexibility Per Period Expected Loss
Per Period Expected Loss
From One Bad Dictator (2.68)
At E = 0, the RHS of (2.67) is E(DE DE _ iP) which is less than P for G(P) > 0.
Thus, with no corruption, free trade is optimal. As 6 -+ 1, for c E (0, 1) the right
hand side of (2.68) goes to infinity implying that an export ban is always optimal.
Intuitively, the more patient a country is, the more it values the losses that occur if
an object is stolen. As 6 -- 1 the losses that occur if an object is ever stolen weighs
heavily in making a decision. This leads to a larger set of E for which an export ban
is optimal.
THEOREM 9: This result is the FOC of Equation 2.41.
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Chapter 3
Experiments in Authority,
Delegation, and Incentive Conflict
Abstract
A large portion of the organization literature has centered on how control rights are
distributed in a setting with incentive conflicts. In this experiment, we use a simplified
version of Aghion & Tirole (1997) to study the interplay between formal control rights,
effort, and delegation. We find that individual effort choices and beliefs are consistent
with the theoretical Nash Equilibrium but that principals retain control rights even
when it is strongly in their interest to delegate. We also find differences in how
males and females allocate and respond to the allocation of authority. As agents,
women appear to have strong fairness preferences resulting in diminished effort in
asymmetric treatments but higher effort in symmetric ones. As principals, women
are more likely to transfer authority when it is efficient to do so. We show that a
significant portion of these gender effects are due to differences in beliefs, a result
consistent with a growing experimental literature documenting a differential response
to incentives between genders.
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3.1 Introduction
Economists have become increasingly interested in the interaction of individuals in
environments where explicit incentives are absent, but where control rights may be
granted to one party or the other to make a final decision. While a large theoretical
literature has formed analyzing these incomplete contracting environments, empirical
analysis has been limited by the complexities inherent in data from informal settings.
This paper uses experimental methods to study how individuals respond to au-
thority and incentive conflicts. We propose a new experimental design based on the
formal and real authority model developed in Aghion & Tirole (1997). As in their
model, a principal and an agent must decide on the implementation of one project
among a large list of potential candidates. The payoffs to the principal and agent for
selecting a task is unknown ex-ante and effort must be exerted in order to learn the
valuations of each project. One of the tasks is best for the principal while a different
task is best for the agent. This misalignment of valuation leads to inefficient effort
by the agent since, in cases where both parties gain information, her suggestions may
be overruled. Delegation of authority to the agent increases the agent's effort but
reduces the control that the principal has in selecting his optimal project.'
By using experiments, we generate a unique data set which includes typically un-
observable primitives such as beliefs, counterfactual actions, and risk attitudes. Since
these primitives are the basis on which theoretical models are based, our experiments
allow for careful study of theoretical predictions and systematic capture of violations.
Experimental methods also allow us to study the behavioral forces present. Given the
one-on-one nature of the incomplete contracting problem, these behavioral forces are
predicted to be acute based on findings from previous experiments and the psychology
and behavioral organization literatures.
Our experiment consists of two players, a principal and an agent. The principal
and the agent are shown a set of 36 cards representing potential projects. One of these
cards has a small positive payout for both the principal and the agent and is placed
face up representing the outside option. The remaining thirty-five cards are shuffled
face down and include two cards with large positive values for both the principal and
the agent, and thirty-three cards with zero payoffs. One of the high valued cards is
best for the principal while the other card is best for the agent creating an incentive
1The literature on authority often assumes that monetary incentive contracts can not realign in-
centives because of either infinite risk aversion by subjects, non-pecuniary payoffs, or non-verifiability
of the value of the selected project. We largely side step these issues by restricting the actions of
the principal to delegation and effort.
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conflict.
Play of the game is conducted in four main stages: (i) The principal decides
whether to delegate formal authority to the agent over the future choice of projects;
(ii) the principal and agent privately and simultaneously gather information about
the face down projects' payoffs; (iii) the party who does not have formal authority
recommends a project to the controlling party; and (iv) the controlling party picks a
project or the outside option on the basis of his or her information and the information
communicated by the other party.
We study the effect of incentive conflict on both effort choice and incentives for
delegation by changing the degree of payoff alignment across treatments. In our
low alignment treatment, the payoffs for the other parties preferred project is small
leading to a large degree of incentive conflict and no incentive to delegate. In the high
alignment treatment, the payoffs for the other parties preferred project is large leading
to low amounts of incentive conflict and a small incentive to delegate. Finally, in the
asymmetric treatment, the agent's preferred project has a high payoff for the principal
while the principal's preferred project has a low payoff for the agent. This treatment
allows us to test the effects of congruence under different authority structures and
ensures that there is a large incentive to delegate within the treatment.
We find that conditional on keeping control rights, the principal's effort choices
and beliefs are similar to the theoretical Nash Equilibrium but that principals retain
control rights even when it is strongly in their interest to delegate. This reluctance
to delegate is surprising since, based on the principals own beliefs, he would have a
higher expected earnings delegating authority instead of keeping control.
Actions of the agent are less consistent with the Nash Equilibrium, with significant
heterogeneity across individuals. A significant portion of agents put in zero effort
when the principal maintains control rights suggesting a behavioral response to being
the subordinate. When delegated to, agents put in more effort than is predicted
by the Nash equilibrium while the principal puts in significantly less effort. These
differences from theory leads to a significantly higher value to delegation than the
initial experimental design.
We also find differences in how males and females allocate and respond to the
allocation of authority. As agents, women appear to have strong fairness preferences
resulting in diminished effort in asymmetric treatments but higher effort in symmetric
ones. As principals, women are more likely to transfer authority when it is efficient
to do so. We show that these gender effects are primarily due to differences in beliefs,
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a result consistent with a growing experimental literature documenting a differential
response to incentives between genders.
This paper is related to three distinct literatures - the theoretical literature on
authority and control, the experimental literature on behavioral contracting, and the
experimental literature on gender and incentive systems. The theoretical literature
on authority has moved steadily into unifying authority with the broader study of
repeated games, communication, and organization. Baker, Gibbons & Murphy (1999)
studies how the inability of the principal to grant formal authority to an agent can cre-
ate incentives to renege on delegation in a static game. They stress that information
structures generate different decisions due both to the information that is generated
and to the different dynamic incentives for reneging on past promises. Rantakari
(2008) and Alonso, Dessein & Matouschek (2008) study how governance structures
differ in terms of the informativeness of information and efficiency when both adap-
tation and coordination are important for the principal and agents involved. We view
our experiments as being an important and necessary first step to experimentally
studying these more complex models. Our main contribution is in validating the core
building blocks of these models while pointing out the importance of incorporating
behavioral forces into the analysis.
Our finding of reduced effort by agents when the principal retains formal authority
is similar to a newer experimental literature in behavioral contracting. Falk & Kosfeld
(2006) find that in a game where a principal can constrain the actions of an agent,
agents put in higher levels of effort, on average, when free to choose an action than
when constrained. In their paper, a principal's distrust in the voluntary performance
of an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well. In our
paper, keeping authority leads to lower average effort than the Nash prediction while
giving up authority leads to higher relative effort. While in their experiment the
principal largely grants freedom to the agent, in our experiment the principal rarely
relinquishes formal control. This result is surprising, especially in the asymmetric
treatment, where giving the agent control results in a much higher expected value for
the principal. Our result suggests that the cost of control may be overshadowed in
many situations by the reduction in uncertainty and non-pecuniary value of having
power.
Finally, our paper sheds further light on the differential effect of incentive sys-
tems by gender and status. In an experiment on competition, Gneezy, Niederle &
Rustichini (2003) find that women have a weaker response to performance incentives
than men in mixed groups, but that the difference in response is diminished in single
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sex designs. In an experiment of competition in India, where the effects of caste
were studied, Hoff & Pandey (2005) find that when there is scope for discretion in
rewarding performance, the announcement of caste leads to less competition among
lower castes. One hypothesis that conforms to results of these experiments, and the
newer work by Shurchkov (2008) and Niederle & Vesterlund (2007), is that a priori
beliefs about the environment differs by gender and leads to different responses to
incentives. Our findings largely support this hypothesis.
In Section 3.2, we quickly review a simplified version of the incentive conflict model
of Aghion & Tirole (1997) and review its theoretical predictions. Section 3.3 details
our experimental design. Section 3.4 reports the main results of our experiment and
is separated into three parts. In section 3.4.1 we study how the effort choices of the
principal and agent respond to the level of inherent incentive conflict. In section
3.4.2 we concentrating on differences in effort choices by gender and in section 3.4.3
we study delegation decisions by the principals. Section 3.5 concludes. We include
summary statistics of all our experiments in the appendix.
3.2 The Model
This section describes a simplified version of the incentive conflict model of Aghion &
Tirole (1997) with a few minor modifications to better fit a laboratory environment.
The model is as faithful to the original model as possible with only minor changes in
notation and is reproduced here for the convenience of the reader.
Consider a world in which a principal (he) and agent (she) are organized in a
hierarchical structure and must decide to implement one or zero project out of a set
of n > 3 potential projects. With each project k E {1,..., n}, there is an associated
noncontractible gain of Pk for the principal and a private benefit Ak for the agent.
The agent's private benefit includes perks on the job, acquisition of human capital,
the chance to signal ability, promotion consideration, or the disutility of implementing
the project. If no project is implemented, the profit and private value of the project
are both equal to a known outside value of Po and A0 respectively.
Ex ante, all objects are identical and information must be collected about the value
of the projects. For each party, the expected value for guessing randomly is less than
their respective outside options. Thus, under the assumption of risk aversion or risk
neutrality, the agent prefers to recommend inaction rather than guessing randomly.
Similarly, an uninformed principal would never choose unilaterally to undertake a
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project.
The principal's preferred project yields known profit P, to the principal and AP to
the agent where P, > Po and Ap > A0. Likewise, the agent's preferred project yields
known benefit Pa to the principal and Aa to the agent with Aa > Ao and Pa > Po.
We assume that for the principal, the principal's preferred project yields a strictly
higher value to the agent's preferred project (Pp > Pa) and define the Principal's
congruence parameter a = - . Likewise, we assume that Aa > A, and define the
Agent's congruence parameter -= ~. Note that both congruence parameters belong
to (0, 1].
The principal is considered risk neutral and has utility Bk - w. The agent is also
risk neutral and has utility bk + w. Since the principal's benefit is noncontractible, the
agent's wage is a constant and is used only to satisfy her participation constraint.2
We assume that the nature of projects' payoffs are initially unknown to both
parties. The principal and agent acquires information in a binary form. At private
cost gA(e), the agent learns her payoffs to all candidate projects with probability
e. With probability 1 - e, the agent learns nothing and still views the objects as
identical. Similarly, the principal chooses how much time or effort to put in to learning
payoffs. At private cost gp(E), he becomes perfectly informed about the payoffs with
probability E and learns nothing with probability 1- E. We assume that effort choices
are made simultaneously, that both gA and gp are strictly convex,satisfy gi(0) = 0
and gf(0) = 0 for i = A, P, and that Aa - gA(1) 5 Ao, and Pp - gp(1) < Po.
Information in our model is soft so that information passed between parties can
not be verified. Communication between the parties, therefore, must be interpreted
as a pure suggestion for a project choice.
Formal authority represents the right to make the final decision. We analyze two
cases, P-Formal authority in which the principal maintains formal authority and an
A-Formal authority structure in which the principal delegates authority to the agent
who can not be overruled. In the P-Formal case, a principal may always overrule the
agent. He indeed does so if he is informed and if the agent's recommendation is not
"congruent". Otherwise, he (optimally) rubber-stamps the agent's proposal any time
he is not informed since Pa > P0. Under A-Formal authority, the principal delegates
authority to the agent. In this case, the agent now has formal authority and has the
irrevocable right to make this particular decision.
2More complicated versions of this model may be considered in which monetary incentives do
play a role. See, for instance section VB of Aghion & Tirole (1997). Our goal is to create as simple
a model as possible in order to study how individuals respond to incentive conflicts.
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The timing is as follows: (i) The principal proposes a contract that allocates formal
authority to him or to the agent over the future choice of projects; (ii) the parties
privately and simultaneously gather information about the n projects' payoffs; (iii)
the party who does not have formal authority recommends a project to the controlling
party; and (iv) the controlling party picks a project or the outside option on the basis
of his or her information and the information communicated by the other party.
Under P-Formal authority, the utilities of the principal and agent are
Up = EPp + (1 - E)ePa + Po - gp(E), (3.1)
UA = EA• + (1 - E)eAa + AO - 9A(e), (3.2)
where
Pi = Pi - Po, for i E {a,p}, (3.3)
Ai = Ai - Ao, for i E {a,p}. (3.4)
Under A-Formal authority, the utility of the principal and agent are
uP = (1 - e)EPp + ePa + Po - gp(E), (3.5)
UA = (1 - e)EAp + eA, + Ao - gA(e), (3.6)
where the d in the A-Formal utility functions stands for the mnemonic delegation.
3.2.1 Analysis and Theoretical Implications
Starting with the analysis of P-Formal authority, the reaction curves for the principal
and agent become, respectively,
Pp - ePa = gp(E) (3.7)
and
Aa - EAa = g'A(e). (3.8)
We assume that AaPa < g"(E)g"(e) so that the system of equations has a unique,
stable intersection (eNE, ENE). Since the agent's reaction curve is downward sloping,
effort by the principal and agent are strategic substitutes. Thus, if the agent's effort
increases, the principal's effort decreases.
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Holding Aa and PP constant, the principal's effort is decreasing in Pa. The more
value that the principal receives for the agents best action, the less incentive he has
to interfere with the agent and overrule. This leads to an increase in effort by the
agent since it is more likely that the project she suggests will be implemented. Notice
also that neither the principal nor the agents best response correspondence depends
on AP, the agents valuation under the principals best project. This implies that
under P-Formal authority, effort choices are independent of the agents payment when
the principal acts on his own information. Recalling that a = G is the congruencePP
parameter for the principal and P = P is the congruence parameter for the agent,
we have the following prediction:
Theoretical Prediction 15 Under P-Formal authority, effort of the principal is
decreasing in a while the effort of the agent is increasing in a. Effort levels of the
principal and agent are unaffected by 0.
Repeating the exercise under A-Formal authority, the reaction curves of the prin-
cipal and agent are
Pp - ePp = g' (E), (3.9)
Aa - EA, = g'(e). (3.10)
Under similar stability and uniqueness criterion, there exists an interior intersection
of (edNE, EdNE) which constitutes the Nash equilibrium. Given the symmetry in the
best response functions, it is unsurprising that under A-Formal authority, Pa does
not affect the equilibrium. Mirroring prediction 1, we have:
Theoretical Prediction 16 Under A-Formal authority, effort of the principal is
increasing in 3 while the effort of the agent is decreasing in P. Effort choices of the
principal and agent are unaffected by changes in a
Finally, mapping the reaction functions in (e, E) space, where e is the horizontal
axis, the slope of the reaction function for both the principal and agent are flatter
under A-Formal authority than P-Formal authority. Since the intersection points
with the origins are identical for the two functions, it must be the case that effort by
the principal is less under delegation than under P-Formal authority.
Theoretical Prediction 17 Delegation results in less effort by the principal and
more effort by the agent. Delegation is optimal when EVJd(EdNE, edNE) > EVp(ENE, eNE).
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3.2.2 Behavioral Forces
Based on current experimental evidence, behavioral forces appear to be most acute
in settings with a small number of parties. The ultimatum game, for instance, leads
to a high level of rejection for low offers with a single principal offering contracts to
a single agents but has a low rejection rate when the number of agents increases to
two or more.3
Given that our game of interest is inherently a one-on-one interaction, the effect
of non-standard preferences are likely to be large. In this section, we briefly present
two behavioral effects which we believe a priori will influence the outcome of the
experiment. We will return to these predictions in the analysis of section 3.4.
Efficiency versus Equality - Inequity Aversion
There is now a large body of experimental evidence that individuals are often willing
to sacrifice social efficiency in order to normalize payments across parties. Fehr, Naef
& Schmidt (2006), for instance, shows that third parties who have the choice between
a socially efficient but unequal allocation and a socially inefficient but equal allocation
often choose the later.
In our experiment, equity concerns will lead the principal and the agent to alter
effort choices so that their expected earnings converge. In all treatments we consider,
this implies that the party with the lower expected payment will decrease their effort
level while the agent with the higher expected earnings will increase effort.
Behavioral Prediction 18 Let ENE and eNE be the Nash Equilibrium of the model
without behavioral effects. When EVp(ENE, eNE) > EVA(ENE, eNE) and Inequity
Aversion is present, then E > ENE and e < eNE. The difference E - ENE is growing
in the difference in EVp(ENE, eNE) - EVA(ENE, eNE).
Hidden Cost of Control & Gift Exchange
Positive and Negative reciprocity have been shown in a number of environments to be
a strong force in principal-agent games. Falk & Kosfeld (2006) finds that in a game
where the principal can reduce the influence that the agent has on the principal's
3See, for instance Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara & Zamir (1991) who shows that behavior in
a market version of the ultimatum game with 9 responders is radically different than the one-on-one
version. See also Charness, Corominas-Bosch & Frechette (2007) for a study of bargaining over a
network where the effects of social preferences appear to be mitigated.
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payments, the agent punishes this form of control with less effort. Based on these
results, we suspect that the act of keeping control may be seen as a hostile act while
the transfer of authority may be seen as friendly. We thus predict:
Behavioral Prediction 19 Let edNE and eNE be the Nash Equilibrium effort levels
of the agent without behavioral effects. Positive and Negative reciprocity would predict
ed >edNE and e < eNE
3.3 The Experiment
In order to study how individuals respond to incentive conflicts and authority, we
developed an experimental design based on the theoretical model summarized above.
Our experiment consisted of two players, a principal and an agent. The principal and
the agent were shown a set of thirty-six cards representing potential projects. One of
these cards had a small positive payout for both the principal and the agent and was
placed face up representing the outside option. The remaining thirty-five cards were
shuffled face down and included a red and a blue card with large positive values for
the principal and agent and thirty-three white cards with zero payoffs to both parties.
Incentive conflict was generated by making the payout to the red card highest for the
principal and the payout to the blue card highest for the agent. The white cards
ensure that guessing had a lower expected return than selecting the outside option.
We studied the effect of incentive conflict on both effort choice and incentives for
delegation by changing the degree of payoff alignment across treatments. In our low
alignment treatment, the payoffs for the other parties preferred project was small
leading to a large degree of incentive conflict and no incentive to delegate. In the
high alignment treatment, the payoffs for the other parties preferred project was large
leading to low amounts of incentive conflict and a small incentive to delegate. Finally,
in the asymmetric treatment, the agent's preferred project had a high payoff for the
principal while the principal's preferred project had a low payoff for the agent. This
treatment allowed us to test the effects of congruence under A-Formal and P-Formal
authority and also to ensure that there was a large incentive to delegate authority to
the agent.
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3.3.1 Protocol
All our experiments took place in May and June 2007 at the experimental laboratory
of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at Zurich University. In total,
140 subjects participated in our experiments, divided into 5 sessions and 14 matching
groups. A matching group consisted of 5 principals and 5 agents.4 Within each
matching group, principals and agents were randomly matched in each of the 10
periods played. Hence, within a matching group, each principal was matched with
each agent twice.5 Each subject maintained the role of either a principal or an agent
throughout the experiment. To avoid framing, all instructions referred to the principal
as player A and the agent as player B. Our sample pool consisted primarily of students
at Zurich University and the University of Zurich and we excluded economics and
psychology students in order to prevent potential confounds.
An experimental session consisted of an instructions phase, a single player stage
game, the main experiment, and a final questionnaire. In the instruction phase,
subjects were given a set of written instructions followed by a small quiz concerning
payments. After all subjects had successfully completed the quiz, oral instructions
summarizing the stage game were read aloud.
All subjects next played a 7 period single player variant of the main game. In the
single player variant, players chose a search intensity, received information probabilis-
tically based on their search intensity, and chose a project. We used search intensities
from the paid periods of this single player experiment (periods 3-7) as a proxy for
risk aversion and other idiosyncratic preferences throughout the analysis. The Nash
equilibrium level of search was identical across all treatments of our experiment so
that there is no predicted variation in this variable across treatment groups.
For the main experiment, subjects were exposed to a single treatment which re-
mained constant across the 10 periods. We chose not to vary the payments within a
session to minimize confusion and framing.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid based on their earnings in the
last 5 periods of the single player variant of the game and all 10 periods of the
main experiment. Subjects were then asked to take a short questionnaire in which
we recorded gender, demographic information, and risk preferences. On average, an
experimental session lasted 50 minutes with an average payment of 28 CHF ($25.50
4 Due to recruitment problems, one group had 8 subjects and one group had 12 subjects.
5Three matching groups were run simultaneously to increase the perception of randomness and
limit dynamic incentives.
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at the time of the experiment).
3.3.2 The Principal-Agent Game
The stage game of our experiment was designed to capture as much information as
possible about the participants effort choices and beliefs. The stage game was split
into six stage, summarized in Figure 3-1:
Stage 1 - Delegation: In the delegation phase, the principal was asked whether he
wished to retain control rights or to delegate them to the agent. Control rights were
termed "the right to make the decision" to minimize framing.
Stage 2 - Search: In the search phase, the principal and agent were asked to
choose their search intensities. Search intensities were bounded between [0, 100] and
corresponded to the probability that the player would be able to view all the cards.
For the principal, we asked only for his search intensity conditional on his delegation
choice. For the agent, we employed the strategy method in which the agent was asked
for her effort choice for the case in which the principal kept control rights or delegated
them.6
Stage 3 - Beliefs: In the beliefs stage, the principal and agent were asked their
beliefs about the effort choices of the other party. We employed the strategy method
for both the principal and the agent. For the principal, we first asked for his beliefs
about the effort of the agent given his actual delegation decision. We then asked
for his beliefs about the effort of the agent if he had chosen the opposite control
right scheme. We did not use monetary incentives for beliefs to prevent potential
hedging between search intensities and belief reports. Further, we did not capture
beliefs about the delegation decision of the principal for fear of creating frames of
resentment when delegation was kept.
Stage 4 - Resolution: In the resolution stage, the agent learned the delegation
decision of the principal and the agents reported strategy for this authority structure
6The strategy method has the advantage of capturing a complete strategy profile for the agent
but may lead to a greater level of self control and consistency than would exist if delegation was
revealed prior to search. For instance, if the agent believes that there is a very low probability
that the principal does not delegate, the cost of committing to zero effort in this case may be very
small. Once the actual delegation decision has been realized, however, this cost is large. Future
experiments will be run using the direct method to ensure this bias is not strongly influencing our
results.
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was carried out. If a player's search intensity was greater than a random draw from
U[0,100], that player privately learned the location of all the cards. This information
was private and not shared with the other player.
Stage 5 - Signal: The party who did not have formal authority was next given the
ability to mark a single card as a recommendation to the other party. This marker,
but not the location of the cards, was shown on the screen of the other player.
Stage 6 - Project Selection: If the principal retained authority, he was shown
the card marked by the agent and allowed to select a project. Otherwise, the agent
was shown the card marked by the principal and allowed to select the final project.
Payment for the round was based on the card selected and the search intensity of the
player.
Figure 3-1: The Stage Game
xý_
Principal
Agent
3.3.3 Treatments and Predictions
Experimental treatments were designed to study 1) how individuals responded to in-
centive conflict and 2) how individuals delegated authority. We divided experiments
into three treatments that varied in Pa, the principal's valuation for the agent's pre-
ferred project, and A,, the agent's valuation for the principal's preferred project.
Recall that in the set of 36 projects, there was one card representing the outside
option, one card which was the agent's preferred project, one card which was the
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principal's preferred project, and 33 cards that yielded zero gross profit for both
parties. The payments for each of the projects across our three treatments - Low,
High, A.High - are recorded in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Overview of Project Payoffs
High Low A.High
Principal Agent Principal Agent Principal Agent
Principal's Preferred 40 35 40 20 40 20
Agent's Preferred 35 40 20 40 35 40
Outside Option 10 10 10 10 10 10
Unsuccessful Project 0 0 0 0 0 0
We studied the effect of incentive conflict on both effort choice and incentives for
delegation by changing the degree of payoff alignment across treatments. In our low
alignment treatment, congruence was low for both parties. Given Nash equilibrium
search intensities, the principal's expected value for keeping control rights was higher
than delegating. In the high alignment treatment, the congruence parameters for
both the principal and agent were high leading to less incentive conflict and a small
incentive to delegate. Finally, in the A.High treatment, the agent's preferred project
had a high payoff for the principal while the principal's preferred project had a low
payoff for the agent. This treatment allowed us to test the effects of congruence
under A-Formal and P-Formal authority and ensured that there was a large incentive
to delegate within the treatment.
Across treatments, we kept the cost of searching constant. For both the principal
and the agent, search cost was increasing and convex with cost function
C(E) = 25E 2 , (3.11)
where a search intensity of E represented the probability of having the cards revealed
to the player. Due to the quadratic cost function, the reaction curves of both the
principal and agent were linear over effort. In the domain of possible effort choices,
the Nash equilibrium predictions and expected values for each authority structure
were:
Looking at the table, the expected value for retaining authority by the principal
is greater than giving up authority in the Low alignment treatments but greater in
the High and A.High treatments. We thus expect: 7
7As we will see in the results, the actual increase in value for delegation in the high treatment is
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Table 3.2: Predicted Efforts and Expected Values
P-Formal A-Formal
ENE eNE EVp EVA EdNE edNE EVpd  EV d
Low 55 25 20.1 17.3 25 55 17.3 20.1
High 45 35 23.3 24.0 35 45 24.0 23.3
A.High 45 35 23.3 17.2 25 55 25.6 20.1
Hypothesis 7 Principal's will keep authority in the Low treatment and delegate au-
thority in the High and A.High treatments
In terms of effort choices, conditional on keeping authority, our theoretical model
predicts that the principal's effort is decreasing in his payment for the agent's preferred
project and should be unaffected by changes in payments to the agent for her preferred
project. Theory Prediction 1 would predict, therefore, that under P-Formal authority,
E in the low treatment should be significantly different from E in the High or A.High
treatment. It also predicts that E in the High and A.High treatments should be the
same. Since these are best reply functions, it follows that the agents effort levels have
the same pattern with less effort under the Low treatment than the other two. We
thus predict:
Hypothesis 8 Conditional on the principal keeping control, we predict:
ELow > EHigh = EA.High, (3.12)
eLow < eHigh = eA.High.
The predicted point estimates are given in Table 3.2.
Similarly, conditional on giving up authority, our theoretical model predicts that
the agent's effort is decreasing in her payments when the principal's preferred project
is selected. Based on our treatments, we predict that under A-Formal authority, the
agent will put in lower effort under the High treatment than the Low and A.High
treatments. It also predicts that the effort level between the Low and A.High treat-
ments will be the same.
Hypothesis 9 Conditional on delegation, we predict:
d = d d
eLow eA.High H e igh .
large. Based on the principals' beliefs, delegation in the high effort case would result in roughly a
20% increase in expected profit over keeping control.
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The predicted point estimates are given in Table 3.2.
3.4 Experimental Results
Analysis of the experiment is divided into three parts: Effort Choices, Gender Differ-
ences, and Delegation Decisions.
1. Effort Choices: In section 3.4.1, we compare effort choices of the principal and
agent to our Nash Equilibrium predictions. We find that the pattern of effort
choices across treatments are consistent with our predictions in the Low and
High treatments but are violated in the A.High treatment. We also find that
when the principal keeps control rights, his effort choices can be explained in
part by his beliefs about the actions of the agent. When the agent is delegated
authority, however, the agent's effort choices are best predicted by their play in
the single player version of the game. This difference can partially be explained
by the fact that principal's who delegate often put in zero effort.
2. Gender Differences: In section 3.4.2, we study the differences in search in-
tensities by gender with particular attention paid to the A.High treatment. We
find that the violation of the Nash prediction in the A.High treatment can be
primarily attributed to women. Differential preferences for efficiency and fair-
ness across genders are consistent with all of our data and is a likely candidate
for observed behavior.
3. Delegation Decisions: In section 3.4.3, we study the decision to delegate. We
find that principal's retain authority even when it is strongly in their interest to
delegate. As with effort, there is a gender difference in delegation, with women
delegating authority closer to the optimal levels. This difference in delegation
can partially be explained by a difference in beliefs about the agents actions
when delegation does and does not occur.
While most of the summary statistics for each of the experiments can be found
in the Appendix, it is worth noting two dimensions of heterogeneity in our data that
we control for throughout the analysis. First, the average search intensity from the
single player game is much larger for the principal in the Low alignment treatment
than in the other two. Since individual level fixed effects would eliminate variation
in gender, we instead use average effort in the single player game as a control for
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idiosyncratic preferences for search. For completeness, we show one version of each
regression without this control variable.
Second, there is a slight downward trend in the agent's search intensity across
periods. To control for this, we introduce period level fixed effects that are used
throughout the analysis. Elimination of these fixed effects, or use of a linear trend,
does not significantly alter the results.
As a simple check of rationality and whether subjects understood the incentives
of the game, we look for situations where individuals made choices that appear to be
suboptimal. There were 153 out of 700 cases in which the subject without decision
rights searched successfully. Out of these, in 149 cases the subject recommended their
preferred project. In the other 4 cases, the preferred project of the agent who had
control rights was recommended. It was never the case that an unsuccessful project
or the outside option was chosen. In the 547 periods in which the subject without
control rights was uninformed, the outside option was chosen 533 times while a card
was selected at random in 14 cases.
Subjects holding the decision right were informed in 374 out of 700 cases. In
all 374 cases where the individual with decision rights was informed, he selected his
preferred project. In 312 of the remaining 326 observations, the subject followed
the recommendation of the agent. The outside option was selected instead of the
recommended card 6 times while a face down card was chosen at random 8 times.
We view these error rates as being relatively low and do not further pursue them in
the analysis.
3.4.1 Effort Choices and the Nash Equilibrium
The theoretical model presented in section 3.2 yielded three predictions on the effort
choices of the principal and the agent. First, the model predicted that Pa, the prin-
cipal's valuation for the agent's preferred project, should affect effort choices of both
the principal and agent under P-Formal authority, but should not influence effort
choice under A-Formal authority. The theoretical model also predicted that AP, the
agent's valuation for the principal's preferred project, should affect effort levels under
A-Formal authority, but not under P-Formal authority.
Before a direct analysis of these predictions, it is useful to get an overview of the
data. Table 3.3 shows the average search intensities for the principals and agents,
divided into treatments and authority structures. For ease of comparison, we include
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the Nash Equilibrium predictions from Table 3.2, the total number of observations
within a treatment, and the percentage of periods in which authority was delegated.8
Table 3.3: Average Search Intensity Across Treatments
P-Formal A-Formal Delegation
E e ENE eNE Ed ed EdNE dNE % Delegation ObSA
Low 62.6 16.3 55 25 14.2 71.4 25 55 15.2% 210
High 46.0 27.5 45 35 17.3 58.1 35 45 35.0% 340
A.High 56.2 18.6 45 35 22.5 62.8 25 55 37.3% 150
While a more careful analysis follows, a number of useful observations can be
made by studying the averages reported in the table. First, the point estimates for
the Low and High treatment are close to the theoretical predictions, with a slightly
higher search intensity from the party who has control rights and slightly lower search
intensity for the agent who does not.
Second, search intensities chosen under A-Formal authority appear to be farther
away from the Nash Predictions than under P-Formal authority. In the A-Formal
authority structure, effort levels for the Agent are near or above the single player
optimum. This suggests that the Agent may either view search by the principal as
unlikely, or is rewarding the principal for being given final power.
Finally, the search intensities in the A.High treatments do not fit the theoretical
prediction in terms of magnitude or pattern. For P-Formal authority, search looks
similar to the Low treatment. Under A-Formal authority, search intensities look
similar to the High treatment. These outcomes are opposite of what the theory
would predict, a topic that we will return to in section 3.4.2.
Search Decisions with Control Rights
To better understand the factors influencing search decisions, we split analysis be-
tween parties who have control rights and those that do not. Turning first to the
situation in which the principal retains control rights, we start with a simple re-
gression looking at search levels across treatment with controls only for idiosyncratic
search preferences (via the single player game) and the time dimension. For principals
sSince the agent's effort was elicited using the strategy method, the total number of observations
for the agent under both P-Formal and A-Formal authority equals the number of observations within
the treatment. Since the principal's search intensity is conditional on his delegation decision, the
number of observations for the principal under P-Formal authority is ObsA * (1 - %Delegation).
The number of observations for the principal under A-Formal authority is ObsA * (%Delegation).
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who did not delegate authority, we estimate:
Ei,t = ao + C at + /singl~Single + IHighlHigh + iA.HighiA.High (3.14)
where Eil, is the search intensity of principal i in period t, at are the period fixed
effects, Single is the demeaned average search intensity of the paid single player
periods, and IHigh is an indicator variable for treatments in the high alignment. Our
a priori theoretical predictions is that PHigh -= A.High < 0.
Result 1 The principal's search intensity is largely consistent with the theoretical
Nash Equilibrium in the symmetric High and Low versions of the game, but not
consistent with the Nash Equilibrium in the A. High treatment. Heterogeneity in beliefs
explains a large portion of the deviations across treatments.
Column (1) of Table 3.4 shows the results of this regression with period 1 as the
omitted category for the time fixed effects. As can be seen from the first two rows,
the high treatment is significantly different than the Low treatment with a magnitude
in line with our theoretical predictions. The A.High treatment looks similar to the
Low treatment in contrast to our a priori hypothesis.
Table 3.4: Principal's Search Intensity with Decision Rightsa
High
A.High
Best Response to Beliefs
Single
Constant
Period Fixed Effects?
Adj. R2
Observations
(1)
-13.813***
(3.612)
-3.102
(4.359)
0.305*
(0.167)
58.901***
(3.169)
Yes
0.176
493
(2)
-4.898
(3.664)
2.714
(4.979)
0.588***
(0.214)
0.366**
(0.173)
28.535**
(11.753)
Yes
0.240
493
aStandard errors in parenthesis. Errors are clustered by individual.
To better understand the difference between the theoretical predictions and actual
search decisions, we turn to our data on beliefs. Recall that in each period, we asked
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(3)
-9.229**
(4.579)
-1.508
(5.314)
0.506**
(0.219)
34.940***
12.17
Yes
0.206
493
the principals to predict the search intensity of the agent in the case of kept control
and delegation. Using this information, we construct the theoretical best response to
beliefs across all three treatments:
100Pof - ebelieffpa
EER = 50 (3.15)50
where ebelief is the principal's belief of the agents search intensity, Pp is the difference
between the payment he receives when his preferred project is selected and the outside
option, and Pa is the difference between the payment he receives when the agent's
preferred project is selected and the outside option.
In our theoretical model, the principal's action should be perfectly predicted by a
best response to his beliefs. In order to test this prediction, we estimate:
Ei,t = Oco + E at + OBREBR + SSingleSingle + 8HighIHigh + fA.HighIA.High. (3.16)
We predict that 3 BR = 1 and that all variation between treatments are subsumed
into this variable (/High = 1A.High = 0).
Column (2) of Table 3.4 presents the search intensity regression from Equation
3.16. While our theoretical prediction of 3 BR = 1 is rejected, much of the variation
across treatments is explained by a best response of actions to the principals beliefs.
Note that even with beliefs taken into account, actions in the single game still have a
large effect on the final outcome. This may in part be due to heterogeneity, in which
a subset of our subjects either (i) do not update their actions in response to their
beliefs or (ii) put a high probability weight on the agent putting in zero effort.
One concern with studying the search intensity of the principal is that the compo-
sition of individuals who chose to delegate across treatments may differ. An advantage
of using the strategy method for the agents, is that there is no selection in their search
decisions. As such, we turn to analyzing their search decisions next.
Result 2 For the agent with control rights, the difference in search intensity between
the High and Low alignment treatments match the theoretical predictions in both sign
and magnitude. In contrast to the theory, the search intensity in the A.High treatment
are closer to the High treatment rather than the Low treatment.
Column (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 report identical regressions for the agent as those
done for the principal in Table 3.4 above. As with the principal, the difference in
search intensity between the Low and High treatments are both the right sign and
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Table 3.5: Agents's Search Intensity with Decision Rightsa
(1) (2) (3)
High -11.485*** -10.215*** -10.166*
(3.210) (3.025) (5.446)
A.High -9.446*** -9.495*** -8.708
(3.090) (3.134) (6.731)
Best Response to Beliefs 0.126 0.304
(0.114) (0.205)
Single 0.812*** 0.806***
(0.064) (0.067)
Constant 68.901*** 61.955*** 53.039***
(2.066) (6.561) (11.725)
Period Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 2  0.549 0.551 0.093
Observations 700 700 700
aStandard errors in parenthesis. Errors are clustered by individual.
magnitude, but the search intensity of the A.High treatment is similar to the High
treatment instead of the Low treatment.
In the Principal's regression, beliefs about the action of the agent largely influence
the Principal's effort. For the agent, however, it is idiosyncratic differences in their
actions in the single player game that is the main driver of heterogeneity across agents.
The next section provides some evidence as to why both beliefs and the search levels
of the single player game both factor into final search intensities.
Search Decisions without Control Rights
An immediate question that arises from the previous analysis is whether the beliefs
from the principal and the agent with control rights are consistent with the true
actions of the agent without control rights. We answer this question by looking at
the actions of the principal or agent without control rights, which we refer to as the
subordinate for the remainder of the analysis. Likewise, we refer to the individual
who has decision rights as the superior.
The left hand side of Table 3.6 reports the average search intensity of the subor-
dinate under P-Formal and A-Formal authority as well as the percentage of time zero
search intensity was selected. Striking in this chart is the relatively large percentage
of subordinates that put in zero search in each period. Recall that the cost for search
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is convex with C'(0) = 0. Since incremental search is nearly costless, zero search is
never predicted by the Nash Equilibrium.
Result 3 A large number of individuals without control rights put in zero search
intensity. This is never a best response to the Superior's search efforts.
Table 3.6: Search Intensities of Subordinates and Beliefs of the Superior
Action of Subordinates Beliefs of Superiors
P-Formal A-Formal P-Formal A-Formal
Average %Zero Average %Zero Average %Zero Average %Zero
Low 16.3 43.8% 14.2 59.4% 29.1 26.4% 21.8 31.0%
High 27.5 27.1% 17.5 39.5% 40.3 9.0% 29.1 22.7%
A.High 18.6 40.0% 22.5 46.4% 29.7 19.2% 19.6 38.7%
Given the large amount of time that the Principal chooses zero search after dele-
gating, it is not a huge surprise that the decisions in the single player version of the
search game is such a strong predictor of search in an A-Formal authority structure.
If the Agent correctly estimates that there is a high chance of matching with a prin-
cipal who puts in zero search, she selects a search level that is optimal in the single
player game.
While our beliefs data appears to underestimate the proportion of agents who put
in zero effort, it is important to note that we ask for a single point estimate rather than
a range or distribution. Thus, depending on how the individual interprets the beliefs
question, beliefs may be biased upward. This would be the case if, for instance,
the agent answered the belief question with her belief about the principals effort
conditional on effort being greater than zero.
3.4.2 Gender Differences in Search
Contrary to our theoretical predictions, search intensities in the A.High treatment
tracked closer to the Low treatment when the principal kept control and the High
treatment when control rights were delegated. In this section we show that a large
portion of this effect is driven by gender. We find that as agents, the search intensities
of women in the A.High treatment violates our theoretical prediction while the search
intensities of men are consistent. These systematic differences also exist in the beliefs
of the principal, suggesting that men and women view the incentive conflict in the
A.High treatment differently.
138
As will be pointed out in the next section, the decision to delegate differed sig-
nificantly between genders. As such, the sample of male and female principals who
are making effort choices under P-Formal and A-Formal authority are likely to differ.
We therefore concentrate solely on the actions of the agent and the beliefs of the
principal, both captured via the strategy method.
Table 3.7 shows search intensities of the agent by gender in the case of the principal
keeping control and delegating. As can be seen in the P-Formal columns, females put
in significantly more effort in the High treatment than in the other two treatments,
while males put in more more effort in the High and A.High treatments. As seen in the
A-Formal columns, males put in lower effort levels in the High treatment while females
put in lower effort in both the High and A.High treatments. For men, the pattern
of effort choices across both P-Formal and A-Formal authority are consistent with
the predictions from Hypothesis 2 & 3. For women, effort in the A.High treatment is
lower than predicted.
Table 3.7: Search Intensities of Agents by Gender
P-Formal A-Formal Observations
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Low 15.2 17.6 68.4 74.7 110 100
High 23.5 31.4 55.2 61.0 170 170
A.High 21.0 16.4 65.9 60.1 70 80
Result 4 The response by agents in the A.High treatment varies by gender. Men re-
spond to the A.High treatment with search intensities consistent with the Nash Equi-
librium. Women respond to the A.High treatment with lower effort than predicted
both when the principal keeps authority and when it is delegated.
A large part of our data, especially under P-Formal authority, has values in the
bottom quartile of the variable range. This creates the potential that a small number
of outliers may be driving our results. To formally test for differences across treat-
ments, therefore, we employ a clustered version of the Rank-Sum Test developed by
Datta & Satten (2005). This test is a direct extension of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxen
test to clustered data without the need for averaging prior to analysis. Analysis using
the median search intensity by individuals yields similar (slightly stronger) results.
Table 3.8 reports the two tailed probability that the pairwise treatment groups
differ. While our sample size is small when the data is segmented by both treatment
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Table 3.8: Pairwise Rank-Sum Tests of Search Intensity by Treatment
P-Formala A-Formal
Male Female Male Female
Low vs. A.High .435 .911 Low vs. A.High .748 .214
High vs. A.High .760 .129 High vs. A.High .129 .946
aClustered Rank-Sum Test using the procedure developed in Datta & Satten (2005)
and gender, there is some evidence that men and women respond to the asymmetric
treatment differently.
There are a few possible explanations for this pattern of search intensities. One
possibility, based purely on selection, is that the random sample of females in the
A.High treatment is not representative. While a larger sample will reduce this possi-
bility, beliefs data from the principals in the experiment shows that this explanation
is unlikely. Table 3.9 shows the beliefs of the principal if he keeps authority and
if he delegates. As with the actual actions of the agent, women believe that effort
choices in the A.High treatment will be similar to the Low treatment under P-Formal
authority and similar to the High treatment under A-Formal authority. This is the
reverse of what is predicted from our theoretical model.
Table 3.9: Beliefs of Principal by Gender
P-Formal A-Formal Observations
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Low 34.1 23.3 62.0 68.3 120 90
High 38.1 31.1 57.7 52.4 180 160
A.High 33.6 22.3 66.8 55.6 80 70
A more likely reason for the gender difference is heterogeneous preferences for
fairness and efficiency. In the A.High treatment, the difference in payments between
the principal and agent under both P-Formal and A-Formal authority is greater in
the A.High treatment when compared to both the Low and High treatments. If pref-
erences between fairness and efficiency differ between genders, with females putting
more weight on fairness, theory would predict that the search intensity of females
would be reduced under both authority structures in the A.High treatment. This
theory would also predict a larger change in search intensities between the Low and
High treatment for women, a result also consistent with our data.
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3.4.3 Delegation Decisions
Our initial experimental design predicted that with optimal search decisions, the
principal has incentive to keep authority in the Low treatment and delegate authority
in the High and A.High treatments. In this section, we study the delegation decision
in detail. We start by confirming that given the actual search intensities of the agent,
a principal who is maximizing expected value would choose to keep authority in the
Low treatment and delegate in the High and A.High treatments. We then analyze
the delegation decisions of the principal and relate these findings back to gender and
beliefs.
Optimal Delegation
In order to verify that the delegation predictions of our experimental design hold in
the actual experiment, we look at the best response of the principal given that he
knows the average search intensities of the agent within the treatment. Table 3.10
shows the actual average search intensity of the agent, 6 and the best response to
that search intensity, EBR(6), under P-Formal and A-Formal authority. As can be
seen from the right hand columns, the expected value for keeping authority is higher
in the Low treatment and lower in the High and A.High treatments.
Table 3.10: Principal's Best Response to Actual Agent Effort Levels
P-Formal A-Formal Expected Values
6 EBR() 6d EBR(6d) EVp EVpd
Low 16.3 55 71.4 15 19.7 17.9
High 27.5 45 58.1 25 22.2 26.1
A.High 18.6 50 62.8 20 21.1 26.9
While we have verified our experimental design using the optimal responses to the
agents actions, it is interesting to note that our predictions are true even if we take
into account (i) deviations from the best response after delegation and (ii) differences
between beliefs and actual actions. Our predictions that delegation is optimal in the
High and A.High treatments still hold if we repeat our analysis from Table 3.10 using
any combination of the following changes:
1. Instead of the principal best responding to beliefs after delegation, we assume
the principal puts in zero effort any time he chooses to delegate.
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2. We use average beliefs of the principal instead of actual search intensities of the
agent.
3. We use average beliefs of only the principals who do not delegate.
4. We use average beliefs of only males or females.
Figure 3-2, which shows the difference in search intensity observed versus the
Nash Equilibrium, gives intuition as to why our delegation predictions are robust.
Notice that when the control right is kept, E > ENE and 6 < eNE. Under P-Formal
authority, the decrease in ý by the agent leads to a decrease in expected value for the
principal. When control rights are delegated, however, Ed < EdNE and ad > edNE
In the High and A.High treatment, even though the principal puts in too little effort
when compared to the best response BRP,(d), the increase in effort from the agent
more than compensates for this suboptimal response. In the Low treatment, high
effort by the agent leads to a maximum of 20 points, which does not adequately
compensate the principal for the loss of control.
Figure 3-2: Difference Between Actual Effort and Nash Equilibrium Prediction by
Delegation Decision
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The finding that ý < eNE and ýd > edNE are consistent with our behavioral
prediction of positive and negative reciprocity. When the principal keeps authority,
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reciprocity would predict that the agent punishes the principal with lower effort.
Likewise, when the principal delegates to the agent, the agent rewards the principal
with higher effort. Under this hypothesis, the increased punishment and decreased
reward of the agent in the A.High treatment may be due to a difference in expectations
about what the agent would do in the principal's position. In the high treatment,
keeping control rights may be viewed as the expected action while delegation could
be perceived as a friendly gesture. In the A.High treatment, delegating control rights
may be seen as the expected action with kept control rights could be perceived as a
hostile action.
An alternative hypothesis is that the act of delegation in some way signals the
principals type. Given the high percentage of principal's who put in zero effort after
delegation, it may be that the agent believes they will be matched with this type of
principal if delegation occurs. This would lead to similar predictions as reciprocity,
since different treatments may have a different subset of principals choosing to dele-
gate and remain.9
Irrespective of the reason for the deviation from Nash equilibrium, the increase in
effort by the agent after delegation leads to a higher expected earning for delegation in
the High and A.High treatments. Deviations from our predicted pattern of delegation,
therefore, are true violations of theory and not a direct result of violations in the sub-
game. To test for violations, we use a simple regression estimating the proportion of
delegation across treatments. We estimate:
Delegationi,t = 6ao + ýHighIHigh + /A.HighIA.High. (3.17)
With a linear regression, our estimates would be 3 High = fA.High = 1 and the constant,
representing the low treatment equal to zero. In a probit specification which takes
into account the discrete nature of our dependent variable, estimates are in terms of
deviations from the mean and thus we expect /High = 1A.High >> 0 and the constant
to be strictly below zero.
Actual Delegation
Column (1) and (2) of Table 3.11 reports the linear and probit regressions for Equation
3.17 respectively. While column (2) is the correct specification and will be used for
extensions, the coefficients on the linear version of the regression are easier to interpret
9In future experiments we plan to isolate the effects by creating some randomness in the delegation
decision. This will allow us to distinguish signals versus reciprocity.
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and thus will be discussed here.
Table 3.11: Delegation Decisions by Principal
(1) (2) (3) .(4)
Linear Probit Probit Probit
High 0.198*** 0.641*** 0.642*** 0.778***
(0.067) (0.219) (0.207) (0.234)
A.High 0.221** 0.703** 0.713** 0.748**
(0.099) (0.290) (0.292) (0.311)
Female 0.376* 0.345*
(0.206) (0.208)
Belief under P-Formal -0.009*
(0.005)
Belief under A-Formal 0.009*
(0.006)
Constant 0.152*** -1.026*** -1.212*** -1.572***
(0.038) (0.162) (0.174) (0.477)
Adj. R2  0.040
Psuedo-R2  .038 .054 .087
Observations 700 700 700 700
Looking at the linear specification in Column (1), notice first that the constant in
the linear specification is significantly greater than zero. In over 15% of our observa-
tions in the Low treatment, the principal delegated to the agent. This is surprising,
given that even under an effort choice of 100 by the agent, the principal is worse
off in delegating than his expected value playing a single player game. One possible
interpretation of this result is that we have created an experimental demand effect in
this treatment by giving principals an option that they never are expected to take.
However, given that delegation differs by gender, we view this as unlikely.
The second interesting result, is that the delegation levels of the principal and the
agent in the High and A.High treatments are far lower than predicted. In the High and
A.High treatments, delegation occurred in only 35% and 37.3% of cases respectively.
This low level of delegation is surprising, especially since the principal accurately
predicts the effort levels of the agent under P-Formal and A-Formal authority.
To better understand the deviation of our prediction, we look at delegation deci-
sion by gender. Figure 3-3 shows the percentage of delegation divided by gender and
treatment. Notice that in both the Low and High treatment, females are significantly
more likely to delegate than males. This pattern is reversed in the A.High treatment,
but the difference is not significant due to the size of our asymmetric sample. A joint
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test that the delegation decision of men and women are the same across all treatments
is rejected at the .05 level.
Figure 3-3: Delegation by Gender
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Result 5 Women delegate more than men. This difference in delegation is due in
part to more pessimistic beliefs about the effort choices of the agent under P-Formal
authority.
As with a growing literature on gender and competition, it appears that some of
our difference in delegation can be explained by a difference of beliefs across genders.
As we saw in table 3.9, females (correctly) predict that the agent will work less under
P-Formal authority than predicted by theory. In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.11,
we include gender and beliefs in our analysis of delegation. When beliefs are not
taken into account, there is some evidence that females are more likely to delegate
across treatments. Differences in beliefs across genders account for roughly 15% of
this effect with the other 85% unexplained in our current data set.
3.5 Conclusion
We develop a new experimental design to study authority, delegation and incentives.
Our results show that in many respects, the model of formal and real authority de-
veloped by Aghion & Tirole (1997) has some power in predicting how individuals
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respond to incentive conflicts. As predicted by theory, increased alignment of prefer-
ences leads to increased effort by agents and decreased effort by the principal, which
translates into more influence for the agent in group decisions. Different from theory,
an increase in congruence for the subordinate leads to an increase in the subordinates
effort, especially for women. One potential reason for this effect is heterogeneity in
the preference for fairness and efficiency, a hypothesis worth exploring in future work.
We have shown that the agents effort choices are strongly influenced by the del-
egation decision, with greater effort than predicted by the Nash equilibrium when
delegation occurs and less effort than predicted when the principal maintains control.
Consistent with the expanding literature on the hidden cost of control, these differ-
ences in effort across authority structures increase the value of delegating. Unlike
other studies, we find that the principals in our experiment do not take advantage of
these differences in effort and keep authority when it is optimal to delegate. This is
even more surprising since the principal correctly forecast the agents' actions. Given
the importance on the optimal transfer of control rights to the incomplete contract-
ing literature, a more careful analysis of the forces generating inefficient delegation is
warranted.
Finally, our results provide evidence of gender differences that is consistent to the
larger experimental literature on gender and competition. We find that much of the
gender difference in delegation is a result of different beliefs about the agents effort
choices. In our experiment, men tend to overestimate the level of search conducted
by the agent while women's beliefs tend to be close to actual levels. This difference
in beliefs explains some, but not all, of the difference in delegation across gender.
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Instructions for Participant A
You are about to participate in a scientific study. A research foundation has provided
funds for conducting this research. Please read the following instructions carefully. The
instructions inform you about everything you need to know to participate in the study. If
you do not understand something, please raise your hand and wait for an instructor, he
will answer the question at your terminal.
For participating in this study and arriving on time, you have already earned a show up
fee of 10 Swiss Francs. During the study you may receive additional money by earning
Points. The amount of points you earn during the study will depend on your decisions
and the decisions of other participants.
All points that you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss Francs at the end of
the experiment. The conversion rate is
10 Points = 1 Swiss Franc
At the end of the study you will receive the amount of money that you earned
during the experiment plus the 10 Swiss francs show up fee.
During the study, it is strictly forbidden to communicate with each other. In addition,
please use only the functions on the computer which relate directly to the study.
Communication or using the computer in a way unrelated to the study will lead to
exclusion from the study. If you have questions we are happy to assist you.
This study consists of two parts:
Part 1:
The first part of the study lasts for 7 periods. The first two of these are practice
periods and won't be paid. In this part of the study you make decisions on your own
and your decisions have no consequences for other participants. Equally, the
decisions of the other participants have no consequences for you.
Part 2:
The second part of the study lasts for 10 periods. In the second part of the study,
you and the rest of the participants have been divided into two groups: Participant
As and Participant Bs.
During the whole study you will be a Participant A.
In each period you will be matched with a different participant from group B. At no
time will you or any other participant be informed of the identity of the individuals
that you match with.
The detailed instructions of part 1 and part 2 of this experiment are similar. For this
reason, the instructions will first explain how to play the game in the second part of the
study. At the end of the instructions, the specific details about the first part will be given.
Summary of Part 2
In this part of the study you will be matched with a different participant from group B in
each of 10 periods. In each period, you and the other participant have the task of
picking a single card out of 35 possible choices. Initially, all but one of these cards will
be shuffled and turned faced down so that you and Participant B can not see their
location. A single Green Card will remain face up.
The 34 cards that are face down contain:
1. The Red Card
2. The Blue Card
3. 32 Blank Cards
Each period has the following steps:
1. Step 1 -Keep or Transfer the Decision Right: In each period, as Participant A
you have the right to decide the card chosen at the end of the period.
* You may keep the right
* Or you can transfer the right to Participant B. In this case, Participant B has
the right to decide the card position chosen at the end of the period.
2. Step 2 - Search: After you either kept or transferred the decision right to
Participant B, you and Participant B can, separately from each other and at a
cost, search for the Red and Blue Cards.
* If your search is successful, you will be informed about the positions of the
Red and Blue card.
* If your search is unsuccessful, all cards but the Green card remain covered.
The same conditions apply to participant B. However, you will not be informed
about the success of B's search. Equally, B will not be informed about the
success of your search.
3. Step 3 - Recommendation: The participant without decision right can
recommend a card position to the other participant. The recommendation will be
transmitted to the participant who holds the decision right, before he makes his
decision.
4. Step 4- Card Selection: The participant with decision right chooses a card.
5. Step 5 - Income: You and participant B are informed about your incomes in
this period.
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Detailed Description
The Setup
The screen below shows the cards at the beginning of each period. 35 cards are
reshuffled in each period and place at a random position. Only the Green Card's
location remains fixed at position 18 and is initially visible to you and participant B:
The Cards
In each round there are four kinds of cards: (1) The Green Card, (2) The Red Card, (3)
The Blue Card, and (4) 32 Blank Cards. At the start of each period, all but the green
card are randomly shuffled and placed face down at random positions. At the end of
each period, you or Participant B chooses one of these Card Positions. The card
selected has payment consequences for you and participant B:
* Blanks: You and participant B get 0 points.
* The Blue Card: You get 35 points, Participant B gets 40 points
* The Red Card: You get 40 points, Participant B gets 35 points
* The Green Card: You get 10 points, Participant B gets 10 points
Card Overview
Blue
Red
Green
Blank
Your Eamings Eamings Participant B
35 40
40 35
10 10
0 0
Step 1: You can transfer or keep the decision right
Either you or participant B chooses a card position at the end of the period. The chosen
card determines the earnings of you as well as participant B. At the beginning of each
period you hold the decision right. You can
* Keep the decision right
* Transfer the decision right
If you keep the decision right, you make the final decision about the chosen card. If you
transfer the right, Participant B makes this decision.
Step 2: The search for cards
In each period, you can search for the Blue and the Red cards. If your search is
successful, all cards will be turned and you will be able to see the positions of
the Red and Blue Card. If your search is unsuccessful you will, as before, only know
the position of the Green Card. All other cards remain covered.
Participant B also has the possibility to search for the Red and the Blue Card. Your
search and the search of Participant B are completely independent from each other.
You will not be informed as to whether participant B searched successfully, and
Participant B does not know whether you searched successfully.
If, for example, participant B searched successfully but you did not, only participant B is
informed about the position of the Red and the Blue Card. You do not receive this
information.
How does search work?
You and Participant B can independently choose a search intensity between 0 and
100. The search intensity equals exactly the probability, with which all cards are
turned.
S0 Search Intensity 5 100
A search intensity of 0 means that the cards will be NEVER tumed. A search intensity
of 100 means that the cards will be ALWAYS turned. For intermediate values it may
happen that the cards are tumed or not
Card OverviewCard
The cost of search
The higher you choose the search intensity, the higher are your costs. The costs of
participant B are identical to your costs. The following table shows the costs for every
possible search intensity. It is only possible to choose search intensities in increments
of 5.
Search intensity 0 5 10 15 20 25 130 135 40 45 50
Costs in points 0 .06 .25 .56 1 1.56 2.25 3.06 4 5.06 6.25
Search intensity 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Costs in points 7.56 9 10.56 12.25 14.06 16 18.06 20.25 22.56 25
Please always consider this table when you choose search intensities. Your
costs will remain the same throughout the experiment.
The higher you choose the search intensity, the more likely it is that the cards will be
turned and you are informed about the position of the Red and the Blue Card. But your
costs are also higher, the higher you choose the search intensity
The Success of Search:
Based on your chosen search intensity, the computer will determine whether search is
successful as follows:
Your chosen search intensity is between 0 and 100. The computer then randomly
draws one out of a hundred balls, which are numbered from 1 to 100. If the drawn
number is smaller or equal your chosen search intensity, all cards will be turned. If the
number is larger then your search intensity, no card will be tumed. Hence, the search
intensity equals exactly the probability with which all cards will be turned.
Examples:
1. You choose a search intensity of 15:
If the randomly drawn ball has a number between 1 and 15 (=15 out of 100
balls) all cards will be turned. If the number is larger than 15 (16-100, and
therefore 85 balls), no cards will be turned.
2. You choose a search intensity of 75:
If the randomly drawn ball has a number between 1 and 75 (=75 out of 100
balls) all cards will be turned. If the number is larger than 75 (76-100, and
therefore 15 balls), no cards will be turned.
At no point in time will you be informed about the search intensity of participant B.
Equally, participant will ever be informed about your search intensity.
If your search was successful, all cards will be tumed and you know the positions of the
Red and the Blue cards. You will then see the following screen (example):
Step 3: The recommendation
After the search, the participant without decision right can recommend a card position
to the other participant.
* If you transferred the decision right, you can send a recommendation to
Participant B.
* If you kept the decision right, Participant B will send a recommendation to you.
Depending on whether the recommender's search was successful, he will either be
informed and know the location of all the cards or be uninformed and know the position
of only the Green Card. Independent of this information, he can recommend any
position.
The participant with decision right is only informed about the recommended card
position, and not, which card it is.
Example: The following screen shows how the recommendation is transmitted to the
participant with decision right. (In the shown example the search of the participant with
decision right was unsuccessful):
Step 4: Choosing a card
The participant with decision right can decide at the end of each period, which card is
chosen.
* If you kept the decision right, you make this decision.
* If you transferred the decision right, participant B makes this decision.
If the search of the participant with decision right has been successful, he knows the
position of the Red and the Blue card. If search was unsuccessful, he does not know
these positions. In addition, he knows the recommendation of the other participant.
The participant with decision right can then, with this information, choose a card and
the participants earn the points associated with that card minus the costs of search.
Step 5: The Incomes
The income of both participants is determined by the following two parts:
* The income associate with the chosen card
* Minus the costs of search
Income in a period = Income from chosen Card - Costs of search
Notice:
In each period you may make losses! These losses will be subtracted from your show
up fee.
You make a loss in a period if your search costs exceed your eamings from the chosen
card.
Example: Assume you chose a search intensity of 50. This costs 6.3 points. Assume
further, that the participant with decision right chooses a Blank. Your eamings from the
card is 0. Hence, your income in that period would be -6.3.
Summary of one Round
1) At the beginning of every period you decide, whether you want to transfer the
decision right to participant B or whether you want to choose a card yourself.
2) Thereafter you and participant B can, independent of each other and at a cost,
search for the position of the Red and the Blue Cards.
3) Both participants are informed about the success of their own search. They do
not get any information about the search and the success of the other
participant.
4) The participant without decision right can recommend a card position to the
participant with decision right
5) The participant with decision right receives the recommendation of the other
participant. Thereafter he can choose the final card.
6) The earnings associated with the chosen card are realized, and you and
participant B are informed about your incomes.
7) You are randomly matched with another participant B, and a new round starts.
The first part of the study:
1) In the first part of the study, you are NOT in a group with a participant B. Hence,
you always have the right to decide, which card is chosen. You cannot transfer it.
2) In each period you choose a search intensity, to find the positions of the Blue
and the Red card. The cost of search and the earnings associated with the cards
are identical to the second part of the study.
3) You are informed about the success of your search and you can choose a card.
Since there is no second participant, there is also no recommendation.
4) The earnings associated with the chosen card are realized. Only the payment to
you (participant A) is relevant. Since there is no participant B, only your points
are paid out.
5) The first two periods are for practice purposes only, so you can get familiar with
the program. You earnings from these two periods will not be paid out. Your
income from the following 5 periods, together with your income from the 10
periods in the second part of the study, will be paid out to you at the end of the
study.
Control Questions:
Please answer the following control questions. Write down all calculations you
make. If you have questions, please contact an instructor.
1. You kept the decision right and you chose a search intensity of 80. Your search was
successful. Participant B recommended to you to choose the Green Card (position 18).
You decided to choose the RED Card.
What are your search costs? .......
What is your final income? .......
2. You kept the decision right and you chose a search intensity of 30. Your search was
unsuccessful. Participant B recommended to you to choose position 32. You decided to
choose position 32. It is the BLUE Card.
What are your search costs? .......
What is your final income? .......
3. You kept the decision right and you chose a search intensity of 30. Your search was
unsuccessful. Participant B recommended to you to choose position 24. You decided to
choose position 28. It is a BLANK.
What are your search costs? .......
What is your final income? .......
4. You transferred the decision right and you chose a search intensity of 40. Your
search was successful. You recommend position 23 to participant B (the RED card).
Participant B chooses position 27. It is the BLUE Card.
What are your search costs? .......
What is your final income? .......
5. You transferred the decision right and you chose a search intensity of 40. Your
search was successful. You recommend position 7 to participant B (the RED card).
Participant B chooses position 7. It is the RED Card.
What are your search costs? .......
What is your final income? .......
3.6.2 Summary Statistics
1. Session:
(a) Sessions 1-4 are Low treatments.
(b) Sessions 5-11 are High treatments.
(c) Sessions 12-14 and A.High treatments.
2. E,Ed: Average effort of the principal conditional on no delegation and delega-
tion.
3. e,ed: Average effort of the agent if the principal under no delegation and dele-
gation. Elicited by Strategy Method.
4. Principal: Male Female Total number of male and female principals in a
session.
5. Agent: Male Female Total number of male and female agents in a session.
6. % Delegation Percentage of periods in which control rights were delegated to
the agent.
7. Single Average effort exerted in the single player version of the game.
Table 3.12: Summary Statistics for Low Treatments
P-Formal A-Formal Principals Agents
Session E e Ed Ed Male Female Male Female % Delegation Single
1 65 8.2 15 76.9 4 2 2 4 6.7 67.9
2 57.1 25.0 24.3 68.7 3 2 3 2 14.0 58.8
3 56.1 19.1 7.5 68.3 2 3 4 1 28.0 60.8
4 69.9 14.6 17.2 70.6 3 2 2 3 14.0 67.2
Total 62.6 16.3 14.2 71.4 12 9 11 10 15.2 64.1
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Table 3.13: Summary Statistics for High Treatments
Principals
Male Female
0 5
3 2
2 3
4 1
3 2
3 2
3 1
Agents
Male Female
2 3
4 1
2 3
2 3
1 4
4 1
2 2
% Delegation
68.0
28.0
34.0
26.0
10.0
42.0
37.5
Total 46.0 18.6 17.3 58.1 18 16 17 17 35.0 58.9
Table 3.14: Summary Statistics for A.High Treatments
P-Formal A-Formal Principals Agents
E e Ed Ed Male Female Male Female
61.3 11.8 8.3 73.7 2 3 3 2
54.5 29.5 14.0 63.0 2 3 2 3
53.9 14.4 41.8 61.8 4 1 2 3
56.6 18.6 22.5 62.8 8 7 7 8
% Delegation Single
48.0 59.9
20.0 56.9
44.0 63.4
37.3 60.0
Table 3.15: Avg Search in Single Player Game
Principal Agent
Low 68.4 63.5
High 59.2 61.3
A.High 59.2 64.2
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Session
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
P-Formal
E e
33.4 21.6
38.5 20.9
52.4 35.5
43.8 42.5
45.2 39.6
57.6 15.5
48.0 14.1
A-Formal
Ed Ed
15.3 44.8
7.9 62.0
13.5 64.0
12.3 66.1
36.0 57.3
24.5 63.3
22.7 47.3
Single
46.9
57.2
58.1
73.1
57.1
61.6
58.0
Session
12
13
14
Total
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